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**ABSTRACT**

**THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT AND THE JOINT DUTY PROMOTION  
REQUIREMENT:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MILITARY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF A  
CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE**

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George Mason University, 2004

Dissertation Committee Chair: Dr. James P. Pfiffner

Under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, several changes were instituted by Congress in an effort to reform the U.S. military. Title IV, Joint Officer Management, of the Act was aimed at reforming the officer development of the services in an effort to eliminate the parochial service dispositions that had previously plagued U.S. military efforts. Title IV instituted policies to provide officers with joint education and joint experience in an effort to develop officers with a multi-service or joint perspective. In an effort to provide senior officers with joint experience, all officers promoted to the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral (O7) must have completed a joint duty assignment prior to promotion. This dissertation looks specifically at the joint duty promotion requirement instituted under Title IV in an effort to analyze the U.S. military's ability to implement a congressional mandate.

The implementation of the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement has been a source of concern for both the services and congressional policymakers.

The services have maintained that the joint duty assignment is a difficult requirement to meet for all officers promoted to O7. Congressional policymakers counter that argument saying that the services have refused ownership of joint officer development because it challenged their control over officer development. Previous studies have found officers able to avoid this requirement and still be promoted yet no empirical analysis exists of the implementation of this policy. This study examines the joint duty history of over 900 officers and uses tabular, analysis of variance, and regression analysis to determine if the services are behaving in a self serving manner within the implementation process by promoting officers without meeting this requirement.

The outcome of this study finds that the services are promoting their best officers without having fulfilled the joint duty promotion requirement indicating that the services are behaving in a self-interested way. However, the majority of officers are meeting this requirement and the promotion time between those that complied and did not comply with this requirement is not so large that it suggests all officers should be in compliance with this policy.

This research contributes to the study of congressional reform of the military and serves as an example of the military's ability to implement congressionally instituted policies.

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REQUIREMENT:  
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MILITARY'S IMPLEMENTATION OF A  
CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

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## **DEDICATION**

To those that seek to improve the performance of the U.S. military.

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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

CF	Career Field
Comm	Commissioning Source
COS	Critical Occupational Specialty
DoD	Department of Defense
DOPMA	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
ED	Education
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GNA	Goldwater-Nichols Act
JDA	Joint Duty Assignment
JDAL	Joint Duty Assignment List
JOM	Joint Officer Management
JSO	Joint Specialty Officer
JTF	Joint Task Force
MRC	Military Review Committee
TTBG	Time to Brigadier General
TTBG0407	Time to Brigadier General field grade time
TTBG0607	Time to Brigadier General for O6
UCC	Unified Combatant Command
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
YOS	Years of Service

## MILITARY RANK

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Army/AF/Marines</u>	<u>Navy</u>
O1	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Ensign
O2	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Lieutenant J.G.
O3	Captain	Lieutenant
O4	Major	Lt. Commander
O5	Lt. Colonel	Commander
O6	Colonel	Captain
O7	Brigadier General	Rear Admiral (L)
O8	Major General	Rear Admiral (U)
O9	Lt. General	Vice Admiral
O10	General	Admiral
Company Grade Officer	O1-O3	
Field Grade Officer	O4-O6	
Senior Rank	O7-O10	

**DISCLAIMER**

The views expressed in this evaluation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

## **Chapter One—Introduction**

Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 with the intention of improving the U.S. military's ability to operate in an integrated or "joint" manner. Title IV, Joint Officer Management Program, of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, established the regulations and guidelines that govern an officer's joint development. With military successes in Panama, the two Iraqi wars, Bosnia, and Kosovo having demonstrated the U.S. military's ability to operate in a joint fashion, many civilian and military officials assert that "jointness" is firmly entrenched in the U.S. military. Critical to these and future military successes is joint competence among the military's officer corps. Congress implemented joint officer development policies, such as joint duty requirements and mandatory joint education, in an effort to develop joint officer competence. However, the ability to implement these policies and the effectiveness of these programs put in place by Congress to cultivate joint officer development is still questioned seventeen years after the passage of the Act.

One policy in question is the joint duty assignment (JDA) as a promotion requirement for promotion to brigadier general/rear admiral (O7). Officers who served in joint duty prior to Goldwater-Nichols were in many cases unqualified for their duties since they either lacked staff experience or knowledge of the other services. Joint duty did not always attract the top officers from the services either. Congressional

policymakers codified into law the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement for general and flag officers under the Goldwater-Nichols Act for two primary reasons. First, joint duty as a promotion requirement would force the services to send their best officers, their future generals and admirals, to joint duty assignments thus improving the caliber of officers who serve in joint duty assignments. Joint duty assignments removed officers from their environment where they established their reputation and developed relationships with peers and colleagues who would be ultimately responsible for their promotion. Officers considered joint duty a possible threat to their promotion potential and in many cases tried to avoid it. Consequently, prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the services did not encourage their better officers to serve in joint duty but rather, these officers stayed within their service in order to get promoted. Second, senior officers needed joint duty experience in order to be effective leaders of U.S. forces. Modern warfare dictates that the success of the U.S. military would come from the combined efforts of the four services. Officers at the senior ranks responsible for the planning, integration, and combat employment of U.S. forces would require understanding and knowledge of all four services. Therefore, the joint duty assignment requirement would provide future senior officers with this joint duty experience.

The implementation of the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement has been a source of concern for both the services and congressional policymakers. Since the inception of Title IV, the services have maintained that the joint duty assignment is a difficult requirement to meet for all officers promoted to O7. The joint duty requirement was aimed at the combat arms officers or warfighters from each of the services since

these officers have predominantly filled the senior ranks of the four services.<sup>1</sup> All officers, especially combat officers, have a demanding set of service specific promotion requirements to meet in order to be competitive for promotion to O7. The additional requirement of a joint assignment further constricts an already crowded career path. Congressional policymakers counter that argument saying that the services have refused ownership of joint officer development because it challenged their control over officer development. Because the joint duty assignment challenges the officer development of the services, the services are viewed as reluctant partners in the implementation of this requirement. According to Stoker, the challenge of national governance is to gain the cooperation of reluctant partners involved in the implementation process.<sup>2</sup>

Congressional policymakers feel that the services have not taken it upon themselves to implement the joint duty policy in accordance with congressional desires. Recent studies discussed later in this paper have questioned the ability of officers to meet this requirement. These studies have found that the services are able to groom officers for promotion to brigadier general/rear admiral without meeting the joint duty requirement.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, joint duty assignments have become a ticket to be punched in order to be

---

<sup>1</sup> Combat arms/warfighting officers is used to describe officers who come from designated combat career fields according to the Critical Occupational Specialty categories outlined by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This is further defined in Chapter Six but subsequent references to combat officers or warfighters indicates that these officers are from the Combat Arms career fields in the Army and Marines; from the Unrestricted Line Officer career fields in the Navy; and the Rated career fields in the Air Force.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Phillip Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*, (Pitt Series in Policy and Institutional Studies. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991)p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Katherine Lemay Brown. "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," (National Defense Fellow: Congressional Research Service, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, June 2000), p. 31; See also United States. General Accounting Office, *Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Improve Joint Officer Development*. GAO 03-548T, March 19, 2003. and United States. General Accounting Office, *Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed*. GAO 03-238. December 19, 2002 .

promoted to O7 rather than an integral part of developing officers with a joint mindset. Consequently, joint duty assignments qualify officers for promotion to O7 without providing the experience intended.<sup>4</sup> This tends to diminish the importance of meeting the joint duty requirement. While Congress instituted joint duty as a promotion requirement, the services are ultimately responsible for implementing it. The irony of federal policy implementation is that while federal policy may challenge the interests or priorities of those that serve as key implementation participants, implementation empowers participants placing them strategically within the policy process. Implementation provides an opportunity for participants to pursue organizational or self-interests and to behave strategically within the implementation framework. When reluctant partners implement policy, the process empowers the implementing authorities who may discover and exploit opportunities for strategic, self-interested behavior.<sup>5</sup>

Within Title IV studies, no empirical analysis has been conducted examining service compliance with the joint duty promotion requirement. This analysis tries to determine if the services are exhibiting strategic behavior in their implementation of the joint duty promotion requirement. In other words, are the services implementing this requirement in a manner that benefits their own organizational, self interests or are they implementing it according to the guidelines of the law? Two aspects of the joint duty requirement are examined in order to evaluate the implementation of this mandate. First,

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<sup>4</sup> Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Education, McClean, Virginia: Booz-Allen Hamilton, March 17, 2003. Executive Summary, p. 9. Will be referred to as Booz-Allen Hamilton Report in subsequent references

<sup>5</sup> Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 4; See also Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game : What Happens after a Bill Becomes a Law*. (5<sup>th</sup> Edition Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), p. 9.

the level of compliance is measured to determine the extent of service compliance with this mandate. Second, the impact of joint duty on promotion times of officers promoted to O7 is measured to see how officers complying with this policy are affected. The assumption is that if the services are exhibiting strategic behavior, officers without joint duty would be promoted faster. Faster promotion time is indicative of better officers. If officers without joint duty are promoted faster, this would indicate the services are promoting their better officers without joint duty and value their service specific promotion requirements over joint requirements.

This analysis uses tabular, analysis of variance, and multivariate regression to evaluate the joint duty promotion requirement. A dataset containing the joint duty history and personnel records of 911 officers promoted to O7 from September 1981 to September 1985 and September 1997 to September 2001 was used for this analysis. The officers were divided into two subgroups based on their career field: combat and non-combat. Two aspects of joint duty were examined: compliance with the joint duty requirement and the effect of joint duty on officer promotion to O7. Tabular data was used to ascertain compliance while analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multivariate regression were used to measure the significance of joint duty on an officer's promotion time to O7.

ANOVA was chosen since it is the best method when groups of observations are created by a categorical independent variable. ANOVA allows a researcher to study the effect of a categorical variable, such as a joint duty on a quantitative variable, such as an officer's promotion time. Multivariate regression is also used to ensure the validity of the

ANOVA analysis and to determine the effects of these variables while controlling for other variables involved in an officer's promotion to O7. The same data analyzed using ANOVA can always be analyzed by regression analysis with suitably constructed dummy variables. Multivariate regression proves useful for models involving multiple variables as in the case of an officer's promotion.

This study finds officers are being promoted without joint duty and the difference in promotion times for those with and without joint duty is significant. Compliance with the joint duty requirement negatively impacts an officer in terms of time to promotion. The ultimate conclusion is that the services are exhibiting strategic, self interested behavior implementing the joint duty requirement in two ways. First, the services are promoting officers to O7 without meeting the joint duty requirement as put forth by Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Second, officers with the quickest promotion times are officers who have not fulfilled the joint duty promotion requirement indicating that better officers are promoted without joint duty.

A paradox and an inconsistency are identified within the implementation of this policy. The paradox is that a majority of officers are meeting the requirements of this policy and the difference in promotion times is not so vast between those with and without joint duty. Therefore, it would seem that all officers should be able to meet this requirement. The inconsistency is that the professional expertise of the services to develop their officers is acknowledged and accepted. Yet, the desire for service development sometimes seems to override the legal authority of Congress and its desire for joint officer development.

This study is limited in evaluating the effect of joint duty on officer promotions because only officers promoted to O7 are required to fulfill joint duty for promotion purposes. Officers that leave the service prior to O7 may or may not have fulfilled a joint duty assignment. Only officers that are designated as Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) are required to have a joint duty assignment prior to promotion to O7. This analysis therefore does not measure the effect that joint duty has for officers who fill joint duty assignments versus those who do not for O5 and O6 promotions. This study only analyzes joint duty as a promotion requirement to O7 in order to evaluate the implementation of this policy.

This analysis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two is a literature review of the relevant literature over the last 17 years that examines the success of Title IV. The literature used for this study draws from previous examinations of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and Title IV; relevant works on U.S. congressional-military relations; and federal policy implementation analyses. All three areas are addressed in the literature review to underscore the motivation for this study and to show that no empirical analysis of the joint duty policy has been conducted.

Although the Goldwater-Nichols Act is not the focus of this dissertation, the historical groundwork that motivated congressional policymakers to implement this policy is useful. Chapter Three provides an overview of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and then traces the roots of the joint duty assignment. Chapter Four discusses the problems associated with the implementation of the joint duty promotion requirement. Chapter Four looks at the relationship between Congress and the services, as well as the design of

the policy in an effort to describe the issues that have hampered the implementation of this requirement.

Chapter Five presents the conceptual model and theoretical underpinnings for understanding and analyzing this policy. At least two theoretical areas are discussed which provide the foundation for evaluating this policy: civilian control of the military and implementation theory. Congress has the authority to authorize reform of the military yet it can be argued lacks control over the implementation of these reforms. Stoker's notion of strategic behavior is also re-addressed in the context of implementation theory. The conceptual model is laid out by describing the variables of interest and their purpose in the analysis. From the conceptual model the hypotheses are derived. Two main hypotheses guide this research with an additional three sub-hypotheses that look at joint duty and its impact on officers from either combat or non-combat career fields.

Chapter Six describes the data and methods used in this research. As already discussed, tabular, ANOVA, and multivariate regression methods will be used to analyze a dataset containing 911 officers promoted to O7. Chapter Seven presents the data analysis and explains the findings of the research. The first section will examine compliance and the second section will examine the effect of joint duty on officer promotion. The findings will be discussed based on the data presented in the tables and in the context of answering each hypothesis.

Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter and amplifies the findings in this dissertation by examining service intent and non-compliance. The paradox and inconsistency discovered within the implementation of this policy are also briefly

discussed. These two discussion points provide the basis for future research and the policy implications that are also examined in this chapter.

## **Chapter Two—Literature Review**

This chapter provides an overview of the literature used in this research. The literature review section is divided into three parts. Section one discusses prior policy studies analyzing the impact of Title IV implementation. The focus of Title IV literature has primarily centered on flaws in policy design and the resulting consequences because of these flaws. Section two examines the literature that puts Goldwater-Nichols in the much broader context of military reform by describing congressional defense reform initiatives, congressional-military relations, U.S. military problems and inadequacies, and the post Goldwater-Nichols literature examining the effectiveness of the legislation. Section three examines federal policy implementation literature and focuses on the relationship between policymakers and implementing authorities and why implementation of Title IV has been fraught with difficulty.

### **Prior Research**

This review encompasses more than 20 different policy studies involving Title IV implementation by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Office of the Inspector General, Rand, individual researchers, military senior service school officers, and Booz-Allen Hamilton. The literature emerging from the military service schools can be broken down along services lines. Examination of Title IV on the officer corps is addressed by Coats, Soriano, Young, and Savage for Army officers; Koran and Cymrot

for Navy officers; Reid and Miller for Marine Officers; and Gatliff and Pruitt and Boggs, et al., for Air Force officers. In general, these studies scrutinize the design flaws of Title IV legislation to reveal the unintended consequences of its policies. Three broad themes emerge among the service distinctions that classify these studies: officer career management, careerism, and Title IV implementation problems. Congressionally directed studies also focus on these three areas, as well as provide comprehensive assessments of Title IV focusing on the problems with Title IV implementation problems.

### **Career Management**

Overall, the greatest challenge of Title IV according to Koran, Reid, Miller, Coats, Young, Gatliff, and Pruitt is integrating the requirements of the law with the personnel management procedures and the needs of the different services.<sup>6</sup> These works discuss the difficulty the services would have meeting the requirements of Title IV, particularly those involving officer professional development. Young claims that Title IV imposes too many requirements for officer professional development in too little time.<sup>7</sup> Both Cymrot and Savage claim that fulfilling the joint duty requirement for officer professional development will be too difficult under the current guidelines.<sup>8</sup> However,

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<sup>6</sup> John G. Koran, III, "Manpower Management for Joint Specialty Officers: A Comparative Analysis," (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1990).; Richard L. Miller, "Marine Corps Joint Assignment Model under Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986," (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1990).; James L. Reid, "The Marine Corps and the JSO," (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 1989).; Julius E. Coats, Jr., "Joint Duty Prerequisite for Promotion to O7," (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: March 1989).; Robert E. Gatliff and Mary C. Pruitt, "Title IV of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Hidden Impacts," (Air War College, Montgomery, AL, 1988).

<sup>7</sup> Terry J. Young, "Title IV-- Joint Officer Personnel Policy: A Peace Dividend is Required," (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 1992).

<sup>8</sup> Donald J. Cymrot, "Analysis of the Size of the Joint Duty Assignment List," (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1990).; Dennis M. Savage, "Joint Duty Prerequisite for Promotion to General/Flag Officer," (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 1992).

two Government Accounting Office (GAO) studies, *Proposals to Modify the Management of Officers Assigned to Joint Duty* and *Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths* published in April and June of 1988 counter claims that officers do not have enough time to meet service and joint requirements. These two studies both note that field grade officers from all services should be able to accomplish the three and a half year joint duty assignment given the current time spent in the field grade ranks. While there is seemingly ample time to accomplish the requirements of Title IV, these reports did find officers having trouble meeting JDA requirements without adversely affecting warfighting skills. The reports further note that Title IV requirements differed between the services and any reduction in the average time for a joint duty assignment needed to be considered in light of the impact of an officer's time away from warfighting duties, a service's desire for high quality officers to fill service staffs, and the availability of officers for command assignments.

Van Trees Medlock's, "A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership," offers a predictive analysis of how the joint officer requirement will affect the Army's future leadership. It is the first academic examination of Title IV mirroring the predictive nature of many of the policy studies during the early years of implementation. Van Trees Medlock tries to determine what effect the joint officer provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act will have on the Army's leadership mixture and how this possibly changes American officership. Overall, Van Trees Medlock finds the joint officer policies instituted under Title IV workable but with the potential to change the essence of U.S. armed forces senior leadership. Van

Trees Medlock uses Janowitz and Huntington as the theoretical underpinnings for her argument to contend that the core of the Armed Forces senior leadership will change from a warrior leader focus to a technical and managerial focus. She finds that Title IV had the unintended consequence of changing the make-up of the American senior military leadership away from its warfighter perspective to one that has a technology focus.<sup>9</sup> Officers who are involved in “troop time” assignments may not be able to meet the requirements of both Title IV and Army required professional development. Therefore, they might not meet their promotion requirements. On the other hand, officers who pursue the Joint Specialty Officer track may have greater promotional opportunities, which provides greater staff and joint experience but less warfighting experience.

Rand's *The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment and Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers* both provide an overview of an officer's timeline and expected flow to promotions. These studies present a comprehensive examination of the structure of the U.S. officer corps and required size of the U.S. military's officer corps in the post Cold War period and help to frame the joint duty requirement in light of an officer's promotion sequence. Rand's *Aligning the Stars: Improvements to General and Flag Officer Management* describes the demanding timeline for the U.S. military's senior leadership and provides an understanding of the timeline needed for these officers to reach the pinnacle of the U.S. military hierarchy.

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<sup>9</sup> Kathleen Van Trees Medlock, “A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership” (PhD Dissertation, George Mason University, 1993), pp. 157-8.

### **Careerism**

Literature also focused on the threat of careerism and the impact on officer professional development. Coats postulates that a major concern for the Army will be the threat of ticket punching as officers only seek joint duty to meet a requirement rather than for officer development. Gatliff and Pruitt predict that the joint duty assignment requirement will also lead to ticket punching by officers resulting in an unhealthy careerism in the officer corps. Career plateauing will also occur for those officers who are not selected for the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO) or do not meet the minimal joint requirements for promotion. These officers will likely leave the service early as they realize they are not on the right track for promotion. In contrast, Reid, in his examination of Title IV on the Marine Corps, finds that the concern over the development of a mandarin class of super careerist officers created by the JSO concept has not occurred and is unlikely to occur due to the prescriptive wording of the congressional reformers.

### **Title IV Implementation Problems**

Congressional policymakers feared the possibility that the services would treat Title IV as one large accounting drill to meet Title IV objectives. Young makes the point that joint officer development will suffer if personnel management of joint officers solely seeks to meet the statistical goals of legislation. Soriano states that adherence to Title IV is statistically driven and therefore, the intent of the law is not being met. To avoid the

pitfalls of officer management, Koran and Miller describe models that can help assignment officers better manage joint officer career paths.<sup>10</sup>

The Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) is often faulted as structurally deficient in providing the proper joint experience and appropriate joint opportunities for officers. According to Soriano and Koran, the ability to provide the proper joint experience, as intended by the law is complicated by the requirements of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Both authors claim that the right officer is not necessarily put in the right job on the JDAL. Coats and Soriano say that the problem with the JDAL stems from the limited amount of jobs available for combat officers. Both Cymrot and Reid find that the size of the JDAL is driven by the need to qualify as many officers as possible for promotion to general. However, Cymrot notes that many of the billets on the JDAL do not provide the experience needed or sought after by officers.

In 1996, the DoD commissioned Rand to conduct a study of the joint duty requirement in response to the problems identified primarily with the JDAL. Rand's report, *Identifying and Supporting the Joint Duty Assignment*, was the synthesis of two previous Rand reports. Rand approached the problem of joint officer development as a supply and demand problem concluding that the services were capable of supporting an even larger JDAL with a recommended 9900 joint duty assignments.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Edward Soriano, "Title IV-Joint Officer Personnel Policy Quality vs. Quantity," (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: March 1989).

<sup>11</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, John E. Schank, Harry J. Thie, "Identifying and Supporting the Joint Duty Assignment," (RAND Study MR-622 Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996); The two preceding Rand studies include Margaret C. Harrell, John E. Schank, Harry J. Thie, Clifford M. Graf II, and Paul Steinberg, "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," (RAND Study MR-593-JS Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). and Margaret C. Harrell, John E. Schank, Harry J. Thie, Clifford M. Graf II, and Paul

The demand side measured the joint content of the assignments on the JDAL to determine if they were appropriate for providing the requisite joint experience to officers. The study determined that all billets on the JDAL have some joint content but a significant number of Captain (O3) and in-service positions not on the JDAL also had significant joint content. Rand recommended that billets be rank ordered according to their job content and that DoD change its policy and allow O3s to receive joint credit. It further recommended that in-service billets for the ranks of O4 through O6 also be allowed joint credit.

The ability to get an officer the appropriate joint experience still proves to be a primary concern. Strange's work in 2001 finds that problems with JDAL and assigning the right officers to the right assignment still exist.<sup>12</sup> Harrell et al., in 2002 concluded that the Navy could support a larger JDAL if other external assignments, such as naval attaches, are added to the JDAL.<sup>13</sup> This would help qualify more naval officers for promotion to admiral.

There have been many unintended consequences for officers and their promotional opportunities as a result of Title IV. Brown found that the joint specialty officer does not meet the needs of either the service or the joint world. The most valuable item an officer can bring to the joint world is his or her service expertise. Joint specialty officers, trained in the joint world, do not cultivate their service expertise. This ironically

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Steinberg, "Who is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List," (RAND Study MR-574-JS Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

<sup>12</sup> Arthur A. Strange III, "Continued Pitfalls with Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act," (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 2001).

<sup>13</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, Harry J. Thie, Jefferson P. Marquis, Kevin Brancato, Roland J. Yardley, Clifford M. Graf II, and Jerry Sollinger, "Outside the Fleet: External Requirements for Naval Officers," (RAND Study MR-1472 Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002).

has a negative impact in the joint arena. Additionally, Brown validates the earlier works of literature noting that officers need precise personnel management to succeed in the current system and that joint careerism has surfaced within the officer corps. She finds that it is easy for officers to bypass joint duty and still get promoted to general officer.<sup>14</sup> Strange concurs noting that some of the services' best officers can and do successfully avoid joint duty until they are general officer selectees.

### **Congressionally Directed Comprehensive Studies**

Congress has recognized the problems with Title IV and the DoD's difficulty implementing Title IV mandates. Congress has tasked the DoD and outside agencies with the reexamination of Title IV. A 1995 Inspector General's report found five major flaws with Title IV implementation.<sup>15</sup> The report stand outs because it qualifies the implementation problems of Title IV and is the first in a series of studies that assess the implementation success of Title IV. It is also noteworthy because it finds that the vast majority of assignment actions, joint organizations, and military services rely on mechanisms specific to each service for assignment handling within the joint officer management (JOM) program. This problem is also identified by Jordan who states the services exercise control over JOM because they control their officers.<sup>16</sup> Promotion is based on service excellence not joint excellence and a joint culture is not permeating

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<sup>14</sup> Katherine Lemay Brown. "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management.", p. 31.

<sup>15</sup>Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation Report: Inspection of the Department of Defense Joint Manpower Process, Report No. 96-029, November 29, 1995.

<sup>16</sup>Richard J. Jordan, III, "Is the Military on Track to Achieve Joint Objectives as Outlined in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Look at Joint Officer Management Policies 1986-2001," (Newport RI: Naval War College, 2001).

officer promotions. It is also noted that there are no DoD procedures for officers trying to obtain joint experience.

Recently, three studies have focused on the need for a strategic approach to developing joint officers. Two GAO studies, *Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed* and *Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Improve Joint Officer Development*, released in December 2002 and March 2003 respectively, found that the DoD has taken positive steps to implement Title IV requirements involving the education, assignment, and promotion of officers serving in joint positions. However, the DoD has relied on legal waivers to comply with the provisions and as a result has experienced difficulties implementing some of its programs. Because of these difficulties, the DoD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. Furthermore, according to the GAO studies, the DoD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. The DoD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs, nor has it identified joint officer development for reserve officers who have served an increasing role in U.S. military activities.<sup>17</sup>

A third study, *Independent Study of Joint Officer Management and Joint Professional Education*, conducted by Booz-Allen Hamilton, confirms the GAO findings and provides a comprehensive assessment of the problems with Title IV. Released also

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<sup>17</sup> United States. General Accounting Office, *Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to Improve Joint Officer Development*. GAO 03-548T, March 19, 2003 and United States. General Accounting Office, *Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved, but a Strategic Approach Is Needed*. GAO 03-238. December 19, 2002 .

in March of 2003, this study claims that JOM is not well focused on joint warfighting.<sup>18</sup> This study lists the need to identify and classify joint duty assignment positions according to their relationship to joint warfighting as a top priority of the JOM program. The services and DoD operate to meet the statistical goals of Title IV rather than the intent of advancing the military's joint warfighting capability. The primary problem is that the practical understanding of "joint matters" throughout the defense establishment has devolved from the original definition of matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces to a variety of definitions depending on the organization. The JDAL, critical joint duty assignments, Joint Specialty Officers, and Joint professional military education all operate under different interpretations of joint matters and are not effective in meeting joint warfighting needs. There are not enough joint duty assignments to meet the true definition of joint matters to provide promotion-qualifying opportunities to a sufficient pool of flag officer candidates. This deficit has turned into an accounting drill with the services working to qualify as many officers as possible for promotion to general. As a result, assignments such as morale/welfare/recreation officer billets and public affairs officer billets count toward joint duty credit.

### **Goldwater-Nichols Literature**

Janowitz's, *The Professional Soldier*, and Huntington's, *The Soldier and the State*, provide a theoretical basis for changes to the U.S. military.<sup>19</sup> Both authors explore the institutional development, the political posture, the organizational structure, and the

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<sup>18</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Executive Summary, p. 10.

<sup>19</sup> Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (London: Glencoe Ltd. 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, (Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass, 1959).

sociological influences of the modern U.S. officer corps. Civilian control of the military is discussed in depth with both authors arguing that since World War II, the military has taken on a larger political role. As a result, the military has challenged the ability of the polity to maintain objective control and a balance of power. Huntington finds an inherent tension between civil authorities and the military as civil authorities struggle with minimizing military power when a stronger military role is needed for national security. Janowitz notes that the structure of both the legislature and executive branches vying for control over the military has allowed the defense establishment to exert more authority in the political realm. Accordingly, it is up to the Congress or the president to establish control over the military and provide it with direction.

### **Congressional Politics**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act must be analyzed in the context of the congressional transformation and in its role in defense reform relationship in the 1970s. As Gregor points out in his study of the U.S. military in the post Cold War, and Allard confirms, other than funding and declaring war, military matters traditionally fell under the purview of the executive office.<sup>20</sup> Prior to the 1980s, the congressional role in defense matters consisted of securing defense programs for their home districts. However, in the 1970s, a transformation occurred within Congress enabling it with a greater ability to challenge the president in defense related issues.

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<sup>20</sup> William J. Gregor, "Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War" Harvard University, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. Post Cold War Civil Military Relations Working Paper Series, No. 6, 1996, p. 32.

Numerous structural and political impediments, including lack of expertise, excessive parochialism, fragmented committee structure, and partisan politics all served as hindrances to congressional efforts into defense reform.<sup>21</sup> Hahn, Lindsay, Locher, Marsh and Blackwell, Pfiffner, Weiner, and Wirls all discuss the congressional transformation that enabled Congress to overcome these obstacles and become an active player in defense reform. The breakdown in comity between the executive and Congress during the 1970s, as well as the improved research capabilities of Congress is specifically addressed by Hahn, Marsh and Blackwell, and Pfiffner.<sup>22</sup> Hahn, Lindsay, and Weiner look at the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, and its impact on committee leadership, as a transforming event in Congress.<sup>23</sup> Lastly, Locher and Wirls (1991) provide an overview of the actors and structures that emerged within Congress specifically aimed at tackling defense reform issues.<sup>24</sup>

Lederman and McNaugher provide similar chronologies of the presidential-congressional relationship with both exposing the factional infighting in the executive branch.<sup>25</sup> Jones, the former Chairman of the JCS, offers insight into the movement

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<sup>21</sup> Robert Hahn, "The Congressional Defense Department." *Airpower Journal*. Special Edition 1995, p. 63.

<sup>22</sup> Hahn, "The Congressional Defense Department.", p. 63; See also James P. Pfiffner, "Congressional Oversight of Defense Management" Institute of Public Policy, George Mason University, Working Paper 92:12, April 1992, p. 2; John O. Marsh and James Blackwell, "Congressional Oversight of National Security: A Mandate for Change," (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies).

<sup>23</sup> James M. Lindsay, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1994) pp. 59-61; See also Sharon K. Weiner, "The Changing of the Guard: The Role of Congress in Defense Organization and Reorganization in the Cold War." Harvard University, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. Post Cold War Civil Military Relations Working Paper Series, No. 10, 1997, pp. 32-34; See also Hahn, "The Congressional Defense Department," p. 64.

<sup>24</sup> Daniel Wirls, "Congress and the Politics of Military Reform", (*Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 17 No. 4, Summer, 1991), p. 490.

<sup>25</sup> Gordon N. Lederman, "Authority and Responsibility: Passage and Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." Harvard Law School Thesis,

within Congress and why he took his message for reform to Congress rather than the executive branch.<sup>26</sup> Crowe, the Chairman of the JCS at the time of Goldwater-Nichols implementation, details the military's perspective towards Congress at the time of implementation.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, Kitfield provides a concise analysis of the political process behind Goldwater-Nichols in his work on the transformation of U.S. military leadership from Vietnam to the Gulf War.<sup>28</sup>

Locher provides the most comprehensive and descriptive analysis of the political dynamics involved in the passage of the act. As one of the authors of the bill and as a political insider, he traces the entire Goldwater-Nichols effort from its start through its implementation in his book, *Victory on the Potomac*. Prior to Locher's book, Weiner, Getz, and Gunderson traced the interactions between the president and Congress using Locher as a primary source for their dissertations.

Gunderson's "In Search of Operational Effectiveness: Military Reform in the 1980s" and Getz's "Congressional Policymaking: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Defense Reorganization Act of 1986" both provide analyses of the legislative history leading up to the act. Gunderson and Getz each focus on how Congress assumed the mantle of defense reform in contradiction to previous defense reform efforts initiated by the executive

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Sept. 21, 1997, p. 63. Note: Lederman's Law School thesis is the basis of his book *Reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986*. Greenwood Press, Westport, CT. 1999; Thomas C. McNaugher, "Improving Military Coordination: Reorganization of the DOD", in *Who Makes Public Policy: The Struggle for Control Between Congress and the Executive*, ed. Robert S. Gilmour and Alexis A. Halley, (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, New Jersey, 1994).

<sup>26</sup> David Jones, "Reform: the Beginnings," in *The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Ten Year Retrospective*. ed. Dennis J. Quinn. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1999); See also David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1996.  
[http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq\\_pubs/0713.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0713.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> William J. Crowe Jr., and David Chanoff, *The Line of Fire - From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993).

<sup>28</sup> James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers*. (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1995).

office. Gunderson also points out that the defense reform effort in the 1980s was unique due to its source, large scope, and actors involved.<sup>29</sup> Gunderson explores how Congress overcame opposition from the executive office, defense officials, and the senior uniformed leadership. Getz uses Johannes' theory as a theoretical foundation to support her argument that Congress is capable of passing sound public policy regardless of electoral considerations and special interest group politics.<sup>30</sup> Getz's dissertation supports David Mayhew's theory that important legislation is passed even during times of divided government.<sup>31</sup>

## **Defense Reform Effort**

### **Events**

The United States military entered the 1980s reeling from Vietnam, its greatest military setback. Additional setbacks in Iran, Beirut, and Grenada further exposed the need for reform buttressing the defense reform effort building in Congress and prompting policy efforts to reform the U.S. military.

Congress initially became interested in defense reform with the Reagan defense build up. However, the interest was directed at the budget and acquisition elements of the U.S. military not its organizational structure. In 1980, Senator Gary Hart (D-CO) founded the Congressional Military Reform Council (MRC) to study defense policy. Wirls provides a comprehensive analysis of the formation and underpinnings of the

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<sup>29</sup> Gregory Gunderson, "In Search of Operational Effectiveness: Military Reform in the 1980's", (PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1997), pp. 5-6.

<sup>30</sup> Colleen Marie Getz, "Congressional Policy Making: The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," (PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 1998), p. 34.

<sup>31</sup> See David Mayhew, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations 1946-1990*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991).

MRC. Hart did not want to, "make a bad military bigger" and addressed a number of non-budgetary problems that related to winning or losing wars, U.S. force doctrine and strategy.<sup>32</sup> Hart argued that President Reagan's push for a bigger defense budget would not necessarily improve the military's ability. The MRC was a bicameral, bipartisan group of fifty Congressmen interested in military strategy reform and defense procurement reform. The group, for the first time, made defense reform a legitimate topic in the Congress.<sup>33</sup> This initial concern for defense budget reform provided the necessary venue for representatives interested in organizational reform.

The military's war fighting failures were then punctuated by a series of operational inadequacies in the early 1980s. These shortcomings included the Iran hostage rescue mission, the Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, and the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Rumbblings from within the JCS about the need for reform of the U.S. military also began to grab the attention of Congress and the public. Ward's 1993 dissertation, "United States Defense Reorganizations: Contending Explanations (Civil Military Accommodation, Domestic Pressure, and External Threat)," found that defense reorganization efforts are prompted by one of three causes: domestic concerns over government performance; external factors, such as a change in the security environment or lessons learned from military operations; and civilian desire to consolidate and centralize control over the military. Ward concludes the Goldwater-Nichols Act was implemented by Congress in response to U.S. military operational inadequacies in the

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<sup>32</sup> Gunderson, "In Search of Operational Effectiveness: Military Reform in the 1980's", pp. 100-101; See also Daniel Wirls, "Congress and the Politics of Military Reform", p. 490.

<sup>33</sup> Gunderson, "In Search of Operational Effectiveness: Military Reform in the 1980's", p. 107.

early 1980s and therefore was motivated by external factors. Ward notes while external factors, such as an enemy's capability, have been the least likely to prompt defense reorganizations in the past, future reorganizations will be prompted by concerns over the U.S. military's ability to meet security challenges.<sup>34</sup>

Specific literature on military inadequacies in the early 1980s indicates organizational flaws within the U.S. military structure. Thomas, Kitfield, Hadley, and Holzworth capture the relevant points of the literature related to the Iranian hostage rescue attempt. Each author notes that the lack of joint inter-operability and the organizational command structure were primary reasons for failure. Kyle's personal account of the Iran hostage rescue offers an insider's look at the highest level of planning for the mission. He refutes much of the criticism of the mission and accounts for the decision-making involved in the mission.

Operational failures in Grenada are discussed by Boyle, Pike, and Cole. Cole, in his analysis prepared for the JCS, finds inter-operability issues between Army and Marine forces; poor communication; inadequate planning and intelligence; and inter-service rivalry all to have significantly hampered the operation. Boyle finds similar conclusions but explores the problem of inter-service rivalry more thoroughly. Kitfield examines the initial reform effort and weaves the reform effort with the military shortcomings of Iran, Beirut, and Grenada, while trying to explain the transformation of the U.S. military from Vietnam to Desert Storm. Kitfield provides a succinct analysis of

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<sup>34</sup> Bryan H. Ward, "United States Defense Reorganizations: Contending Explanations", (Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1993).

the Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut finding fault with the organizational command structure under which the Marines operated.<sup>35</sup>

Allard's, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*, and Hadley's, *The Straw Giant*, both provide comprehensive overviews of the history of the U.S. military and expose the organizational problems that have plagued it. Allard explores the impact of service loyalty on the U.S. military's ability to develop joint combat power.<sup>36</sup> Hadley uncovers the misconceptions about American military strength and exposes much of the infighting and service rivalry that has hampered the American military in the twentieth century.

Record, in "Why Our High Priced Military Can't Win Battles", finds that since Inchon in 1951, American military performance has been a "case of persistent professional malpractice."<sup>37</sup> Record finds there are three distinct problems with the U.S. military. First, there are significant institutional and intellectual deficiencies in the U.S. military that have been overlooked because of American faith in technology. This faith

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<sup>35</sup> For analysis of Iranian Hostage rescue see Thomas, William C. "Planning for Failure: An Examination of Operation Eagle Claw", *Introduction to Joint and Military Operations*, Forbes Publishing, New York, 1999; C. E. Holzworth,, "Operation Eagle Claw: A Catalyst for Change in the American Military" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Holzworth.htm>, 1997; and James Kyle, *The Guts to Try*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995). For analysis of Beirut Marine bombing and how these three operations played a role in passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act see James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers*. For analysis of Grenada invasion see John Boyle "Operation URGENT FURY: A Critical Analysis", *Introduction to Joint and Military Operations*, (New York: Forbes Publishing, 1999); John Pike, [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/urgent\\_fury.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/urgent_fury.htm); Ronald H. Cole, "Operation Urgent Fury: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Grenada 12 October- 2 November 1983". (Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. 1997); See Robert T. Hadley, *The Straw Giant Triumph and Failure: America's Armed Forces*. (New York: Random House, 1986) for a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. military's problems in the 1980s.

<sup>36</sup> Kenneth C. Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*. (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1996), p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> Jeffrey Record, "Why Our High Priced Military Can't Win Battles." In *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*. ed. David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1988.), p. 466.

proved to be irrelevant in Vietnam and unreliable in Iran. Second, the U.S. military has become another vast bureaucracy whose focus has changed from winning wars and warfighting values to supporting the bureaucracy of career advancement, protecting one's turf, and maintaining the status quo. Lastly, Record says there is no punishment for dereliction causing performance to falter.

Eberhardt's "Inter-service Rivalry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Comparison of Military Force Deployments under the Weak and Strong Chairman Models" illustrates the difference in the U.S. military pre and post Goldwater-Nichols Act by comparing the operational employment of U.S. military forces under a weak Chairman of the JCS prior to Goldwater-Nichols and a strong Chairman in the post Goldwater-Nichols era. Eberhardt's premise is that under a weak Chairman, operational activities took place under the auspices of decentralized decision-making, however, while under a strong Chairman, decision-making was centralized.<sup>38</sup> Eberhardt uses the Korean War as an example of the weak Chairman and the Persian Gulf War as an example of the strong Chairman to illustrate his premise.

### Studies

U.S. military inadequacies, coupled with an emerging defense reform effort in Congress led to two landmark studies analyzing joint officer development to improve the U.S. military performance. General Jones' 1982 study, *Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chairman's Special Study Group: The Organization and Functions*

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<sup>38</sup> David R. Eberhardt, "Interservice Rivalry and the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Comparison of Military Force Deployments under the Weak and Strong Chairman Models," (PhD Dissertation, University of Denver, August 2001).

of the JCS also called The Brehm Report, focused on the organizational flaws within the JCS and specifically detailed the problems with officer joint duty performance. The second study, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate* also called the Locher Report, sponsored by Senators Goldwater (R-AZ) and Nunn (D-GA) in 1985, comprehensively addressed all problems with the defense establishment from the acquisition process to officer development. Each report explicitly noted that the overriding element of service influence hampered the performance of officers serving on joint staffs and in joint assignments. Both reports called for a strengthening of joint duty and a greater emphasis on the development of officers with multi-service or joint perspectives. The Locher Report served as a basis for much of the legislative directives found in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

### **Post-Goldwater-Nichols Act**

The merits and the effectiveness of the Act are still a point of contention amongst scholars and military professionals. While Kester, Kitfield, Boo, Hadley, and Roman and Tarr find that the bill changed the U.S. military for the better, Isenberg, Tighe, and Cropsey find that the bill did little to reform the military.<sup>39</sup> Adolph and Chiarelli find the

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<sup>39</sup> John G. Kester, "The 1986 Defense Reorganization: A Promising Start." In *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*, Ed. by David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1988); James Kitfield, "Command performance in Norfolk." *The National Journal*, 12 (December 1998): 2947; Katherine Boo, "How Congress Won the War in the Gulf", *The Washington Monthly*, Oct 1991, pp 31 -38; Peter J. Roman and David W. Tarr. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From service parochialism to jointness." *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 1998: 91-111; Seth Cropsey, "The Limits of Jointness." *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1992): 72-79; David Isenberg, "Missing the Point: Why the Reforms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff won't Improve U.S. Defense Policy." *Policy Analysis*, February 29, 1988. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa100.html>; Dennis W. Tighe

bill did not go far enough and that more reform should be undertaken.<sup>40</sup> Bourne postulates that the Goldwater-Nichols Act upset the balance of civilian control over the military by elevating the status and role of the chairman of the JCS within the president's national security apparatus.<sup>41</sup> Prina and Yuknis both offer early assessments of the legislation and determine that while the Act has changed some aspects of the military for the better, it will be years before the effectiveness of the Act can be measured.<sup>42</sup>

Williams, Abbott, and Booker all assess the ability of Goldwater-Nichols to foster a sense of jointness within the officer corps of the four services. Williams' "Defense Reform and Organizational Change: Have the Services Embraced the New Joint Paradigm" assesses the impact of Goldwater-Nichols efforts at cultivating jointness among the officer corps and is the first in academic literature to assess the effectiveness of Title IV. Williams claims that despite operational inadequacies and congressional reform efforts, prior to 1986, the services were unable to operate in a joint fashion because the JCS was incapable of making the services coordinate their planning and strategy.<sup>43</sup> Williams examines military operations from World War II to the Persian Gulf War and finds that the services were unable to overcome service parochialism until the

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"Unification of forces: the road to jointness?" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies), 1991.

<sup>40</sup> Robert B. Adolph, Jr. et. al. "Why Goldwater - Nichols didn't go far enough". *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1995: 48-53; Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols." *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 1993: 71-81.

<sup>41</sup> Christopher Bourne, "Unintended Consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1998. PP. 99-108.

<sup>42</sup> Edgar L. Prina, "Reorganization and reality—the Goldwater-Nichols Act: Pitfalls and promises." *Sea Power*, January 1987: 19-23; Christopher A. Yuknis, "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: an interim assessment." (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992).

<sup>43</sup> Garland Harmon Williams, "Defense Reform and Organizational Change: Have the Services Embraced the New Joint Paradigm?", (PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1994), p. 114.

Goldwater-Nichols Act. However, the Act failed to promote a greater sense of joint intelligence sharing between the services and if further reform is to be mandated it must come from an external stimulant such as Congress.

Abbott in his dissertation "The United States Joint Staff after the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Organizational Culture Perspective" finds that Joint Staff has a distinct organizational culture but that there is little aspiration from the Joint Staff's senior leadership to extend the staff's power into civilian policy making. Abbott uses statistical analysis, interviews, and survey information to determine if the Joint Staff has an organizational culture separate from the distinct cultures of the services. Abbott uses a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test his null hypothesis finding that there is no significant difference between the means of the group.<sup>44</sup> Abbott's qualitative survey analysis determined that the most important attributes needed to become a successful Joint Staff officer are initiative, honesty, objectivity, and flexibility.

Booker's "Cultural Conditioning in Public Organizations: A Survey of the Ideological Perspectives of Air War College Students," examined if the concept of jointness had taken hold in the Air Force officer corps.<sup>45</sup> A sampling of students at the Air Force's Air War College indicated little difference between aviators and non-aviators in their support for Air Force cultural values versus the current joint values.

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<sup>44</sup> Gerald W. Abbott, "The U.S. Joint Staff after the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Organizational Cultural Perspective," (PhD Dissertation, University of Southern California, 2000), p. 151.

<sup>45</sup> David Lyons Booker, "Cultural Condition in Public Organizations: A Survey of Ideological Perspectives of Air War College Students", (D.P.A Thesis, University of Alabama, 1996).

Booker postulates that continued emphasis on joint values may promote a stronger adherence to Air Force values for both groups.

The effect of Goldwater-Nichols on the military's ability to operate within the U.S. political structure is assessed by Gibson. Gibson argues that the Goldwater-Nichols Act unexpectedly increased the military's political savvy. The Act fostered inter-service harmony that politically empowered the military and facilitated a unified voice.<sup>46</sup> Gibson posits in "Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and National Security through Madisonian Politics" that in the post-Vietnam era, the political skills of the officer corps has increased and that Goldwater-Nichols only exacerbated this process by altering the structure and rules governing the military promotion system to enhance joint interoperability.<sup>47</sup> Gibson claims that the politicized military has successfully challenged civilian authority. Gibson finds that the civilian component of the national security structure needs to be strengthened. Rather than adhere to Janowitz's notion of subjective control of the military or Huntington's call for objective control of the military, Gibson feels the Madisonian notion of pluralism and countervailing forces in the power structure within U.S. civil-military relations should be fostered to prevent the military from challenging civilian authority.<sup>48</sup>

### **Policy Implementation**

Implementation literature has concentrated on the relationship dynamic between policymakers and implementing authorities. Etzioni points out that compliance consists

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<sup>46</sup> Christopher P. Gibson, "Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and National Security through Madisonian Concepts," (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1998), p. 8.

<sup>47</sup> Gibson, "Countervailing Forces", p. 8.

<sup>48</sup> Gibson, pp. 9-10.

of two parties, an actor who exercises authority, and an actor who is subjected to that authority.<sup>49</sup> Stoker argues that this authority paradigm governs the study of federal policy implementation and holds that the federal government has the legitimate authority and wisdom to institute policy. However, while the federal government has the authority to institute policy it sometimes lacks control over its implementation.<sup>50</sup> Anything that diminishes the control or authority within policy implementation challenges the ability to implement a policy. Often the relationship between policymakers and implementing authorities is inter-governmental as state or local officials are responsible for carrying out federally mandated policy initiatives. In such cases, federal control of the policy process is limited and therefore the federal government struggles to implement policy at the local level according to Seidman. However, Seidman notes the federal government is well equipped to perform its traditional functions, such as taxation, infrastructure development, and public works with reasonable effectiveness.<sup>51</sup> Military reform falls into the category of traditional federal government functions.

Implementation difficulties are normally attributed to two causes: an uncooperative, strained relationship between policymakers and implementing authorities or flaws in the policy design. Pressman and Wildavsky; Derthick ; Bardach; Peterson, Rabe and Wong ; Elmore; Scheberle; Allison and Halperin; and Stoker all note

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<sup>49</sup> Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations; on Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates*, (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 3.

<sup>50</sup> Stoker, *Reluctant Partners: Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 23-25.

<sup>51</sup> Harold Seidman, "Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization." In *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*, ed. David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1988), p. 368.

relationship difficulties between policy agents as a determining factor in successful implementation.<sup>52</sup>

Multiple organizations are normally involved with each organization bringing its own objectives and parochial interests to the policy process. In many cases, policy is forced upon those it is designed to help and is seen as a threat to a target groups' interests. As Stoker points out, the challenge of national governance is to gain the cooperation of reluctant partners. The federal government has to solicit the cooperation from other authorities to be able to implement policy. However, federal policy may challenge the interests and priorities of those who are responsible for its implementation.<sup>53</sup> As Seidman and Winter show, federal agencies have their own interests to protect and have a tendency to combat attempts by outsiders to encroach on their turf.<sup>54</sup> Winter notes that organizations have various conflicts and may or may not be

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<sup>52</sup>See Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky. *Implementation : How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland : Or, Why It's Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes*, (3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); See also Martha Derthick, *New Towns In-Town*, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1972); See also Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game : What Happens after a Bill Becomes a Law*; See also Paul E. Peterson, Barry G. Rabe, and Kenneth W. Wong, *When Federalism Works*. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1986); R.F. Elmore, "Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analysis of Public Policy." in *Policy Implementation in Federal and Unitary Systems: Questions of Analysis and Design*, ed. K. Hanf and T. Koonen. (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985); See also Denise Scheberle. *Federalism and Environmental Policy : Trust and the Politics of Implementation American Governance and Public Policy*.( Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997), Chapter 1; See also Graham T. Allison, Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm" in *American Defense Policy*. ed. Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel. (7th ed. Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 1997) Excerpt taken from original article "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm" found in *World Politics* Vol. 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations (Spring, 1972), p. 40-79. See Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*.

<sup>53</sup> Stoker, *Reluctant Partners: Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> Soren Winter, "Integration Implementation Research," in *Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening up the Black Box*. ed. Palumbo, Dennis James, Donald J. Calista, and Policy Studies Organization. Contributions in Political Science, No. 252. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 27; Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power; the Dynamics of Federal Organization*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 136.

in accord with the objectives of the policy in question.<sup>55</sup> Allison and Halperin point out that government actors do not act solely on strategic objectives, but rather according to various conceptions of national security, organizational, domestic, and personal interests.<sup>56</sup> This causes the relationship between policymakers and implementing authorities to be strained.

Title IV challenged the services' autonomy regarding the development of their officers. The prescriptive mandates of Title IV put forth by reformers created, "a joint dimension of military professionalism whose requirements seem to come at the expense of professionalism as defined by each of the four services."<sup>57</sup> The history of the Goldwater-Nichols implementation has been one of active tension between compliance with the law and preservation of service interests.<sup>58</sup> Title IV is at the center of this tension since it involves control over the crown jewel of the services: personnel.<sup>59</sup> Joint officer management challenges the services control over its officers for readiness, professional development and cultural reasons.<sup>60</sup>

The relationship between policymakers and implementing authorities is impacted by institutional behavior. Implementation of a policy threatening service autonomy is bound to be fraught with difficulties. Builder notes institutions, such as the services, have distinct and enduring personalities that govern their behavior. Personalities are

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<sup>55</sup> Winter, "Integration Implementation Research," in *Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening up the Black Box*, p. 26.

<sup>56</sup> Graham T. Allison, Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm", p. 26.

<sup>57</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Executive Summary, p. 4.

<sup>58</sup> Theme of John P. White's speech, "Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense," in *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, ed. Dennis J. Quinn, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999, pp. 51-64; See also Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chap 1 p. 7.

<sup>59</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 April 03.

<sup>60</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1 p. 7.

deeply embedded in the services and will persist despite changes in administrations or changes within the DoD, JCS turnover, or even the trauma of war. Understanding these personalities will help determine what will happen in the American military. Those imposing change upon the military should be aware of the services' unique personalities and realize that they will only be able to implement changes if the military services accept and pursue them.<sup>61</sup>

Policy design plays a key element in policy implementation success. Winter notes that policy design is a factor and when studying implementation one cannot ignore the link between policy formation and implementation. Elmore says that policy formation should recognize the parochial interests of those involved if the policymakers properly forward and backward map their policy process. Elmore's idea of reversible logic provides insurance against unanticipated effects so that if things go wrong in the implementing process an intelligent response can be reached.<sup>62</sup> Elmore states that policymakers are limited by what they control and tend to frame solutions using implements where they have the greatest control. As a result, they cannot always implement an effective policy.<sup>63</sup> In the case of Title IV, prescriptive legislation was crafted in an effort to create the joint duty officer. The two aspects congressional policymakers had control over were the joint duty assignment and joint professional

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<sup>61</sup>Carl H. Builder, "Service Identities and Behavior" in *American Defense Policy*, ed. Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel (7th ed. Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 108.

<sup>62</sup>R.F. Elmore, "Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analysis of Public Policy." in *Policy Implementation in Federal and Unitary Systems: Questions of Analysis and Design*, p. 35-37.

<sup>63</sup>Elmore, "Forward and Backward Mapping: Reversible Logic in the Analysis of Public Policy." p. 37.

military education. However, Congress depends on the services for policy implementation and ultimately relies on the services for creation of the joint duty officer.

The services are responsible for implementing the provisions of the joint officer program. Bardach and Stoker both warn of the perils of empowered implementing authorities in light of conflicting objectives. They find that participants in the implementation process tend to behave "strategically" by pursuing their own self-interests within the framework of implementation. Peterson, Rabe, and Wong note that eventually the relationship between federal policymakers and implementing authorities undergoes a maturation process as federal and local officials work together to modify the policy in an effort to meet initial objectives and comply with the policy.

However, Kanter found while examining military support for administration policies that non-compliance from the military services could occur.<sup>64</sup> Non-compliance is a function of four conditions: the degree of congruence (or divergence) between policymakers and the services; the capabilities available to subordinates to accomplish their assignments; the quality of communication between superiors and subordinates; and the distribution of bargaining resources within a formal hierarchy.

## CONCLUSION

The literature reviewed for this dissertation supports the reasoning for analyzing the joint duty assignment policy. In evaluating the joint duty requirement, previous Title IV studies focus on flaws in policy design as the primary cause of implementation

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<sup>64</sup> Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 45-47.

problems. While the implementation success of the joint duty promotion requirement has been studied, service compliance has not been empirically evaluated to determine if this is another possible reason besides policy flaws for implementation difficulties. Many of Title IV studies note the tension between Congress and the services regarding this policy, but they do not analyze the services' desire and overall approach to implementing this policy. The body of literature examined shows the motivations for establishing the joint duty policy, its formation process, and the subsequent concerns over its implementation success. The literature review provides the foundation for the theoretical underpinnings for this analysis and the ability to derive research questions specific to this analysis.

### **Chapter Three: The Joint Duty Assignment Policy**

This chapter examines the history and traces the underlying reasons for the joint duty assignment policy that was codified into law under Title IV, Joint Officer Management Program, of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

#### **Goldwater-Nichols Act**

The Goldwater-Nichols Act stands out as a major milestone in U.S. federal policymaking. Former congressman Les Aspin called it, "one of the landmark laws of American history" and labeled it, "the greatest sea change in the history of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775."<sup>65</sup> With the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress attempted to reform the government's largest and arguably most powerful bureaucracy, the Department of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed a wide variety of faults with the post World War II U.S. military ranging from command relationships to the military acquisition process. The most prominent fault though addressed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act was the military's difficulty fighting in a joint, unified manner.

#### **The Need for Reform**

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<sup>65</sup> James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols.", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 13 (Autumn 1996), p. 10.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act defines joint as, "matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including matters relating to national military strategy; strategic planning and contingency planning; and command and control of combat operations under unified command."<sup>66</sup> Essentially, Goldwater-Nichols was designed to unify the services regarding strategy, planning, and fighting rather than allowing them to remain four autonomous organizations. Prior to the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, two significant problems hampered the U.S. military's ability to operate in a unified or joint manner. The foremost was, "servicism" and the second was joint officer performance.

Servicism, according to Samuel Huntington, is the subjugation of the national interest for the sake of individual service interest. Huntington labeled servicism the central woe of the American military.<sup>67</sup> The National Security Act of 1947 was instituted to create a unified military establishment that would provide an overall strategy, force structure, and planning capability for the nation's military in the form of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Instead of unifying the military, the individual services dominated force structure issues, strategy, and warfighting. The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 brought three competing agencies under one roof. The newly formed defense establishment became rife with interservice rivalry as the different services fought for roles, missions, and money. The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, found that

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<sup>66</sup> United States. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1986. Public Law 99-433. p. 39-40

<sup>67</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Defense Organization and Military Strategy." In *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*. ed. David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1988).p. 413.

interservice rivalry dominated all aspects of decision making from funding to service missions. Forrestal also found interservice rivalry endemic at even the highest level of the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).<sup>68</sup> Huntington points out that rather than developing a system for coherent, central strategic planning, the Joint Chiefs became champions of their individual services. Joint Staff officers bargained amongst themselves to get the most for their individual services. Choices for weapons systems and planning requirements were largely determined by service needs and service interests rather than national interest.<sup>69</sup> Additionally, combatant commanders in charge of the fielded military forces found their authority usurped by allegiances to respective services rather than the unified command. As a result of servicism, the source for non-service tainted military advice to the president or Secretary of Defense came from civilians rather than from the nation's top generals.<sup>70</sup> More importantly, servicism hampered the U.S. military's ability to integrate the four services to fight in a unified manner. Military shortcomings in Vietnam, Iran, Beirut, and Grenada demonstrated the inability of the U.S. military to fight in a joint manner displaying the problems associated with servicism in the combat arena. At the heart of these military failures was a lack of mission integration among the four services.

The second significant problem impacting the U.S. military's ability to operate in a unified manner stemmed from the poor performance of officers serving in joint duty assignments, particularly those serving on joint staffs. In April 1982, General David

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<sup>68</sup> Colleen Marie Getz, "Congressional Policy Making: The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," p. 91.

<sup>69</sup> Huntington, "Defense Organization and Military Strategy," p. 412.

<sup>70</sup> Huntington, p. 412.

Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commissioned a special study group to examine the organizational failings of the U.S. military. The report officially titled *The Organization and Functions of the JCS* and chaired by William K. Brehm, detailed the faults with the JCS and Joint Staff officers.<sup>71</sup> Known as the Brehm Report, this report was the first to state the problems associated with joint staff officers.<sup>72</sup> The Brehm Report found that few officers were experts within their own service. Yet, joint staff officers were expected to have a broad working knowledge of their own service as well as other services. The Brehm report found that few joint staff officers had the required experience, education, and training to adequately perform what was required of them. The report also found that only two percent of all officers serving in the Office of the JCS (OJCS) had previous joint staff experience while only 36% had prior service staff experience. The average tour length of the officers in the OJCS was less than 30 months. General officers served even less time with normal tour times of 24 months. At any one time, the average experience level on the Joint Staff was 15 months and about 12 months for the senior leadership of the Joint Staff. Less than 60% of the senior leadership had served in a joint duty assignment even though it was required by DoD directive 1320.5. In addition to a lack of joint experience, joint education was also lacking as well. Only 13% of the O4s (Major/Lt. Commander) and O5s (Lt. Colonel/Commander) had attended

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<sup>71</sup> Joint Staff is capitalized in this case because it is the title of the staff serving the JCS. Other joint staffs exist for example at each combatant commands or joint task force headquarters. Joint staff is not capitalized if it is used to describe a generic reference to any joint staff.

<sup>72</sup>Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chairman's Special Study Group, *The Organization and Functions of the JCS*, (The Brehm Report, April 1982), p. 41. Subsequent references will be noted as the Brehm Report.

joint professional military education and less than 25% of all the O6s (Colonel/Captain) had attended joint professional military schooling.<sup>73</sup>

The system for preparing officers to perform joint duty was failing. The officers themselves were not necessarily poor quality officers but the education and experience level required to perform the job was not being provided.

...Joint officers are asked to analyze major national issues such as arms control, develop national security objectives, oversee the development of Joint military plans, and complete other major tasks that require a depth of knowledge of the other Services, of defense strategy, and of the overall defense programs that they simply have not had the opportunity to acquire. The combination of lack of staff experience, lack of practical knowledge of Joint activities, and lack of formal preparation through the Joint school system, all coupled with short tours, makes it difficult for Joint Staff officers, no matter how capable (and many are very capable), to deal effectively with these major staff responsibilities.<sup>74</sup>

The lack of capability of joint staff officers had serious repercussions since the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the unified commanders all relied on these staffs for advice.

### **Problems Identified**

In 1982, in an unlikely move, General Jones told Congress that the U.S. military was broken. He took the unprecedented action of criticizing the JCS while still sitting as its Chairman. Jones was a firsthand witness to the ineptitude of the JCS during the Iranian hostage rescue knowing that, "the JCS organization he led and the fragmented military force structure it professed to control were all but unworkable."<sup>75</sup> Jones had studied President Eisenhower's reform attempts of the 1950s and he knew that Congress was

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<sup>73</sup> Brehm Report, pp. 41-42

<sup>74</sup> Brehm Report, p. 43.

<sup>75</sup> James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers*, p. 218.

successful in thwarting and limiting Eisenhower's reform efforts. Jones saw that Congress could make or break any type of reform effort and realized that any successful military reform would have to come from within Congress.<sup>76</sup>

Prior to briefing the House Armed Service Committee (HASC) on the 1983 defense authorization bill, Jones decided that this was his chance to expose the problems uncovered in the Brehm Report.<sup>77</sup> He laid the groundwork for the forthcoming defense reform effort that ultimately became the Goldwater-Nichols Act by listing his criticisms of the JCS to the House Armed Service Committee (HASC) during the 1983 budget hearings. Jones' criticisms included how each service tried to dominate the channel of military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense. He explained that the four military services were in effect, four competing bureaucracies. Jones also pointed out the problem with the individual service staffs. Services staffs tended to overshadow the JCS's staff, the Joint Staff, when proffering military advice. Services staffs were a major contributor to service competition and a shortcoming of the JCS capability.

Each service, on its own volition and outside the formal boundaries, pushed its own agenda, sometimes even in direct contrast to the corporate issuances of the JCS. This behavior made the service staffs powerful. Joint Staff officers often had to rely on the more powerful and better-equipped service staffs for information and guidance. This further funneled individual service influence into what should have been untainted advice for the Chairman. In many cases, Joint Staff officers would accept drafts of proposals

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<sup>76</sup> David Jones, "Reform: the Beginnings," in *The Goldwater-Nichols Act: A Ten Year Retrospective*, p. 7; See also Gregory Gunderson, "In Search of Operational Effectiveness: Military Reform in the 1980's," p. 112.

<sup>77</sup> Gunderson, p. 112.

authored by the services staffs. Rather than receive a report initiated by a Joint Staff officer untainted by service influence, the Chairman received proposals analyzed by five different staffs often protecting individual service positions.<sup>78</sup>

Additionally, officers serving on the Joint Staff lacked the experience and education to effectively deal with the major staff responsibilities they faced further forcing them to rely on the service staffs.<sup>79</sup> Joint experience prior to serving on the Joint Staff was lacking and those officers who attended the joint senior service schools were not guaranteed of serving in a joint duty position.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, the branches kept their best officers for their own staffs since career minded officers did not want to go to work for a joint staff where they would be out of sight of their service.

General Jones noted that there was little desire to serve on the Joint Staff or in any joint duty assignment. The Joint Staff for the JCS and the joint staffs for the unified combatant commanders did not get the top officers from the services. A joint duty assignment removed an officer from his or her service, the environment he or she had been trained in and the organization ultimately responsible for their promotion. An officer established his or her reputation for promotion amongst their service colleagues and superiors. Therefore, officers avoided joint duty considering it the "kiss of death" seeking instead service staff positions that offered greater career enhancement by offering a chance to excel in front of those dictating promotion.<sup>81</sup> This practice led to a high turnover rate as officers sought to return to their service as quickly as possible leaving an

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<sup>78</sup> Brehm Report, p. 48.

<sup>79</sup> Brehm Report, pp. 41-46.

<sup>80</sup> Brehm Report, p. 42.

<sup>81</sup> Brehm Report, p. 44.

ineffective Joint Staff advising the Chairman. Jones' criticisms took the HASC by surprise.<sup>82</sup>

General Jones' 1982 testimony ignited the defense reform effort within Congress. By 1985, both the House and Senate Armed Service Committees (SASC) were drafting legislation to reform the organizational structure of the U.S. military. In 1985, the SASC, under the bipartisan leadership of Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) commissioned a study, "Defense Organization: The Need for Change". This study was an effort to educate other members of Congress for the need for military reform. This report would become known as the Locher Report after the SASC staffer and report author, Jim Locher.<sup>83</sup>

The Locher Report confirmed the problems of the JCS raised by the Brehm Report and further identified problems with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Unified Commands, the Military Departments, the Acquisition Process, and Congressional oversight of the military organization. The report identified seven problems. The principal among them was the inability of the four services to fight in a unified manner. The Locher Report noted that the primary organizational goal of the Department of Defense, from the time of its inception in 1947, was, "the integration of the distinct military capabilities of the four Services to prepare for and conduct effective

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<sup>82</sup> Gunderson., "In Search of Operational Effectiveness: Military Reform in the 1980's," pp. 113-4.

<sup>83</sup> United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate.* ((Locher Report) Washington, DC: GPO, 1985) p.77-80 Subsequent references to this document will be listed as the Locher Report; See also "The Goldwater-Nunn Defense Organization Staff Study," In *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security : Theory and Practice*, ed. David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1988), p.490-495.

unified operations in fulfilling major U.S. military operations.”<sup>84</sup> Locher identified this goal as “mission integration” defining it as, “efforts by joint organizations—those that have a multi-Service perspective (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified commands)—to aggregate the capabilities of the four Services in a manner to provide the most effective combat forces to fulfill the major military missions of DoD.”<sup>85</sup> The Locher Report added:

Mission integration is necessary at both of the distinct organizational levels of DoD the policymaking level, comprised basically of Washington Headquarters organizations, and the operational level, consisting of the unified and specified commands. Effective mission integration is critical to U.S. national security because none of the major missions of DoD can be executed alone by forces of any single Service.<sup>86</sup>

Mission integration is difficult in an organization such as the DoD because it is composed of four organizations that are highly differentiated. The nature of each service’s missions requires the development of specialized tasks and functions to meet each service’s requirements. Yet, the tasks of these same four organizations are highly interdependent and the success of the DoD depends on the ability of these four services to integrate their specialized tasks effectively.<sup>87</sup>

Highly differentiated organizations with highly interdependent tasks require an organizational structure and supporting mechanisms that would provide for the integration of mission tasks. Prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, mission integration was

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<sup>84</sup> Locher Report, p. 2; See also “The Goldwater-Nunn Defense Organization Staff Study” p. 490.

<sup>85</sup> Locher Report, p. 80.

<sup>86</sup> Locher Report, p. 80; See also “The Goldwater-Nunn Defense Organization Staff Study”, p. 490.

<sup>87</sup> Locher Report, pp. 79-84.

hindered by an inequity between service and joint interests. The Locher Report concluded that service dominance in DoD decision-making resulted from three problems. First, the Office of the Secretary of Defense was not organized to effectively integrate service capabilities and programs into the force needed to fulfill the major missions of the DoD. Second, the Joint Chiefs of Staff system was dominated by the services that had veto power over almost all JCS action. Third, the unified commands were also dominated by the services primarily through the strength and autonomy of the service component commanders and the limitations on the unified commanders themselves.<sup>88</sup>

Locher stated that correcting the imbalance between service and joint interest would require adjustments to strengthen the authority, stature, and support of joint organizations, primarily the Organization of the JCS and the unified commands. The DoD lacked the mechanisms and organizational structure for mission integration that would balance the influence of the Services on issues of resource allocation, strategy, and policy. Locher further noted that the problem of mission integration was deeper than just realigning organizational structure at the top levels of the DoD. The problem of mission integration involved the disposition of the professional officer corps. Locher felt that:

Whatever changes are made at the top of the DoD organization, powerful resistance to a more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of military officers deeply immersed in the culture of their Services. This dimension of the problem will require changes in the system of military education, training, and assignments to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements, a genuine multi-Service perspective, and an improved understanding of other Services.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Locher Report, p. 4.

<sup>89</sup> Locher Report.

In essence, to eliminate the root cause of Huntington's servicism, officer development would have to cultivate a multi-service perspective within the individual officer rather than solely a service perspective, as had been the case.

As a means to develop officers imbued with a joint perspective rather than a service perspective, both the Brehm and Locher Reports called for strengthening the appeal of joint duty and to create a joint duty career specialty that would provide officers with the joint experience and education necessary to effectively fulfill the duties required of a joint staff position.<sup>90</sup> Coincidentally, another defense reformer within Congress, Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO) had also been pushing the idea of a joint officer specialist as a byproduct of his legislative efforts to reform the JCS.<sup>91</sup> These supporters of defense reform emphasizing joint duty and the creation of "joint officers" culminated into reality with the establishment of Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

#### **TITLE IV**

Two factors motivated the legislation of the Joint Officer Management Program also known as Title IV: joint staff officer performance and the nature of modern warfare.<sup>92</sup> Joint staffs consist of officers from all four services. High quality and well-trained officers are needed to serve the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unified command headquarters, NATO headquarters, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and selected defense agencies. Joint staff officer performance needed to be improved and

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<sup>90</sup> Locher Report, p. 201; The Brehm Report, p. 69.

<sup>91</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 Apr 03, HASC Staff member and principal author of HASC portion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

<sup>92</sup> Interview, Jim Locher, 25 Mar 03, SASC Staff member and principal author of SASC portion of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Title IV addressed the quality, experience, and education of officers the services assigned to joint duty, and especially to the Joint Staff, and the stability of officers in such assignments.<sup>93</sup>

Furthermore, better joint staff officer performance would help silence the anti-reform element opposing Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The anti-reform effort felt that the problem with DoD was not with the organizational structure of the military but rather with the caliber of officers in the organization. As former Marine Commandant General Krulak testified before Congress in 1983, "Someone once said in referring to an organization chart, it is not the boxes on the chart, it is the bloke in the boxes."<sup>94</sup> General Maxwell Taylor's congressional testimony that same year claimed, "that good organization and mediocre people will get no place. Good organization should be designed to make it easier for good men to do their tasks, but in no way could it really replace the quality of the individual."<sup>95</sup> Title IV was developed in response to these complaints. Congressional policymakers wanted to provide better-qualified officers to the joint organizations via mandatory joint experience and education.<sup>96</sup> Better qualified officers would appease officials such as General Krulak and General Taylor who thought defense reform was just a question of improving the quality of officers rather than organizational change.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 2.

<sup>94</sup> Locher Report, p. 91.

<sup>95</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Investigations. *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, Hearings Held June 14, 23, and 29, 1983.* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1983).p. 102.

<sup>96</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 Apr 03.

<sup>97</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 Apr 03; See also Locher Report, pp. 91-92.

The second motivating factor for Title IV was modern warfare. Eisenhower knew that joint warfighting would be requisite in future conflict. In 1958, Eisenhower remarked, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, in one single concentrated effort."<sup>98</sup> However, military shortcomings in Vietnam, as well as a series of military inadequacies in the 1980s, exposed the fact that the U.S. military did not know how to fight in an integrated fashion. For example, during the Vietnam War, five separate organizations conducted air campaigns independent of one another. Military deficiencies in the Iran hostage rescue, the Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, and the U.S. invasion of Grenada further exacerbated the fact that each service operated independently.<sup>99</sup> Prior to Goldwater-Nichols, joint warfare was what each service brought to the fight while operating independently of each other. The services lacked sufficient knowledge of one another and were so hamstrung by service parochialism that when it came to allotting resources, personnel, and manpower for combat operations, force integration was virtually non-existent. For this reason, Title IV primarily focused on combat officers since they occupy the majority of senior leadership positions and would be the ones responsible for the integration, planning, and strategy involving the

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<sup>98</sup> Huntington, "Defense Organization and Military Strategy." p. 411.

<sup>99</sup> For analysis of Iranian Hostage rescue see William C. Thomas, "Planning for Failure: An Examination of Operation Eagle Claw", *Introduction to Joint and Military Operations*, Forbes Publishing, New York, 1999. and Holzworth, C.E.. "Operation Eagle Claw: A Catalyst for Change in the American Military" <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Holzworth.htm>, 1997; Kyle, James H. *The Guts to Try*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1995. For analysis of Beirut Marine bombing and how these three operations played a role in passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act see James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers*. For analysis of Grenada invasion see John Boyle "Operation URGENT FURY: A Critical Analysis", *Introduction to Joint and Military Operations*, (New York: Forbes Publishing, 1999) and John Pike, [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/urgent\\_fury.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/urgent_fury.htm).

combat elements of the different services.<sup>100</sup> Title IV's goal was to create a multi-service perspective at the individual officer level that would instill into future military leaders the efficacy of integrated service operations to ensure greater integration of combat forces in military operations.

The Joint Officer Management Program was a compromise within the defense reform movement within Congress. Congressional reformers trying to create officers with a multi-service perspective or "joint officers" were faced with three alternatives.<sup>101</sup> The first was the creation of a General Staff. One of the more ardent members of the reform effort in Congress, Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO), had introduced a bill, H.R. 2560 *Military Command Reorganization Act of 1983* that called for the elimination of the JCS and establishment of a national command authority under a Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff would be the principal military advisor to the president and would have a joint military staff of permanently assigned officers who worked directly for him. The staff would be comprised of the best officers from each service.<sup>102</sup> This bill called for the establishment of a General Staff much like that was in place in several European militaries where officers were removed from their respective service and career fields to spend the remainder of their time as fulltime staff officers.

Members within the military and Congress balked at Skelton's idea of a joint staff that followed along the lines of a General Staff. General John Vessey, Chairman of

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<sup>100</sup>Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn, 1993, p. 78.

<sup>101</sup> Interview, Arch Barrett, 9 Apr 03.

<sup>102</sup> Skelton's proposal, H.R. 2560 was included in this hearing--United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Investigations. *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, Hearings Held June 14, 23, and 29, 1983.* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1983).p. 47.

the JCS after General Jones, testified that he was, “against creating a corps of joint paper pushers [who] don’t have the right contact with the fighting element of their own services.”<sup>103</sup> A General Staff would completely remove officers from their services diminishing the impact the services have in developing officers for future service specific leadership. A whole different personnel system would need to be created to handle this new body of officers.

The second alternative for congressional reformers was the status quo. This was obviously not working as the Brehm and Locher Reports had made abundantly clear. The third alternative was something in between the idea of a General Staff and the status quo. The “in between” became Title IV. Title IV did not completely remove officers from their service, yet officers would undergo joint officer development that fell outside the control of the services. Officers would develop a multi-service mindset and an understanding of joint operations yet would remain a member of their respective service.

#### **Title IV Requirements**

Title IV requirements have changed little since its inception in 1986. All of Title IV was codified into law under Title 10, Chapter 38 of United States Code except for the joint duty requirement, which was codified into law under Title 10 Chapter 36 Section 619a. Title IV includes the following stipulations:<sup>104</sup>

- Establishes a “joint specialty” in joint matters

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<sup>103</sup> *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, Hearings Held June 14, 23, and 29, 1983.* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1983).p. 76 for General John W. Vessey’s testimony .

<sup>104</sup> In order as listed in Booz-Allen Hamilton Report Executive Summary page 3. Title 10 Chapter 38 Sec 661 through 668 requirements and Chapter 36 Section 619a can also be found at <http://www4.law.cornell.edu>.

- Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) qualify through JPME II (Joint Professional Military Education) and experience in a joint duty assignment (JDA)
- Secretary of Defense must define JDAs as positions that provide significant experience in joint matters
- Secretary of Defense must maintain a list of all such positions, the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL)
- Secretary of Defense must fill approximately half of JDAs with JSO or JSO nominee
- Secretary of Defense must designate not less than 800 JDAs as "critical"
- Secretary of Defense must fill critical JDAs with JSOs
- Secretary of Defense must ensure officers in JDAs and JSOs are promoted comparably to peers in service assignments
  - Joint organizations get a fair share of quality officers
  - Officers are not penalized for joint duty
- Officers must serve one full tour in a JDA to be eligible for promotion to general or flag rank (07)

Title IV mandated joint officer development by outlining promotion, education, and career progression requirements. The Secretary of Defense, not the services, would be responsible for the development of joint officers. Title IV instituted two significant changes to the officer corps. First, it established the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO), which created a category of officers specially trained in joint matters. However, not all officers would become JSOs. Certain officers would be selected for this designation in order to fill duty assignments that specifically required joint expertise. JSOs have to fulfill a joint duty assignment requirement as well as two joint schooling requirements. Second, Title IV mandated a joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement for those promoted to

brigadier general/rear admiral (O7). Congressional policymakers implemented the joint duty requirement to ensure that future senior leaders of the military received joint experience but also to make sure the services sent their higher quality officers to joint duty. The services' future general and admirals would be required to serve in a joint duty assignment lasting at least three and a half years sometime between the ranks of major (O4) and colonel (O6).<sup>105</sup>

## JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT

The joint duty assignment is the greatest change to an officer's career path because of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.<sup>106</sup> The joint duty assignment is the foundation of Title IV since it is the primary means to provide joint experience and is the cornerstone for JSO development. It is also a promotion requirement to make O7 and therefore significantly alters an officer's career path. Some minor changes have been made to the original provisions of Title IV. The most significant change is an amendment in Section 514 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 that changed the length of joint tours from three and half years for field grade officers and three years for general officers to three years and two years respectively.<sup>107</sup> In addition, officers who occupy combat

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<sup>105</sup> United States. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1986. Public Law 99-433.

<sup>106</sup> See Statement of Louis J. Rodrigues, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office in United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, Hearings Held February 3, 17 March 22, April 20, and September 22, 1988*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1989, p. 2.

<sup>107</sup> John G. Koran, III. "Manpower Management for Joint Specialty Officers: A Comparative Analysis," p. 46; Arthur Strange III, "Continued Pitfalls with Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act," p. 4. See also Katherine Lemay Brown. "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," p. 9; Kevin G.

occupational specialties who are destined to become JSOs are only required to serve two years as opposed to three years for joint duty credit.

A joint duty assignment is defined as an assignment to a designated position in a multi-service, joint or multinational command or activity that is involved in the integrated employment or support of the land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the three Military Departments. Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine and policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified or specified command.<sup>108</sup> The joint duty assignment is focused on the combat functions and capabilities of the U.S. military.

### **History of the Joint Duty Assignment**

The joint duty assignment was advocated by President Eisenhower to emphasize the importance of and raise the quality of officers assigned to joint duties. It was first instituted as a requirement to promotion to general officer in 1958.<sup>109</sup> In 1983 during his congressional testimony, General Taylor reemphasized Eisenhower's emphasis on the importance of joint experience for officers for congressional military reformers. Taylor noted that Eisenhower felt officers should have joint experience prior to promotion to

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Boggs, ; Bourque, Dale A.; Grabowski, Kathleen M.; James, Harold K.; Stanley, Julie K., "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Analysis of Air Force Implementation of Title IV and Its Impact on the Air Force Officer Corps," (Air Command and Staff College, Montgomery, AL, May, 1995), p. 8.

<sup>108</sup> DoD dictionary available at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddic/>.

<sup>109</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 2 notes this requirement was established in 1958. The author could not find a document that stated this. However, the Brehm Report (*Organization and Functions of the JCS*, Report for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Chairman's Special Study Group, April 1982) stated this requirement had been around since the early 1960s on p. E-1. The earliest documented reference the author could find was DoD Policy Directive 1320.5 written in 1978 that stated that to be promoted to general officer a joint duty assignment was required.

colonel (O6) to provide a larger field of officers to select from for specific and higher-ranking joint duty assignments.<sup>110</sup> However, the JDA as a promotion requirement had been honored in the breach because each service could decide which assignments were “joint.”<sup>111</sup>

DoD Directive 1320.5, “Assignment to Joint Tours of Duty”, dated July 26, 1978 spelled out DoD policy regarding joint duty stating, “that all officers...will serve a normal tour of duty with a Joint, Combined, Allied or OSD Staff before being considered qualified for promotion to general or flag officer rank.”<sup>112</sup> Though this requirement had some impact, it was increasingly avoided by waivers and liberal interpretations of what constituted joint duty.<sup>113</sup> During the early 1980s, attention was refocused on the requirement for joint duty as congressional policymakers sought ways to fix the organizational problems of the DoD. The joint duty assignment was one method to provide officers with the experience they needed to develop the multi-service perspective as well as force the services to send their better-qualified officers to joint duty.

The Brehm Report suggested reemphasizing joint duty by returning to a strict interpretation of DoD policy outlined by Directive 1320.5. However, the Brehm report acknowledged that this tactic would be coercive and not beneficial in the long run. It did not elaborate why. Instead, in order to attract officers to joint duty, DoD would have to

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<sup>110</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Investigations. *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, First Session, Hearings Held June 14, 23, and 29, 1983.* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1983).p. 101.

<sup>111</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 2.

<sup>112</sup> Locher Report, p. 197

<sup>113</sup> Brehm Report, p. E-1.

make joint duty interesting and challenging and provide recognition for good work within the joint environment.<sup>114</sup>

The Locher Report suggested strengthening the requirement for joint duty for promotion to flag or general rank as a means to increase interest in joint assignments. The Locher Report noted the concerns of the Brehm Report but elaborated that it could lead to the undesirable practice of ticket punching amongst officers seeking to meet requirements for general.<sup>115</sup>

Congressional desire to send the services' better officers, their future generals and admirals, to joint duty outweighed these concerns. Congress codified the joint duty assignment as a requirement to promotion to O7 under U.S. Code Title 10 Chapter 36 Section 619a. The law required all officers promoted to O7 to have served in a meaningful JDA and thus ensuring that joint commanders obtained higher quality officers.<sup>116</sup>

Section 619a requires that all officers promoted to general or flag rank must have served a full tour of duty in a joint position as a field grade officer. To ensure that future general or flag officers actually have meaningful joint experience, Chapter 38 further requires that the Secretary of Defense, not the services, maintain a list of all qualifying joint duty assignments known as the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) so that they yield meaningful joint experience and qualify an officer for promotion. The Secretary

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<sup>114</sup> Brehm Report, p. E-1.

<sup>115</sup> Locher Report, p. 197

<sup>116</sup> Booz Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 3.

may define such positions; however, the positions may not be within service departments and they must be related to "joint matters," as defined by law.<sup>117</sup>

## CONCLUSION

This chapter provided the underlying motivations for the establishment of the joint duty assignment policy and the historical background of the joint duty assignment. Desires to overcome "servicism" at the individual officer level and improve the performance of officers serving in joint duty were the two main catalysts for the establishment of Title IV. The joint duty assignment policy is a foundational element of Title IV and was instituted to provide officers with joint experience. Congress made joint duty a promotion requirement to O7 so the services would have to send their higher quality officers to joint duty and to also ensure officers with a multi-service perspective would eventually occupy the senior leadership positions in the military. The next chapter will discuss the difficulties involved with the implementation of the joint duty assignment.

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<sup>117</sup>"Joint matters are matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea and air forces; national military strategy; strategic and contingency planning; and the command and control of combat operations under unified command." Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II Chapter 38, Section 668 (a).

## **Chapter Four—Joint Duty Implementation Concerns**

The implementation of the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement has been a source of concern for both congressional policymakers and the services. Two arguments have emerged regarding the joint duty promotion requirement. Since the inception of Title IV, the services have maintained that the joint duty assignment is a difficult requirement to meet for all officers promoted to O7. Congressional policymakers counter that argument saying that the services have refused ownership of joint officer development because it challenged their control over officer development. Congress feels that the services have not taken it upon themselves to implement the joint duty policy in accordance with congressional desires. Scholars have concluded it is not difficult for the best officers to bypass the joint duty assignment requirement and still be promoted to general/rear admiral.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, government studies noted that as of fiscal year 2001, the services had been promoting more officers to O7 who had met the joint duty requirement to O7 than in 1995 but, the DoD had to rely on waivers allowable under the law to comply with this provision.<sup>119</sup>

The perception exists that the services are reluctant partners in implementing the joint duty requirement and indifferent to Title IV's success because Title IV mandates

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<sup>118</sup> Katherine Lemay Brown, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," p. 31; See also Arthur Strange III, "Continued Pitfalls with the Implementation of Title IV, Goldwater-Nichols Act," p. 12.

<sup>119</sup> United States. Government Accounting Office, "Military Personnel: Joint Officer Development Has Improved but a Strategic Approach Is Needed," GAO-03-238, p. 23.

have been forced upon them.<sup>120</sup> When examining the implementation of the policy, two aspects need to be examined to understand policy compliance according to Winter. First, the relationship between the policymakers and the implementing authorities during the implementation process must be studied. Second, the design and structure of the policy must be examined to determine if it offers a feasible way to meet policy objectives. Winter finds the link between the implementation process and the design of the policy is often ignored in policy studies. The majority of implementation literature attributes failures to a lack of cooperation between policymakers and implementing authorities and disregards flaws in policy design. Winter notes though that regardless of the commitment or the nature of the relationship some policies are impossible to implement from the start since they are not structured to ensure full compliance.<sup>121</sup>

This section examines the two contending explanations for the difficulties associated with implementing the joint duty requirement. The first explanation looks at the relationship between the services and congressional policymakers explaining why the services are reluctant partners and not taking ownership of implementing this requirement. The second explanation examines policy design and the services' claim that they have to "fit in" a joint duty tour into a demanding set of requirements for their future general and flag officers.<sup>122</sup>

## RELUCTANT PARTNER

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<sup>120</sup> James Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," p. 15; Interview, James Locher III, 25 Mar 03.

<sup>121</sup> Winter, "Integration Implementation Research," in *Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening up the Black Box*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>122</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, John E. Schank, Harry J. Thie, Clifford M. Graf II, and Paul Steinberg, "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," RAND Study MR-593-JS, p. 17.

Title IV challenges the services' ability to develop their own officers therefore the services have not embraced the implementation of Title IV statutes. While positive steps were made in the area of joint officer management, James Locher noted in 1996:

These positive results were achieved despite indifferent implementation of the joint officer provisions by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. The failure of the last decade to develop a DoD directive to govern the joint officer management program confirms a lack of commitment on the part of top civilian and military organizations. The services were not indifferent. They made vigorous efforts to minimize the impact of the legislation on their interests. Senior joint officers—the beneficiaries of improved joint staffs—took little interest in the issue.<sup>123</sup>

Locher further added, "Congress had hoped that the department (DoD), after several years of implementing Title IV, would conceptualize a better approach to joint officer management. That has not occurred."<sup>124</sup> According to Locher, the services still remain largely indifferent to implementation of Title IV provisions, contending that it was thrust upon them. Therefore, the services have refused ownership of Title IV policies.<sup>125</sup> The military's inability to implement the provisions of Title IV is a source of concern for congressional policymakers, especially in light of studies that indicate the services are capable of meeting the joint duty requirement.<sup>126</sup>

Three factors support the argument that the services are reluctant to embrace the implementation of the joint duty assignment policy: conflicting objectives, a tradition of

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<sup>123</sup> James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," p. 15.

<sup>124</sup> Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," p. 15.

<sup>125</sup> Interview, James Locher, 25 Mar 03; See also Locher, "Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," *Naval War College Review*, (Washington, D.C.: Autumn 2001), p. 7

<sup>126</sup> See Harrell, et. al., "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," RAND Study MR-593-JS; See also two GAO studies: United States. General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: Proposals to Modify the Management of Officers Assigned to Joint Duty*. GAO/NSAID-88-78BR, April, 1988; United States. General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths*. GAO/NSAID-88-184BR, June, 1988.

service autonomy, and a deficient authority apparatus enforcing the joint duty mandate. These are all characteristics of the congressional-military relationship regarding the joint duty mandate.

### **Conflicting Objectives**

Tension exists between the services and congressional policymakers due to compliance with Title IV versus the preservation of service interests. High among service interests is control of its officer corps for readiness, developmental, and cultural reasons.<sup>127</sup> Two areas are especially valued by the services: money and people. Service chiefs are more adamant about protecting their personnel than acquiring a larger portion of the budget.<sup>128</sup> Title IV went after the gem of the military services: its personnel.<sup>129</sup>

The services initially felt and still feel that joint officer development comes at the expense of service officer development.<sup>130</sup> The joint duty assignment lies at the heart of this tension since it is the foundation of Title IV. The services want to develop and mold their officers in the traditions of their particular service. Ultimately, the services want their best officers to represent and serve the interests of their particular service at the highest ranks of the military. On the other hand, Congress wants to see the services' higher quality officers in joint duty to improve the quality of joint organizations and develop a multi-service perspective among the officer corps. To achieve this, Congress

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<sup>127</sup>Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1 p. 7; See also Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*; *Victory on the Potomac: Goldwater-Nichols Unifies the Pentagon*. (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 2002), p. 16; John P. White, "Meeting the Needs of the Secretary of Defense," in *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective*, pp. 51-64.

<sup>128</sup>William J. Crowe Jr., *The Line of Fire - From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military*, p. 160.

<sup>129</sup>Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 April 03.

<sup>130</sup>Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 4.

placed the Secretary of Defense, not the services, in control of joint officer development in order to make the services comply with the legislation.

Joint officer development though is ultimately dependent upon the services for Title IV compliance. The services plan, recruit, educate, train, assign, promote, and transition their officers according to their missions and specialties.<sup>131</sup> The result is that joint organizations are entirely reliant on the services for officers. The services are responsible for their officers meeting the requirements set forth under Title IV and are charged with implementing the requirements of Title IV. The services however, have specific service requirement they want their future senior officers to meet.

### **Service Requirements**

All officers, regardless of career field or service, are expected to meet certain service requirements in order to be promoted. Officers also have a limited time frame to meet these requirements. The joint duty assignment still has to be "fit into" an officer's career path amongst service requirements, which also have to be met if an officer is to be a competitive candidate within their service for promotion to O7.<sup>132</sup> These mandatory requirements include command, staff, and professional schooling assignments. The minimum service requirements these officers will need to meet as field grade officers in order to be competitive for brigadier general/rear admiral is service and career field dependent. Certain non-combat career fields will not have the same command requirements as combat officers in order to get promoted. Table 4.1 shows that each officer will likely have to fulfill two command assignments, two schooling assignments

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<sup>131</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report. Chapter 1, p. 4.

<sup>132</sup> Harrell, et. al., "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," p. 17.

and one service staff assignments. The Navy does not emphasize the schooling requirement as the other services but places greater emphasis on having their best officers out at sea or in warfighting assignments.<sup>133</sup> Added to this is the two or three-year joint duty assignment that all officers promoted to O7 are also expected to fulfill.

Table 4.1: Field Grade Service Requirements

Field Grade Service Requirements for Combat Officers					
Rank	Time	Army Combat Arms Officer	Air Force Fighter Pilot	Marine Combat Arms Officer	Navy Surface Warfare Officer
O4	10 to 16 years	-School (1yr) -Staff pre/post branch qualifying tour (1 or 2 yr) -Branch Qualifying Tour (1 to 2 yrs)	-School (1yr) -Service Staff (2yr) -Executive Officer (2 yr) or -Wing Level Position (2 or 3yr) --ie Safety, Stan/Eval	-School (1 yr) -Fleet Tour (3yr) --Operations Officer --Marine Staff or -Non-Fleet Tour (3yr) --ie Recruiting	-Shore Tour (3yr) --Staff -Sea Tour (2yr) -- Executive Officer
O5	16 to 20 years	-Battalion Command (2 yr) -Senior Service School (1 yr)	-Operations Officer (1 yr) -Squadron Command (2 yr) -Senior Service School (1 yr)	-Battalion Command (2 yr) -Staff Tour (2 to 3yr) -Senior Service School (1yr)	-Shore tour (3yr) -- Staff -Sea Tour (2yr) -- Command
O6	20+ years	-Brigade Command (2yr)	-Deputy Group Commander (1 yr) -Group Commander (2 yr) - D.C. Tour/Staff (2 yr)	-Brigade Command (2yr)	-Shore Tour (3 yr) --Staff -Sea Tour (2 yr) -- Major Command

The services feel that service specific requirements are more important than joint requirements to prepare officers for senior level leadership in their respective services.<sup>134</sup>

Service requirements are a priority over joint requirements for two reasons. First, the

<sup>133</sup> Interview, Navy Personnel Officer, 20 Oct 03. Executive officer as a Lieutenant Commander (O4) is a prior requirement to command of a ship as a Commander (O5).

<sup>134</sup> Harrell, et. al., "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," MR-593, p. 17.

services feel that there are service-specific experiences, such as unit command, that are more important to an officer's development as a future general or flag officer than a joint duty assignment.<sup>135</sup> The services want to develop their best officers in the tradition of their service in order for these officers to eventually fill senior leadership roles in the service. The services would like to retain their best officers to meet service needs.<sup>136</sup> Therefore, it would seemingly be in the services' best interest to minimize or avoid the joint duty requirement. Second, officers need to meet service requirements in order to get promoted. Service requirements have a higher priority for officers since they provide officers with more exposure within their service to those responsible for their promotion. Officers are more likely to want to fulfill service requirements first over joint requirements in order to remain competitive for promotion.

Therefore, the services and Congress do not share the same objectives regarding joint duty and officer development. Conflicting objectives are common in policy implementation making cooperation difficult. Furthermore, Stoker notes that cooperation is considerably more difficult and uncertain if the implementation participants enjoy substantial autonomy.<sup>137</sup> Builder argues that the individual services enjoy considerable power and autonomy within the national security structure and therefore outside attempts to reform the services are only implemented if the services choose to pursue the reforms.<sup>138</sup> Allison and Halperin note that career officials within the military services believe that the health of their service is vital to the national interest. The key to

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<sup>135</sup> Harrell, et. al., "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments".

<sup>136</sup> J. Schank, Harry Thie, Jennifer H. Kawata, Margaret C. Harrell, Clifford M. Graf, Paul Steinberg, "Who is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List," p. 2.

<sup>137</sup> Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 3.

<sup>138</sup> Carl H. Builder, "Service Identities and Behavior" in *American Defense Policy*, p. 108.

protecting an organization's health is to protect the overall essence of the organization, which in the case of the services would be their personnel, missions, and budgets. Protecting the essence of the organization drives the services' need for autonomy within the defense establishment.<sup>139</sup> The military has a tradition of acting autonomously when faced with undesirable reform efforts. Joint officer management is no different. The recent Booz-Allen Hamilton study of joint officer management noted that, "despite the impressive acceptance of joint matters that has occurred in the Armed Forces as a result of Goldwater-Nichols, the services remain deep, power institutions likely to act in their own interest without external pressure."<sup>140</sup>

### **Service Autonomy**

#### **Roots of Service Autonomy**

Control of the military is granted by the Constitution.<sup>141</sup> The Constitution provides for a series of checks and balances so that no single branch has total control over any one element of the government. The president was made the Commander in Chief of the military while Congress was given the power of the purse and the ability raise armies. During the course of the nation's history, both branches of the polity have found it necessary to seek out the military for support for different initiatives. This need has empowered the services and provided them with a sense of autonomy. The spreading of power between the two branches "is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force,

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<sup>139</sup> Graham T. Allison, Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm" in *World Politics*, (Spring, 1972), p. 48-50.

<sup>140</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 5.

<sup>141</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 81-83

drawing military leaders into political conflict.”<sup>142</sup> In turn, the multiple authority structure governing the military permits, “a service, in good conscience, to give less than full and faithful compliance with an administration decision, to impose the most congenial interpretation on an ambiguous order, to exercise professional military judgment, and to appeal to other superiors for a reversal of an offending directive.”<sup>143</sup>

Since the end of World War II, both the legislative and executive branches of government have sought to strengthen the machinery of political control over the armed forces. However, the services have been able to manipulate this diffusion of power to serve their own interests.<sup>144</sup> As the competition between these branches has increased, the individual services could and would seek out support from the other branch.<sup>145</sup> The services were more likely to turn to Congress, a traditional supporter of service autonomy, in its efforts to stave off unfavorable legislation.

### **Congressional Support for Service Autonomy**

Congress has encouraged service autonomy for three reasons. First, the American political experience embraces the notion of separation of powers and civilian control of the military. The Madisonian concept mandating countervailing forces to best control the aggrandizement of power served as the basis for the creation of a decentralized military consisting of two autonomous services.<sup>146</sup> Decentralized controls of the military and

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<sup>142</sup> Huntington, p. 177.

<sup>143</sup> Kanter, *Defense Politics : A Budgetary Perspective*, p. 38

<sup>144</sup> Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 347.

<sup>145</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 180-184.

<sup>146</sup> James Madison, “Federalist No. 51”, in *Governance and American Politics: Classic and Current Perspectives*, ed. James P. Pfiffner (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1995), pp. 276-280. See also Christopher P. Gibson, “Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and National Security through Madisonian Concepts,” PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1998.

separate services are extensions of the fragmentary, pluralist nature of the nation's government. The distinction between branches prevented the military from speaking with one voice and becoming too powerful in the political decision making process.

Second, congressional jealousy of the respective powers between the legislative and executive branch has made Congress leery of any type of military unification.<sup>147</sup> Congress did not want to cede any power to the presidency. An increase of power within the DoD's organizational structure could tilt the balance of power away from Congress and to the President.<sup>148</sup> Service autonomy and overall lack of DoD cohesion has worked in Congress' favor.<sup>149</sup> Interservice rivalry enabled Congress to solicit the information it needed in order to play a role in defense policy.<sup>150</sup> Congress could play one service against another to get the answers it needed.

Lastly, a decentralized DoD prevented a strong budget recommendation from a unified defense establishment giving individual legislators more leeway to provide favorable funding for their districts.<sup>151</sup> From the days of political patronage at the nation's shipyards and army bureaus in the late 1800s to the present, defense dollars translate into jobs and votes. Congressmen who had established mutually rewarding

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<sup>147</sup> Thomas C. McNaugher, "Improving Military Coordination: Reorganization of the DOD", in *Who Makes Public Policy: The Struggle for Control Between Congress and the Executive*, p. 221.

<sup>148</sup> Gordon N. Lederman, "Authority and Responsibility: Passage and Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," p. 63.

<sup>149</sup> Lederman, "Authority and Responsibility: Passage and Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," p. 63.

<sup>150</sup> Sharon K. Weiner, "The Changing of the Guard: The Role of Congress in Defense Organization and Reorganization in the Cold War.", p. 1

<sup>151</sup> Lederman, "Authority and Responsibility: Passage and Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," p. 64.

relationships with certain services tended to be reluctant to initiate or engage in a review of the military that might threaten the services or possibly funding to their districts.<sup>152</sup>

Congressional policymakers were well aware of the services' autonomous behavior. The DoD had successfully resisted or ignored reform efforts over the four decades preceding the passage of Title IV and the Goldwater-Nichols Act.<sup>153</sup> Congress had played a significant role in DoD resistance by limiting the defense reform efforts of both President Truman and Eisenhower. General Jones, the initiator of the congressional defense reform effort in the early 1980s, saw this having studied President Eisenhower's effort to reorganize the military. General Jones realized that any successful reform effort would have to come from within Congress not the executive branch. He deliberately detailed the failings of the DoD citing the Brehm Report to Congress during his 1982 congressional testimony.<sup>154</sup>

The magnitude of the problems afflicting the Defense Department in the 1980s, further detailed in the Locher Report and exacerbated by operational failings, ultimately forced Congress to collectively acknowledge that it would need to discard its favorable relationship with the military to enact reform.<sup>155</sup> Many in Congress saw the Goldwater-Nichols Act as Congress' chance to finally fix all of the organizational problems that had plagued the DoD since its inception in 1947.<sup>156</sup> Congressional policymakers, fully aware

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<sup>152</sup> See Seymour Scher's seven reasons why legislators fail to oversee implementation in, "Condition of Legislative Control" *Journal of Politics*, 25 (Aug 63) 526-51.

<sup>153</sup> Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers*, p. 281.

<sup>154</sup> Jones, "Reform: the Beginnings," p. 7. See also Gunderson, "In Search of Operational Effectiveness: Military Reform in the 1980's," p. 112.

<sup>155</sup> Locher, "Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act," p. 7.

<sup>156</sup> Interview, James Locher, 25 Mar 03.

of the autonomous behavior of the services, placed the Secretary of Defense in charge of joint officer development.

### **Authority and Enforcement**

Congress, fearful that the services would not comply with Title IV requirements, provided the Secretary of Defense, not the services, with control over joint officer development in order to place trained, experienced, quality officers with a joint perspective on joint staffs and at the senior ranks of the military.<sup>157</sup> Specifically, Section 404 of Title IV outlines the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense regarding the joint duty assignment. It states that the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the regulations governing USC Title 10, Chapter 36, Section 619a, "Joint Duty Assignment as a Prerequisite for Promotion to General or Flag Officer Grade."<sup>158</sup>

Congress had hoped that by placing the Secretary of Defense, not the services, in charge of joint officer management the services would comply. While the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for joint officer management, he does not have the power needed to force the services to comply in order to make joint officer management work as prescribed by congressional policymakers. Schlesinger points out that the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the power afforded the Secretary of Defense are incongruent. Schlesinger notes that similar to Neustadt's notion of the president only having the power to persuade, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "provides the

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<sup>157</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 2.

<sup>158</sup> United States. *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1986. Public Law 99-433. Title IV, Section 404, p. 42.

secretary simply with a license to persuade outside parties.”<sup>159</sup> The first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, identified two problems with the new defense establishment in 1948. First, interservice rivalry dominated all aspects of decision making from funding to service missions. Forrestal found interservice rivalry endemic at even the highest level of the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).<sup>160</sup> Second, Forrestal was powerless to do anything to cure this rivalry. The Secretary of Defense had no legislatively authorized power to order compliance. He could only persuade the services to get along not command it.

Congressional policymakers working on defense reform in the early 1980s were aware of the weakness of the Secretary of Defense in exercising effective civilian control over the military, especially if his authority conflicted with the bureaucratic interests of the services.<sup>161</sup> Congressional policymakers still provided the Secretary of Defense with total authority over the administration of Title IV. The services have been able to promote officers without joint duty and without notable repercussions. As early as 1992, it was noted that not one single officer had been denied promotion to O7 because the joint

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<sup>159</sup>James Schlesinger, “The Office of the Secretary of Defense” in *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace*, ed. Robert J. Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985,) p. 261. See also Richard E. Neustadt, “Power to Persuade,” in *Governance and American Politics: Classic and Current Perspectives*, ed. James P. Pfiffner (Ft. Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1995), p. 143; Gordon N. Lederman also makes note of Neustadt's theory when he discusses Forrestal's lack of statutory powers in , “Authority and Responsibility: Passage and Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.” Harvard Law School Thesis, Sept. 21, 1997, p. 33.

<sup>160</sup>Getz, “Congressional Policy Making: The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986,” p. 91.

<sup>161</sup>See John G. Kester, “The Office of the Secretary of Defense with a Strengthened Joint Staff System,” in *Toward a More Effective Defense*, ed. by Barry M. Blechman and William J. Lynn (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1986), pp. 181-197, See pp. 186-187 for specific discussion on the limited power of the Secretary of Defense.

duty requirement was not met.<sup>162</sup> One potent method the Secretary of Defense could use to enforce this requirement is to withhold waivers for officers who have not yet completed joint duty.<sup>163</sup> This has not occurred. The Secretary of Defense's lack of authority is only partially to blame. The ultimate authority for joint duty compliance rests with Congress.

Congress is the branch responsible for military reform. Huntington points out that while there are vagaries surrounding the Constitution's designation of the President as "Commander in Chief", the Constitution is explicit in its powers assigned to Congress regarding the military.<sup>164</sup> Janowitz points out that while the locus of civilian control tends to reside in the executive branch, Congress remains the forum for military matters and retains the critical capability to reform the military.<sup>165</sup> Article One, section eight of the Constitution expressly guarantees Congress the power to organize, discipline, and employ the armed services of the United States.<sup>166</sup> Congressional weapons include statutes, appropriations, and investigation that can all be used to enforce service compliance.<sup>167</sup> Furthermore, Congress is authorized to control the officer promotion system. The ultimate punishment Congress could exercise is to withhold confirmation of brigadier general/rear admiral nominees unless they meet the joint duty requirement. This enforcement has also not occurred.

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<sup>162</sup> Dennis M. Savage, "Joint Duty Prerequisite for Promotion to General/Flag Officer," p. 7.

<sup>163</sup> Savage, "Joint Duty Prerequisite for Promotion to General/Flag Officer," p. 7.

<sup>164</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 178-179

<sup>165</sup> Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, pp. 350-353.

<sup>166</sup> U.S. Constitution, Article I, Sec 8 (16).

<sup>167</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 179.

Overall, implementation of the joint duty assignment challenges the services ability to retain their best officers for service specific positions and their ability to develop officers in a manner befitting the respective military branch. With no enforcement authority coupled with conflicting objectives and a historical predilection for autonomous behavior, this raises the question that the services may be behaving in a self-interested manner by not complying with this policy in order to meet the interests of the services rather than Congress. However, the services' argument that the joint duty is difficult to fit into an officer's career path has merit. Problems with the design of the joint duty pose difficulties for officers trying to meet this requirement.

#### **POLICY DESIGN**

Three problems with the design of the joint duty policy provided obstacles for the implementation of this requirement. First, congressional policymakers, fully aware of the autonomous behavior of the services, dictated prescriptive legislation throughout the Goldwater-Nichols Act including Title IV in order to force service compliance. The prescriptive legislation made it difficult for the services to comply and further alienated the services' desire to comply. Second, the joint duty assignment further burdened the demanding career path of officers with another promotion requirement. As previously noted, the services prioritized service promotion requirements higher than joint requirements. In most cases, joint duty assignments compete for the best officers at the most demanding points of their career further limiting an officer's ability to meet this requirement.<sup>168</sup> Lastly, the structure of the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) does not

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<sup>168</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Executive Summary, p. 14

always provide assignments with appropriate joint experience or suitable opportunities from officers from different career fields.

### **Prescriptive Legislation**

Prior to implementation, the services' protests to the prescriptive nature of Title IV went unheeded by congressional policymakers. The services' ability to resist the previous reform efforts of Truman and Eisenhower now worked against them. Protest and resistance by the services to the prescriptive nature of Title IV was viewed as further indication that the services were "anti-joint" and trying to protect their own interests at the expense of national interest.<sup>169</sup> Congressional policymakers felt that no matter what they proposed the services would fight it.<sup>170</sup> The legislation of Title IV was put in place by congressional reformers to ensure service compliance. In reality, the services feel that the prescriptive nature of Title IV has made it difficult for the services to comply with Title IV mandates.

Congressional policymakers were forced to inscribe rigid regulations for two reasons. First, Congress was afraid the services would not follow Title IV mandates based on their previous ability to thwart reform efforts and their desire to retain control over their personnel.

Because the law proposed to take responsibilities away from the service departments and service chiefs and then give them to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, JCS, and UCCs, the services...resisted the law strongly. This resulted in congressional reformers believing that DoD and the services would not carry out a general reform mandate. Consequently, they crafted very prescriptive

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<sup>169</sup> William J. Crowe Jr., *The Line of Fire - From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military*, p. 158.

<sup>170</sup> Email Interview, James Locher, 26 October 03.

legislation to compel DoD and the services to comply, to prevent circumvention, and to monitor compliance.<sup>171</sup>

Second, while Title IV implementation requirements were not vague, its objective was. The objective of Title IV was to create an officer corps imbued with a joint perspective. This is difficult to quantify. How is a perspective measured?<sup>172</sup> The implementation of the joint duty assignment and joint education requirements under Title IV were methods put in place by policymakers to try to cultivate this joint perspective. Requirements such as the joint duty assignment could be measured to make sure the services were taking steps to actualize a joint perspective within the officer corps.

Some senior military officers did approve of the many changes being implemented under the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Admiral Crowe, the sitting Chairman of the JCS during the passage of Goldwater-Nichols, was one such officer. However, he was opposed to Title IV legislation because it was too rigid:

One element of the Goldwater-Nichols that I opposed strongly was Title Four... The concept per se was not objectionable. But the detailed legislation that mandated every aspect of the "Joint Corps" from the selection process and the number of billets to promotional requirements, I believed, a serious mistake that threatened a horrendous case of congressional micromanagement. In this instance the chiefs were unanimous in their opposition, and I agreed with them wholeheartedly.<sup>173</sup>

With the military's top leadership not wholeheartedly embracing Title IV, the services did not fully support the implementation of Title IV mandates either.

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<sup>171</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 4.

<sup>172</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 April 03.

<sup>173</sup> Crowe Jr., et al., *The Line of Fire - From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military*, p. 158.

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<sup>171</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 4.

<sup>172</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 April 03.

<sup>173</sup> Crowe Jr., et al., *The Line of Fire - From Washington to the Gulf, the Politics and Battles of the New Military*, p. 158.

The original joint duty requirement has changed since 1986. Today, field grade officers are now only required to serve three years instead of three and a half years.<sup>174</sup> The Critical Occupation Specialty (COS) was also introduced where officers from combat career fields only need to serve in a two year joint assignment rather than a three year joint assignment in order to qualify as a JSO. Officers are also able to accumulate credit towards full joint duty credit.<sup>175</sup> Yet, even with these concessions, the services feel that both service and joint requirements could not be met during an officer's field grade time.<sup>176</sup>

### Officers' Timeline

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 provided a common standard for officer career progression across the four services. DOPMA instituted how officers should be trained, appointed, promoted, separated, and retired. DOPMA established the number of officers allowed in each grade above O3 and the time an officer is allowed to spend in that grade. DOPMA instituted the "up or out" system in

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<sup>174</sup> Put into place under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989; Officers occupying critical occupational specialties and who are JSOs are still only required to serve a two-year joint duty tour.

<sup>175</sup> See Katherine Lemay Brown, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," p. 9; See also Boggs, et. al, "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Analysis of Air Force Implementation of Title IV and Its Impact on the Air Force Officer Corps," p. 8; Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 9 Apr 03.

<sup>176</sup> United States. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. *Implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, Hearings Held February 3, 17 March 22, April 20, and September 22, 1988*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1989; Included in committee report is United States. General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths*. GAO/NSAID-88-184BR, June, 1988 that indicates that the services felt both joint and service requirements could not be met. Also, based on discussions with Dr. Barrett and James Locher who cite specific examples of officers pointing this out.

which officers have to be promoted in order to stay in the service.<sup>177</sup> An officer has to meet his or her promotion requirements in the allotted time at each grade in order to make it to the next grade. Therefore, the driving force underlying an officer's career path is time and promotion requirements.

DoD's higher quality officers have an extremely tight timeline to meet all their requirements in order to be promoted. Two major problems emerge with an officer's career path with the implementation of the joint duty assignment. First, higher quality officers, especially combat officers, have a more crowded career path. More qualified officers have to meet both service and joint requirements in order to be promoted. Not all officers will serve in a joint duty assignment. Unless they become JSOs, officers whose careers end at O4, O5, or O6 are not required to serve in joint duty. Only those that are promoted to O7 or are JSOs are required to fulfill the joint duty requirement. Furthermore, officers that retire as O5s or O6s do not always meet the command and schooling requirements necessary to become a competitive candidate to O7. Therefore, an officer promoted to O7 has the supplementary requirement of a two or three-year joint duty assignment in addition to a more demanding set of service requirements.

Second, an officer's time in service is limited according to the law. Officers promoted to brigadier general/rear admiral must have completed all the necessary requirements in order to be competitive for O7 but they also need to be promoted early enough to general/admiral so they can fulfill the services' senior leadership needs further

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<sup>177</sup> Bernard Rostker, Harry Thie, James L. Lacy, Jennifer H. Kawata, S.W. Purnell "The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment," MR 4246 (Rand: Santa Monica, CA, 1993), see Section 2 on discussion of DOPMA. Officers passed over for promotion twice depending on grade and time in that grade are separated from the service.

down the line. A typical officer's career is programmed to finish at the rank of O5 and at the 20-year mark. Any promotion beyond O5 is considered an exceptional career.<sup>178</sup> However, the services need to promote officers beyond O6 to fill their senior leadership positions.

The typical officer spends between 14 and 17 years total as a field grade officer.<sup>179</sup> However, officers who are competitive for promotion to brigadier general/rear admiral are often promoted at an accelerated rate with some officers spending as little 12 years as a field grade officer.<sup>180</sup> These officers are considered to be the services' best officers and on the "fast track". They are promoted "below-the-zone", which compresses their time as field grade officers. Future generals and admirals are promoted at an accelerated rate for two reasons. First, the services have a pressing need to make two, three, and four star generals/admirals in order to fill the highest ranks of military leadership. Second, these officers must have enough time to fulfill the responsibilities of the ranks at senior levels before being forcibly retired. O7's are required by law to retire at 30 years, O8's at 35 years, O9's at 38 years, and O10s at 40 years.<sup>181</sup> However, while

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<sup>178</sup> Air Force Personnel Center, Officer Career Path Guide Available on the web [http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/ofcr-cpguide/New\\_Folder/Career%20Path%20Guide.doc](http://www.afpc.randolph.af.mil/ofcr-cpguide/New_Folder/Career%20Path%20Guide.doc); See also Katherine Lemay Brown, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," p. 29; Noted as general theme during discussions with military personnel officers.

<sup>179</sup> United States. General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths*. GAO/NSAID-88-184BR, June, 1988. p. 5.

<sup>180</sup> Katherine Lemay Brown, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," p. 29-30; Van Trees Medlock, "A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership" p. 67 cites 12 years specifically for Army officers; Interview, Anonymous Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, Below the Zone Selectee, 9 October 03.; Email Interview, Air Force personnel officer 7 October 03. Air Force officers competitive for O7 are normally first considered for promotion to O7 by their 22<sup>nd</sup> year of service.

<sup>181</sup> Title 10 Subtitle A Part II, Chapter 36, Subchapter III, Sec 635 and Sec 636.

an O10 is able to serve 40 years, the average O10 retires with 33 to 34 years of time in service spending almost ten years in the general/admiral ranks. Officers that retire at O7s spend about three years at O7 before retiring.<sup>182</sup> Therefore, the services' future generals and admirals are promoted ahead of their peers through the field grade ranks to ensure that they have enough time to meet senior rank requirements. In addition to the accelerated promotion rate of higher quality officers, structural flaws in the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) impact an officer's ability to meet the joint duty requirement.<sup>183</sup>

### **Joint Duty Assignment List**

The JDAL is a list created by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense that contains all the joint duty assignments that provide joint qualifying credit to officers. The first JDAL was immediately put into place by Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the JCS in 1986, in an effort to show that the services were on board with the implementation of Title IV. Admiral Crowe had the DoD designate 100% of the positions for officers in grade O-4 and above in the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands as joint duty assignments. He further qualified 50% of the positions in the existing defense agencies as joint duty assignments for the JDAL.<sup>184</sup> This created two structural flaws that are still evident today.

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<sup>182</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, Harry J. Thie, Peter Schirmer, Kevin Brancato, "Aligning the Stars: Improvements to General and Flag Officer Management," MR 1712, (Rand: Santa Monica, CA, Sep 2004), pages xvi, 10-13, and Appendix A pp. 63-84 for description of time in grade for general/flag rank officers.

<sup>183</sup> Edward Soriano, "Title IV-Joint Officer Personnel Policy Quality vs. Quantity," pp. 18, 37; Donald J. Cymrot "Analysis of the Size of the Joint Duty Assignment List," p. 13-14; Julius E. Coats, Jr., "Joint Duty Prerequisite for Promotion to O7".

<sup>184</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 30; Interview with Army Personnel Officer 17 July 03; Margaret C. Harrell, Harry J. Thie, Jefferson P. Marquis, Kevin Brancato, Roland J. Yardley, Clifford M. Graff II, Jerry Sollinger, "Outside the Fleet Navy Requirements" RAND National Security Division,

Assignments on the JDAL are identified as lacking in joint content and therefore not providing joint experience to the officers serving in them.<sup>185</sup> The designation of all assignments in the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the unified commands as joint duty assignments set the precedent of extending to all staff officers joint duty credit. This was done without regard to their specialty or duties. Many of these positions do not meet the definition of "joint matters" and diluted the purpose of the joint duty assignment. Positions such as deputy comptroller, morale/welfare/ recreation staff officer, assistant director of advertising, public affairs officer, directors of military equal opportunity policy, budget analyst, and director of military compensation can be found on the current JDAL. These positions have little to do with the planning, strategy, and the employment of U.S. combat forces yet service in these positions qualifies an officer for promotion to O7.<sup>186</sup>

Furthermore, Admiral Crowe's initial JDAL did not provide for enough promotion qualifying opportunities for combat officers. This condition still exists today. While combat officers occupy a significantly higher portion of the senior level positions in the U.S. military, they have a disproportionately lower number of assignments available to them on the JDAL.<sup>187</sup> The current JDAL contains over 9000 assignments.<sup>188</sup>

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Study MR-1472 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p. 25; Defense agencies include such organizations as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) or the Missile Defense Agency.

<sup>185</sup> Cymrot, "Analysis of the Size of the Joint Duty Assignment List," p. 18; See also Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Executive Summary, p. 8.

<sup>186</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 34.

<sup>187</sup> Edward Soriano, "Title IV-Joint Officer Personnel Policy Quality vs. Quantity," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: March 1989, pp. 18, 37; Donald J. Cymrot "Analysis of the Size of the Joint Duty Assignment List," Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1990, p. 13-14; Julius E. Coats, Jr., "Joint Duty Prerequisite for Promotion to O7," U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: March 1989.

Each service has an allotted amount of assignments on the JDAL. The Army and Air Force each have approximately 3300 assignments to fill on the current JDAL. The Navy has 2000 assignments to fill while the Marines have close to 600 assignments to fill.<sup>189</sup>

Combat officer assignments are limited compared to other career fields. For example, Army armor officers have a two percent chance of finding a joint duty assignment based on the number of armor assignments available on the JDAL and armor officers eligible. This holds true for the other services. Air Force fighter pilots have a ten percent chance of finding a joint duty assignment on the JDAL while Navy surface warfare officers have an eight percent chance. Compare this to non-combat career fields such as intelligence. Air Force intelligence officers have a 40% chance; Army intelligence officers have an 18% chance; and Navy intelligence officers have a 33% chance of finding a joint duty assignment on the JDAL compared to the number of officers eligible.<sup>190</sup>

The initial JDAL created by Admiral Crowe contained 8200 assignments. Admiral Crowe felt this number would satisfy the immediate concerns of the services for enough promotion qualifying positions and joint organizations' desire to attract higher

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<sup>188</sup> Numbers based on most recent JDAL provided by Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, VA.

<sup>189</sup> The JDAL fluctuates. These numbers are approximations based on the 2003 JDAL.

<sup>190</sup> Army and Air Force numbers supplied by Army Perscom Center, Alexandria, VA. On the current JDAL 14 armor assignments exist while the Army has 836 armor officers in the field grade ranks. For Army intelligence officers, 233 assignments exist for 1813 officers. For the Air Force, 149 fighter pilot assignments are available for 1522 fighter pilots eligible in the field grade ranks. For Air Force intelligence officers 384 intelligence assignments are available for 967 intelligence officers. Navy numbers provided by Navy Bureau of Personnel, Millington, TN. JDAL breakdown provided by Special Assistant Joint Matters section; Shortage of promotion qualifying opportunities for combat officers noted by Donald Cymrot in his 1990 paper "Analysis of the Size of the Joint Duty Assignment List," JDAL has 167 surface warfare assignments while the Navy has 2065 surface warfare officers eligible for joint duty. Naval intelligence officers have 213 assignments for 637 intelligence officers eligible.

quality officers. He expected the JDAL to be refined in the future in an effort to better meet congressional expectations for providing joint experience.<sup>191</sup> Admiral Crowe's original concept for the JDAL is still in existence today.<sup>192</sup> While the JDAL has expanded to include more assignments to qualify more officers for promotion to O7, the JDAL has not undergone any adjustments as expected by Admiral Crowe to better match officers with specific joint assignments nor has it changed its apportionment of assignments based on career field requirements.

### CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS

Congressional policymakers from the inception of this policy were aware of the difficulties of fitting the joint duty requirement into an officer's career path and have altered the design of this policy in an effort to get all officers joint duty qualified. The focus of congressional policymakers at the time of this policy's inception was on the larger issue of making sure that the services sent their better officers to joint duty and overcoming service resistance to this policy rather than joint duty tour lengths and its potential impact on an officer's career path.<sup>193</sup> Therefore, congressional policymakers reduced the time required for joint duty credit and created the Critical Occupational Specialty (COS) officers in order to get as many officers joint credit as possible. Furthermore, Congress has allowed for an even larger JDAL than Admiral Crowe's initial 8200 assignments as the services try to qualify as many officers as possible with joint credit and joint organizations try to qualify as many assignments as possible in an

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<sup>191</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 30

<sup>192</sup> Harrell, et. al., "Outside the Fleet Navy Requirements," MR-1472, p. 25;

<sup>193</sup> Email Interview, James Locher, 26 Oct 03.

effort to attract the services' better officers. Adjustments to the JDAL are the responsibility of the DoD not Congress. Congress was surprised at the initial size of the JDAL expecting a smaller JDAL of 5000 to 6000 assignments.<sup>194</sup> The JDAL now currently stands at 9000 plus assignments.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the implementation concerns regarding the joint duty policy. Winter argues that the relationship among implementing authorities needs to be examined as well as the design of the policy in order to analyze implementation success. The tense relationship between the services and Congress is well documented. Congress has found the services largely unenthusiastic about implementing the joint duty assignment while the services maintain the joint duty assignment is difficult to fit into the crowded career path of the services' future generals and admirals. Congress has changed the design of the joint duty policy in an effort to ensure full compliance. Studies have shown that officers from each service have enough time to fit a joint assignment into their field grade time.<sup>195</sup> Furthermore, it has been shown that the services are capable of fulfilling the demands of a larger JDAL.<sup>196</sup> Yet, implementation problems plague this policy. This indicates that other problems may exist with the implementation of this

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<sup>194</sup> Donald Cymrot, "Analysis of the Size of the Joint Duty Assignment List," p. v-vi.

<sup>195</sup> United States. General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths*. GAO/NSAID-88-184BR, June, 1988.

<sup>196</sup> Margaret C. Harrell, John E. Schank, Harry J. Thie, "Identifying and Supporting the Joint Duty Assignment," (RAND Study MR-622 Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996); This analysis is culmination of two preceding Rand studies by Margaret C. Harrell, John E. Schank, Harry J. Thie, Clifford M. Graf II, and Paul Steinberg, "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," (RAND Study MR-593-JS Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996). and Margaret C. Harrell, John E. Schank, Harry J. Thie, Clifford M. Graf II, and Paul Steinberg, "Who is Joint? Reevaluating the Joint Duty Assignment List," (RAND Study MR-574-JS Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

policy. The next chapter will discuss the theoretical underpinnings and conceptual model for evaluating the implementation of the joint duty promotion requirement to determine if the services' are behaving in a self-interested manner.

## **CHAPTER Five---Theory and Conceptual Model**

The intent of this study is to evaluate the policy requiring joint duty as a requirement for promotion to O7. Implementation concerns still exist with this policy. While the focus of these concerns concentrate on flaws in policy design or the strained relationship between Congress and the services, no empirical analysis has been conducted examining service compliance with the joint duty requirement. This evaluation of the joint duty requirement will attempt to determine if the services are exhibiting strategic behavior within the implementation of the joint duty assignment requirement. Are the services implementing this requirement in a manner that benefits their organizational self-interest? Congress' concerns that the services are reluctant partners are based on the historical inclination of the services acting autonomously when faced with unfavorable legislation. However is this concern justified? Strategic behavior by the services needs to be discerned to determine if this is a factor in the implementation process of the joint duty mandate.

As stated in the introduction, the challenge of national governance is to gain the cooperation of reluctant partners involved in the implementation process. Implementation provides an opportunity for participants to pursue self-interests and to behave strategically within the implementation framework. When reluctant partners implement policy, the process empowers the implementing authorities who may discover and exploit

opportunities for strategic, self-interested behavior.<sup>197</sup> The services are reluctant partners implementing the joint duty requirement. Because Congress relies on the services to implement this policy, the services have the opportunity to behave in a self-interested manner within the implementation process.

Two areas of the joint duty assignment will be evaluated to determine if the services are exhibiting strategic behavior. First, the level of compliance with joint duty policy needs to be examined. Studies previously referenced in this analysis have indicated that officers are not meeting this requirement. If the services were reluctant partners prone to acting autonomously in this implementation process, non-compliance of this requirement would be an issue. Furthermore, the extent of the non-compliance needs to be established. Second, the impact of complying with the joint duty requirement on promotion to O7 needs to be examined. If the services were behaving strategically within the joint duty implementation process, it could be expected that the services would be promoting their better officers without joint duty. Better officers are promoted faster than their peers. Therefore, if the services' value service development over joint development, one would expect the services to promote those officers without joint duty faster than officers meeting the joint duty requirement.

As noted in the previous chapter, officers promoted to general/admiral ranks are the services' better officers and are often promoted "below the zone". An officer's primary zone for promotion is when he or she meets the promotion board with their peers at the expected time established by the services. Officers promoted in their primary zone

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<sup>197</sup> Robert Phillip Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 4; See also Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game : What Happens after a Bill Becomes a Law*, p. 9.

are considered “on time” or “in the zone” to promotion. The “below-the-zone” promotion capability allows for the accelerated promotion of outstanding officers who have demonstrated performance and potential superior to those who otherwise would be promoted. Below-the-zone promotions apply only to promotion to the grades of O4, O5, and O6. The Air Force recently became the only service to discontinue below the zone promotions to O4. Officers can be promoted one or two years below the zone thus compressing the time an officer has to meet their requirements to O7. Officers consistently promoted ahead of their peers are considered on the “fast track.”

While all officers promoted to the general/admiral ranks are considered superior officers, even within this pool of officers fast track officers distinguish themselves amongst their peers. For example, the majority of officers are promoted to O7 between their 25<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> year of service.<sup>198</sup> However, officers that rise to O10 are promoted to O7 between their 21<sup>st</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> year.<sup>199</sup> Faster promotion time is typically thought of as indicative of a better officer. Officers on the fast track would have faster times to promotion to O7.

Two theoretical areas, civilian control of the military and implementation theory, provide the theoretical foundations to evaluate this policy. Following the theoretical foundation, the key definitions and variables of interest used in this model will be examined. Lastly, the hypotheses guiding this research will be offered and discussed.

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<sup>198</sup> For the officers in the post Goldwater-Nichols sample in this analysis, 58% of the officers were promoted between their 25<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> years of service to O7. 10% of the officers were promoted between their 18<sup>th</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> year to O7 and 32% were promoted between their 28<sup>th</sup> and 33<sup>rd</sup> year of service. This is supported by data presented in the study by Rand “Aligning the Stars: Improvements to General and Flag Officer Management,” p. 12.

<sup>199</sup> Rand Study, “Aligning the Stars: Improvements to General and Flag Officer Management,” Rand MR 1712, pp. 11-13.

## THEORY

Two theoretical areas provide the foundation for evaluating this policy: civilian control of the military and implementation theory. Congress has the authority to authorize reform of the military yet it can be argued that Congress lacks control over the implementation of these reforms. These two areas establish the theoretical principles underlying the requirement for the joint duty assignment policy and the basis to analyze the policy's implementation success.

### **Civilian Control of the Military**

In general, most societies stipulate that their armed forces need to be controlled and that their powers kept in check. The basic problem of civilian authority over military power is the degree that the power needs to be minimized so that the military is strong enough to protect the society but unable or unwilling to subvert societal institutions such as the government. Civil authorities can exercise either subjective control or objective control of the military. Subjective control refers to the maximizing of power of civilian groups in relation to the military. In essence, the civilian institutions of the state control the military. In contrast, objective control refers to political power distributed by civil authorities that allows for the maximizing of military professionalism. Objective control seeks to militarize the military and make it a tool of the state. The military and political elements operate in separate spheres under objective control.<sup>200</sup> According to Huntington and Janowitz, the U.S. polity exercises subjective civilian control over the military.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 81-83.

<sup>201</sup> Huntington, p. 80.

Subjective civilian control is manifested in three ways according to Huntington. The first is subjective control exercised by governmental institutions, such as Congress or the president. The second is class control when social classes, such as the aristocracy, dominate the officer corps of a country's military. And lastly, subjective control can be a constitutional form that presupposes civilian control, such as a democracy.<sup>202</sup> In the United States, subjective control is carried out through governmental institutions. Congress has the right to institute military reform. However, civilian control of the military decreases in the subjective form since the military gradually becomes involved in the politics of the ruling civilian institutions. In contrast, objective control is the antithesis of military participation in politics. Because objective control reduces military power by professionalizing the military and making it a tool of the state, it renders the military politically neutral. Objective control of the military has only been possible since the emergence of the professional officer corps and it has been difficult to achieve in Western society since civil authorities continue to insist upon the subordination of the officer corps to their desires.<sup>203</sup>

The United States can claim to have a professional officer corps, but objective control is not attainable since the officer corps has strong political influence. Huntington points out that the political power of the officer corps lies in its authority and influence.<sup>204</sup> The officer corps' influence is manifested through its affiliation with congressional committees, which in turn determine a large portion of the government's budget. The

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<sup>202</sup> Huntington, pp. 81-82.

<sup>203</sup> Huntington, pp. 81-85.

<sup>204</sup> Huntington, p. 88.

officer corps' influence is also felt through the presence presented by senior officers within the political administration and with the public. Janowitz notes that since World War II, there have been competing efforts between the executive and legislative branches to strengthen control over the military. The military elite have developed a sophisticated ability to intervene in the national decision making process and have emerged as a pressure group in the domestic political arena.<sup>205</sup> As a result, the U.S. military is neither politically sterile nor neutral and objective control is unattainable.

Janowitz notes the need for civilian involvement in the military establishment and greater congressional oversight because of the larger role the officer corps plays in the political realm.<sup>206</sup> The dual nature of control between the President and the Congress has unintentionally increased the military's political influence and has not provided for an effective method for civilian management of the military. This allows the DoD to play the executive branch against the legislative branch when searching for support.<sup>207</sup> The services are also able to solicit support from wherever they can find it within Congress and are able to avoid or ignore unfavorable legislation. The services will continue to seek out legislative support if it is available. Janowitz concludes that greater congressional oversight of the military is necessary to control the military and this cycle.

In the 1950s, Janowitz argued that U.S. subjective civilian control led to an increase in inter-service rivalry and rivalries among the officers of the four services as each service sought support from the legislature. The services would not unify

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<sup>205</sup> Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, pp. 348-9.

<sup>206</sup> Janowitz, Chapter 17; See also Christopher P. Gibson, "Countervailing Forces: Enhancing Civilian Control and National Security through Madisonian Concepts", (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1998), p. 12.

<sup>207</sup> Janowitz, p. 349.

themselves thus leading Janowitz to conclude that it is up to the civilian authorities to unify the services. This analysis foreshadowed the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the joint duty assignment.

Janowitz found that officers with an immediate superior from their own service largely agreed that an officer who "vigorously supports the view of his own service" is more likely to get promoted. Conversely, officers who were serving in joint duty under an officer from a different service were less inclined to support this viewpoint and had a broader, less parochial outlook.<sup>208</sup> Janowitz believed that understanding the mechanisms of the promotion system were at the root of the unification process and that the method to unify the services could be solved by promoting the officers with the multi-service outlook. Janowitz theorized that if Congress modified the system of promotions they could guarantee that the officer with the "joint" or broad non-service point-of-view would be rewarded via promotion and thus enhance unification of the services.<sup>209</sup> Janowitz identified the military promotion system as, "a crucial lever of civilian control," stating that:

Modification of the system of promotions, a crucial lever of civilian control, has not been undertaken for the purpose of enhancing unification. The DoD has been reluctant to interfere with the selection of higher officers, and Congress has been inhibited on the grounds of "playing politics." Consequently, there has been no effort to guarantee that the officer with a broad non-service point of view would be rewarded.<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Janowitz, p. 352.

<sup>209</sup> Janowitz, p. 352.

<sup>210</sup> Janowitz, p. 353.

The establishment of the joint duty assignment as a requirement under the Goldwater-Nichols Act is the manifestation of Janowitz's idea of civilian control. After the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Congress would only be authorizing the promotions of joint experienced officers to senior level ranks.

Civilian control of the military, although ascribed to, does not always allow for effective military reform. In order to authorize and enforce military reform, Congress must have legitimate authority. Additionally, the DoD must be obligated to meet congressional reform initiatives. Implementation theory provides a theoretical basis for understanding congressional authority and service compliance regarding the joint duty policy.

### **Implementation Theory**

The legitimacy, the ability, and the right to implement policy are critical factors to understanding policy compliance. The basis for examining policy implementation is grounded in the authority paradigm.<sup>211</sup> A compliance relationship consists of two parties, an actor who exercises power and an actor subjected to this power.<sup>212</sup> Those exercising power have legitimate authority and wisdom to implement policy. With all federal policy initiatives, the wisdom and legitimacy reside in the federal government.<sup>213</sup> In the case of the joint duty assignment, Congress is granted the authority to reform the military under the Constitution. Article One, section eight, expressly guarantees Congress the authority to organize, discipline, and employ the armed services of the

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<sup>211</sup> Robert Philip Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 25.

<sup>212</sup> Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations; on Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates*. p. 4; See also Robert Philip Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 23.

<sup>213</sup> Stoker, *Reluctant Partners: Implementing Federal Policy*, p. 22.

United States.<sup>214</sup> A key aspect of implementation theory is the relationship between policymakers and implementing authorities.

Effective implementation is rooted in authority and control of the policymakers charged with realizing a policy's goals. Whatever hampers or diminishes control of the federal authorities during implementation is detrimental to implementation compliance. Although Congress has the authority to order military reform it lacks control over the implementation. As previously mentioned, Congress has relied on the DoD to implement the joint duty requirement. As a result, the success of this policy ultimately depends on the services that are responsible for implementing it. Policy implementation is also determined by the relationship between implementation actors. Congruence of policy objectives often establishes the type of relationship between policymakers and implementing authorities.

Policies that challenge the organizational interests of a bureaucracy often determine how an organization will behave during implementation. Title IV's objectives challenged the services' ability to develop their own officers. Conflicting objectives between policymakers and implementing authorities can have a deleterious effect on policy implementation.<sup>215</sup> Of particular note is the power that implementing agents have in the implementation process. Empowered implementing authorities can be detrimental to the implementation process in light of conflicting objectives. As noted earlier,

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<sup>214</sup> U.S. Constitution, Article I, Sec 8 (16).

<sup>215</sup> See Martha Derthick, *New Towns In-Town*; Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Implementation : How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland : Or, Why It's Amazing That Federal Programs Work at All, This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hope*, for groundbreaking examinations of conflicting objectives between policymakers and implementing authorities.

participants in the implementation process tend to behave “strategically” by pursuing their own self-interests within the framework of implementation especially if the participants are used to a certain degree of autonomy.<sup>216</sup> The services’ predilection for acting autonomously in an effort to protect their organizational interests has been established.

The evaluation standard for any policy should be the official goals of the policy.<sup>217</sup> Congressional goals for implementing the joint duty assignment were two fold. First, the joint duty assignment was designed to improve the quality of officers serving in joint duty. By making it a promotion requirement to O7, the services would have to send their best officers to joint duty. Second, the joint duty assignment requirement was to provide officers promoted to the senior level ranks with joint duty experience. In this case, officers promoted to brigadier general/rear admiral should have complied with the joint duty requirement.

## **KEY DEFINITIONS AND VARIABLES OF INTEREST**

### **Joint Duty Variable**

Two different joint duty variables are used in this analysis. The first portion of this evaluation examines compliance. To measure overall compliance, joint duty is the dependent variable and is a three way categorical variable divided into *no*, *waiver*, and *yes* categories. Officers in the *no* category did not have full joint duty credit prior to

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<sup>216</sup> Stoker, *Reluctant Partners : Implementing Federal Policy*; Eugene Bardach, *The Implementation Game : What Happens after a Bill Becomes a Law*.

<sup>217</sup> Soren Winter, “Integration Implementation Research,” in *Implementation and the Policy Process : Opening up the Black Box*, pp. 21-23.

promotion to O7. Officers in the *waiver* category have been exempted from the joint duty requirement based on the criteria discussed in the next section. Lastly, officers falling into the *yes* category have full joint duty credit and have met the promotion requirement as required by congressional policymakers.

The second portion of this evaluation examines the effect of joint duty compliance on promotion times. For this portion of the methodology, the joint duty variable used in the compliance portion will become a two-category variable since officers with waivers are considered in compliance with the policy. Joint duty will be used as an independent variable in this case. The *yes* category will consist of officers in compliance with the policy and will be comprised of officers who had full joint duty credit or had a waiver. The *no* category will consist of officers that did not have full joint duty credit. This is done so a comparison in promotion times can be made for those officers that complied with the requirement compared to those officers that did not comply. Certain officers are granted waivers from joint duty because they are exempted from it or do not have to meet it.

### **Waiver Criteria**

According to USC 10 Chapter 36, section 619a, the Secretary of Defense can waive the requirements for joint duty for five reasons. These waivers are categorized as for the good of the service in which the Secretary of Defense waives the joint duty requirement, as required to benefit the service. Currently, this waiver is limited to ten percent of the total officers promoted each year. This guideline might be undergoing

changes in the near future.<sup>218</sup> The Secretary of Defense can also waive the joint requirement for officers promoted in scientific and technical career fields where a joint duty requirement does not exist. These are called science and technology waivers. A third waiver, the serving in waiver, is for officers who are currently serving in a joint duty billet at the time of their promotion. As long as they have been in the joint duty assignment for at least 180 days at the time the selection board convenes, and the officer has over two years of consecutive joint time in the organization, joint duty can be waived. Joint duty can also be waived if an officer served in what is now considered a joint duty assignment prior to 1987. The officer had to have served in that assignment for at least 12 months to get credit. This is known as the Pre-87 waiver. Lastly, if an officer served in an assignment that involved joint matters but was not classified as a joint duty assignment, the officer can receive what is known as a previous JDA waiver. The use of this waiver expired January 1, 1999. Officers with waivers are accounted for in the compliance portion of this evaluation falling into a specific category separate from officers with and without joint duty. For the promotion effect portion of this evaluation, officers with waivers fall into the category of officers complying with this requirement.

### **Career Field**

For comparison purposes, non-line officers, such as medical, legal, and chaplain were eliminated so that only line officers were evaluated. Line officers are divided into two groups: combat and non-combat. This is done for three reasons. First, there has always been a distinct delineation between combat and support officers in the military.

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<sup>218</sup> Interview, Joint Officer Management Branch, Joint Manpower Division, Joint Staff, 21 August 03.

This dichotomy has its roots within the intra-service relationships present in each service. As Builder points out, all three services make intra-service distinctions among their people, particularly their officers on the basis of their specialties or skills. The Navy is the most elaborate with a distinction between officers in aviation, submarines, and surface ships. The Army and Air Force has a two caste or two plateau system for officers. The Air Force is pilots and all others while the Army is combat branch officers and all others.<sup>219</sup> Within these castes, Kanter notes that the Air Force has the highest degree of differentiation while the Army demonstrates the least.<sup>220</sup> Overall, each service can divide its officers into operational career fields or support career fields. Operational career fields are those that are involved in combat activities while support career fields, as the name suggests, provide support to those serving in combat career fields.

Second, the traditional means to promotion to the higher ranks of the military has been through the operational career fields. More officers from combat specialties occupy the senior level ranks of the military. It can be expected then that more combat officers are promoted to general and at a faster rate than their peers in the support career fields. Both Huntington and Janowitz speak of the heroic leader whose key qualification is his warfighting skill.<sup>221</sup> Janowitz notes that officers aspiring for senior rank find that the combat career fields are the prescribed career track to senior level rank.<sup>222</sup> However, as Riper and Unwalla found in their 1959 study, while rapid promotion and high rank is still

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<sup>219</sup> Carl H. Builder, "Service Identities and Behavior" in *American Defense Policy*, pp. 114-115.

<sup>220</sup> Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective*, p. 20.

<sup>221</sup> See Kathleen van Trees Medlock discussion on Huntington and Janowitz's description of military leadership in her dissertation, "A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership", Dissertation, George Mason University, 1993, pp. 4, 22.

<sup>222</sup> Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, p. 147.

most likely to come through operational career fields, prospects for promotion for support officers has increased.<sup>223</sup> Janowitz does note that military managers and technicians have emerged as leaders in the modern military.<sup>224</sup> Wood, in his survey of Air Force officers, found the prestige of support jobs had increased, while the prestige attached to the flying function had diminished.<sup>225</sup> Today's hi-tech military environment requires an increasing amount of highly trained support functions to support a smaller number of combat officers. Support officers now have greater access to senior level promotion, yet the senior ranks are still dominated by officers from the combat branches.

Third, Title IV recognizes the difference between operational and support officers by labeling certain career fields "critical occupational specialties" (COS). Combat officers were the focus of joint officer development since they provide the majority of officers to senior leadership positions and are responsible for the integration, planning, and strategy involving the combat elements of the different services.<sup>226</sup> Because of the demanding requirements for future combat leaders, congressional policymakers adjusted the time requirements of the joint duty assignment from three years to two years for critical occupational specialty (COS) officers and three years for all other officers in an effort to ease the difficulty of fulfilling this requirement for the services.<sup>227</sup> This

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<sup>223</sup> Paul P. Van Riper and Darab B. Unwalla, "Military Careers at the Executive Level," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 9 Issue 4 (March 1965), p. 435.

<sup>224</sup> Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, p. 21. See also Van Trees Medlock, "A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership", p. 25

<sup>225</sup> Frank R. Wood, "At the Cutting Edge of Institutional and Occupational Trends: The U.S. Air Force Officer Corps," in *The Military: More than Just a Job?*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, Frank R. Wood (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's Inc, 1988), p. 31.

<sup>226</sup> Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, p. 78; Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 16 Dec 03.

<sup>227</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 16 Dec 03.

designation only applies to combat officers who are selected as JSOs. However, the services categorized as many career fields as COS as possible in an effort to get as many officers qualified with the joint duty requirement.<sup>228</sup> Those career fields that fall into the combat category are listed in Table 5.1 and are based on the COS designation created by Title IV policymakers.<sup>229</sup>

**Table 5.1: Critical Occupational Specialties used for Combat portion of Career Field Variable**

CRITICAL OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES (COS)			
USA	USAF	USMC	USN
Infantry	Pilot	Infantry	Surface
Armor	Navigator	Tanks/Amphib Vehicle	Submariner
Artillery	Command/Control Operations	Artillery	Aviation
Air Defense Artillery	Space/Missile Operations	Air Control/Air Support	SEALS
Aviation		Anti-Air Warfare	Special Operations
Special Operations		Aviation	
Combat Engineers		Engineers	

The non-combat category contains officers from the support career fields, such as intelligence, communication, and supply.

### Promotion Time

The second portion of this analysis evaluates the effect of joint duty compliance on an officer's promotion to O7. The dependent variable used for this portion of the evaluation is time to promotion to brigadier general/rear admiral and is a quantitative

<sup>228</sup> Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 16 Dec 03, Interview, James Locher, 25 Mar 03.

<sup>229</sup> Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report to President and the Congress*, 2000, Appendix E Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Report. Can be accessed at [http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr\\_intro.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html)

measure using months as a metric. Two different metric variables are used to measure the total effect of the joint duty assignment. The first metric variable measures how fast an officer was promoted from O6 to O7. Promotion time from O6 to O7 was chosen as the metric since the law allows officers to fulfill joint duty at the O4, O5, or O6 ranks and some officers will not fill a joint duty assignment until they are O6. The effect of joint duty cannot be measured if it has not yet been performed. The O6 to O7 metric will capture all officers who have fulfilled joint duty. The second metric variable expands the promotion time of the O6 to O7 promotion variable in order to conduct a sensitivity analysis. This metric variable measures an officer's time in the field grade ranks, from O4 to O7 and affirms the results of the O6 to O7 metric while examining a possibly wider impact of joint duty compliance on promotion times.<sup>230</sup>

### **Goldwater Nichols Act**

To determine if joint duty has had an effect on officer promotion times, a comparison of promotion times for officers prior to and post the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act needs to be established. A categorical variable will be used placing officers into two categories: pre-Goldwater Nichols Act or post-Goldwater Nichols Act. This establishes a baseline promotion time to determine the possible effects of joint duty on promotion times since only officers in the post-Goldwater Nichols group are required to have joint duty.

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<sup>230</sup> Sensitivity analysis will be conducted with a smaller sample size. Three dates of rank are provided in the dataset. Date of rank to O7, date of rank to O6, and whatever date of rank the officer was 10 years prior to the start of the data set groups (30 Sep 81 for the first group and 30 Sep 97 for the second group). The majority of officers were O4s (n=655) 10 years prior so those officers were used because it captured total time as a field grade officers. Sample size for other ranks 10 years prior to the start date are O3 n=14; O5 n=237; and O6 n=8.

### Promotion Variables

An officer's promotion to O7 is a result of several factors. The model chosen for this analysis is based on Moore and Trout's Visibility Theory of Promotion. Their model uses seniority, commissioning source, performance reports, actual performance, assignment, visibility, and chance as independent variables to measure an officer's promotion chances from the junior ranks to the senior ranks. Moore and Trout find that at the senior officer level, visibility, the officer's reputation amongst his or her peers and superior officers, are the most significant factors in promotion. Performance is not a significant factor at the senior officer level for two reasons. First, senior officer duties are too diffuse to quantify. Second, it can be assumed that since these officers are being considered for promotion to senior level rank, their performance, which is established in the middle ranks, is superior.<sup>231</sup> Since all officers in this dataset were promoted to O7, it can be assumed that they achieved the required visibility, met the required assignments, and that their performance was superior.<sup>232</sup> This analysis will therefore use other distinguishing characteristics for control variables noted by Moore and Trout that distinguish an officer at the senior level. These include time in service and commissioning source (Academy, ROTC, OTS/OCS). Level of education (Bachelors, Masters, Doctorate) has also been included since advanced degrees are expected at the senior officer level.

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<sup>231</sup> David B. Moore and Trout, "Military Advancement: The Visibility Theory of Promotion," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 72, Issue 2 (June 1978), p. 455-458.

<sup>232</sup> Moore and Trout, "Military Advancement: The Visibility Theory of Promotion," p. 460.

These promotion variables will be used in conjunction with previously mentioned categorical variables of career field, Goldwater-Nichols, and joint duty to determine the overall effect of joint duty on promotion times. As previously mentioned, joint duty will now be a two category variable consisting of two categories: *no, not compliant* or *yes, compliant*. Lastly, distinction by individual service for both compliance and the effect of joint duty compliance on promotion will be examined. The service variable will serve as a categorical variable with each service serving as a category.

### **HYPOTHESES RESULTING FROM THE MODEL**

Congressional policymakers claim that the services have not embraced the implementation of the joint duty requirement. Scholars and government studies have already noted that the joint duty assignment can be avoided. The relationship between Congress and the services regarding joint duty indicates that compliance with this requirement is a problem. The higher priority placed on service requirements rather than joint requirements, meshed with a history of autonomous behavior and no enforcement measures, calls into question the level of compliance by the services. Therefore, to what extent have the services complied with the joint duty promotion requirement? The first hypothesis is:

**Hypothesis 1: While the majority of officers have met the joint duty requirement, the services are not in complete compliance with this policy.**

The next portion of this analysis determines whether or not the services are behaving strategically within the implementation process by promoting their better officers without joint duty at a faster rate than officers who have met the joint requirement. Since Congress is reliant on the services for implementing the joint duty

requirement the services are in a position to behave strategically or in a self-interested manner within this implementation process by promoting their better officers without joint duty. The services claim that it is too difficult to meet this requirement for all officers and supposedly place a higher priority on service requirements than joint requirements. Officers with faster promotion times are better officers. If the services are behaving strategically, officers with faster promotion times would not have complied with the joint duty requirement. To determine if the services have exhibited strategic, self-interested behavior, promotion times of officers who complied with the policy versus those who did not need to be compared. The second hypothesis is as follows:

**Hypothesis 2: Officers not meeting the joint duty requirement are promoted at a faster rate than officers in compliance with the joint duty promotion requirement.**

Three sub-hypotheses follow from the examination of joint duty on promotion times. The effect of joint duty and promotion times for combat versus non-combat officers can be discerned. The traditional means to promotion to the higher ranks of the military has been through the operational career fields. Therefore, it is expected that officers from the combat career fields are promoted faster. Furthermore, the joint duty requirement focused on combat officers since they provide the senior leadership responsible for the integration, planning, and strategy involving the combat elements of the different services.<sup>233</sup> Therefore, more combat officers should be in compliance with this policy and combat officers should be promoted faster. The three sub-hypotheses are:

**Sub-Hypothesis 1: More combat officers are in compliance with the joint duty requirement policy than non-combat officers.**

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<sup>233</sup>Peter W. Chiarelli, "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, p. 78; Interview, Dr. Arch Barrett, 16 Dec 03.

**Sub-Hypothesis 2: For non-compliant officers, combat officers are promoted at a faster rate to O7 than non-combat officers.**

**Sub-Hypothesis 3: For officers in compliance, combat officers are promoted at a faster rate to O7 than non-combat officers.**

## **CONCLUSION**

This chapter discussed the theoretical foundation for evaluating the joint duty promotion requirement. The conceptual model was addressed by describing the variables to be used for this evaluation. Lastly, the hypotheses derived from the conceptual model were explained and given. This evaluation attempts to determine if the services have exhibited strategic behavior within the implementation process of the joint duty promotion requirement by first examining compliance with the policy objective and second, to see if the services are promoting officers without joint duty ahead of those who were in compliance with the policy. The next chapter will discuss the data and methodology used to evaluate the hypotheses.

## **CHAPTER Six—Data and Methods**

This chapter describes the data used for this study and the methods used to analyze it in order to evaluate the implementation of the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first section will describe the data. The second section will explain the methodology. The methodology for each hypothesis will be discussed.

### **THE DATASET**

The services' ability to implement the joint duty assignment requirement will be evaluated using data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. This analysis evaluated archival data containing the promotion characteristics and the joint duty history of officers promoted to O7.<sup>234</sup> The dataset contains a total of 911 officers promoted to O7 and is broken down into two distinct periods. The first period contains 492 officers promoted to O7 from September 30, 1981 to September 30, 1985. The second period contains 419 officers promoted to O7 from September 30, 1997 to September 30, 2001. However, because non-line officers were eliminated from this sample, the sample is reduced to 793 officers with 403 officers in the 1981-1985 group and 390 officers in the 1997-2001 group. For both subsets of officers, the officer had to be on active duty for the

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<sup>234</sup> The joint duty portion of an officer's record came from the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS), which was put in place after Goldwater-Nichols to monitor joint officer compliance. Officers from each services' GOMO (Each service has a GOMO (General/Flag Officer Management Office) that tracks general/admirals within their service) indicated that this is the most reliable source for an O7's joint duty history.

entire period to be included in the sample. For example, an officer promoted in 1983 would still have to be on active duty September 30, 1985 to be included in the sample. However, an officer promoted in 1983 but retired in 1984 would not be considered.

These year groups were selected for two reasons. First, the 1981 to 1985 year group is the immediate group preceding the passage of the Act and will allow a pre- and post-comparison of promotion times to O7. This comparison should show if the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act had any impact on promotion times to O7. Second, the 1997 to 2001 group represents the first groups of officers who served their entire field grade time under the requirements of Title IV. Title IV studies cite twelve years as the approximate time an officer competitive for promotion to O7 will have to meet his or her promotion requirements during their field grade time.<sup>235</sup> Furthermore, the last significant modification impacting the joint duty requirement occurred in 1993 when Congress authorized joint duty credit for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.<sup>236</sup> Therefore,

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<sup>235</sup> Both Van Trees Medlock and Kathy Lemay Brown assert twelve years as the number of years an officer has to meet both service and joint requirements to be competitive for promotion to brigadier general/rear admiral. In Van Trees Medlock's dissertation, "A Critical Analysis of the Impact of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act on American Officership" p. 67 she states an Army officer has 12 years to meet JSO requirements and service requirements before they are looked at for promotion to general. Brown in "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," pp. 29-30, cites Van Trees Medlock when she asserts the same time period to fulfill requirements. Brown notes that this does not include officers promoted below the zone who make rank faster than other officers. The GAO study, *Military Personnel: Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths*, 88-184BR, June 1988, p. 5 claims that Army officers spend 13.6 years as field grade officers, Marines 15 years, Air Force 12.9 years, and Navy 16 years. This study however does not consider the fact those officers who are competitive for brigadier general are likely to make rank on time or faster than other officers. Van Trees Medlock assertion of 12 years is appropriate considering an officer will make Major/Lt Commander (O4) around the 11 year mark and should be competing for brigadier general/admiral (O7) at the 22-23 year mark.

<sup>236</sup> See Kevin G. Boggs, ; Bourque, Dale A.; Grabowski, Kathleen M.; James, Harold K.; Stanley, Julie K., "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: An Analysis of Air Force Implementation of Title IV and Its Impact on the Air Force Officer Corps," p. 8 for a discussion of modifications prior to 1990; See also Brown in "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

this group of officers should have been able to accommodate a joint duty assignment prior to promotion to O7 and incorporate any changes into their joint duty history.

## **METHODOLOGY**

### **Compliance**

The methodology for the first research question will use tabular data to determine the extent of service compliance with the joint duty policy. Three tables will be used to accomplish this and will only use officer data from the 1997 to 2001 group since they were required to meet the joint duty assignment requirement in order to be promoted.<sup>237</sup> The first table will look at the percentage of officers receiving waivers from joint duty. Two categorical variables will be used for this table, career field and waivers. Waivers will be the dependent variable. The second table will look at the overall percentage of officers within the DoD in compliance with the joint duty requirement. Two categorical variables will be used, career field and joint duty, with joint duty as the dependent variable. This table will give the percentage of overall compliance DoD wide. The third table will break out compliance by service to see if there is a difference among the services and compliance. Three categorical variables will be used: career field, joint duty, and service. The percentage of officers not meeting the joint duty requirement according to service will be shown in this table.

### **Joint Duty and Promotion Time**

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Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," p. 9 for GNA updates since 1987.

<sup>237</sup> One officer in the 1981 to 1985 group was credited with joint duty.

The methodology to be used to determine the overall effect of joint duty compliance on an officer's promotion time to O7 will be analysis of variance (ANOVA) and multivariate regression. ANOVA is used because it is usually the most appropriate method when groups of observations are created by a categorical independent variable. ANOVA allows a researcher to compare groups by showing the impact of a variable on different groups.<sup>238</sup> ANOVA determines the variation in the mean for the two groups affected by the variable and compares the means of the different groups. This allows the researcher to draw conclusions regarding the impact of a variable and to study the effect of a categorical (qualitative) variable on a quantitative (metric) variable.<sup>239</sup> For this analysis, multiple factor ANOVA will be used because the analysis of the joint duty requirement involves multiple categorical variables and will help determine if there is an interaction effect between these variables.

Interaction describes the relationship between two variables in the context of a third or controlling variable. Two factor ANOVA designs allow the researcher to investigate the interaction between two sources of influence. An absence of interaction indicates that the relationship between the response variable and explanatory variable does not change for the different categories of a control variable.<sup>240</sup>

Multivariate regression will also be used to ensure the validity of the ANOVA analysis and to determine the effects of the variables used in the ANOVA equations while

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<sup>238</sup> Gudmund Iversen and Helmut Norpoth. *Analysis of Variance*. 2nd ed.(Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987), p. 6.

<sup>239</sup> Alan Agresti and Barbara Finlay. *Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences*. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), p. 438; See also Iversen and Norpoth. *Analysis of Variance*. p. 8.

<sup>240</sup> Rick J. Turner and Julian F. Thayer. *Introduction to Analysis of Variance : Design, Analysis, & Interpretation*. (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2001), p. 53; See also Agresti and Finlay, *Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences*, p. 369 for definition of interaction.

controlling for other variables involved in an officer's promotion to O7. Most explanatory statistical models analyzing policy start with one response variable and one describing variable. However, as the analysis develops, additional describing variables are added. Officer promotion time is impacted by more variables than the joint duty requirement. As a result, multivariate regression proves useful for models involving multiple variables.<sup>241</sup> Like ANOVA, one can determine the impact of two or more explanatory variables on a dependent variable with multiple regressions. Whereas ANOVA determines the effect of a qualitative, categorical variable on a quantitative, dependent variable, multivariate regression analyzes the relationship of quantitative, explanatory variables on a quantitative, dependent variable. The same data analyzed using ANOVA can always be analyzed by regression analysis with suitably constructed dummy variables.<sup>242</sup> The importance of multivariate regression is that it enables the researcher to determine if there is a linear relationship between the dependent and explanatory variable.<sup>243</sup>

Three sets of measures will be used to analyze the effect of the joint duty requirement. Each set of measures will include tables with O7 promotion times, ANOVA, and multivariate regression. The first measure will look at the effect of the Goldwater-Nichols Act on promotion time in order to establish a comparison of promotion times to O7 pre and post Goldwater-Nichols. The categorical variables for the ANOVA will be career field and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, pre and post. The

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<sup>241</sup> Edward R. Tufte, *Data Analysis for Politics and Policy*. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 18; See also Thomas H. Wonnacott and Ronald J. Wonnacott. *Introductory Statistics*. (New York: Wiley, 1969) p. 269.

<sup>242</sup> See type of variable in Appendix B and coding of variables in Appendix C.

<sup>243</sup> Iversen, Norpoth. *Analysis of Variance*, pp. 88-90.

multivariate regression will include variables for time in service, commissioning source, and education level in addition to career field and Goldwater-Nichols.

The second measure will look at the effect of complying with the joint duty requirement on promotion times to O7. The categorical variables for ANOVA will include career field and joint duty. As previously mentioned, the joint duty variable will be measuring compliance, *yes* or *no*, and is a dummy variable. The multivariate regression will include career field and joint duty from the ANOVA, as well as time in service, commissioning source, and education level. The third equation will look at the effect of joint duty on officers specific to each service. The same ANOVA and regression equation for measure two will be used but will be sorted by service to determine the effect of joint duty compliance specific to each service.

#### **Career Field and Joint Duty**

For the last three sub-hypotheses, to determine the difference between combat and non-combat officers regarding joint duty, this analysis will use the previous two methodologies. Career field is an independent variable throughout the first two methodologies. For the first sub-hypothesis, the results found in the compliance methodology will be used to determine the level of compliance between combat versus non-combat officers. A chi-squared test will be used in conjunction with joint duty table to determine if career field and joint duty compliance are statistically independent. For the other two sub-hypotheses, the promotion tables and ANOVA results in the second methodology will be used to compare promotion times.

#### **CONCLUSION**

This chapter presented the data and methodology to be used to evaluate the hypotheses presented in Chapter Five. The data consists of the personnel records and joint duty histories of 911 officers promoted to O7 from two distinct periods prior to and after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These records will be evaluated using tabular, ANOVA, and multivariate regression methods to determine the extent of compliance with this policy, the effect of complying with the joint duty requirement on officer promotions, and the difference between combat and non-combat officers regarding joint duty. These methods will provide original empirical analysis of the joint duty assignment. The next chapter presents the findings of this research and will provide an analysis of the data.

## **CHAPTER Seven –Findings and Analysis**

This chapter presents the data analysis and explains the findings of the research. The first section examines compliance and the second section examines the effect of joint duty compliance on officer promotion. Each section shows the data findings followed by summaries. Findings are discussed based on the data presented in the tables and will answer each respective hypothesis.

### **COMPLIANCE**

Three tables determine the level of compliance with joint duty assignment policy and will only look at officers in the post-Goldwater Nichols sample of officers. Table 7.1 presents the percentage of line officers in this population sample who have received waivers exempting them from the joint duty requirement. Table 7.2 presents the percentage of officers in this sample population in compliance with the joint duty promotion requirement. Table 7.3 presents joint duty compliance broken down by service.

**Table 7.1 Waiver Percentages (%)**

(N values are in the parentheses and reflect the entire number of officers in sample)\*

<u>Career Field</u>			
<u>Waivers</u>	<u>Non-Combat</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>
Good of Service	1.8	6.6	5.1
Sci/Tech	22.4	5.8	10.8
Previous JDA	4.3	1.5	2.3
Serving In JDA	4.3	13.9	11.0
Pre-1987	1.7	1.1	1.3
No Waiver	65.5	71.1	69.5
<u>Total</u> (N)	100 (116)	100 (274)	100 (390)

A little more than 30% of the officers in this sample received waivers exempting them from joint duty. Eleven percent of the officers in this sample were promoted to O7 while serving in a joint duty assignment. Another 10.8% of officers were exempted because they belonged to career fields that did not require joint duty due to science or technical expertise. Only 5.1% of the officers in this sample received a Good of Service waiver. The 5.1% falls below the 10% authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

**Table 7.2 DoD Compliance with Joint Duty Requirement (%)**

(N values are in the parentheses and reflect the entire number of officers in sample)\*

<u>Career Field</u>			
<u>Joint Duty</u>	<u>Non-Combat</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>
No	31.9	17.5	21.8
Waiver	33.6	20.8	24.6
Yes	34.5	61.7	53.6
<u>Total</u> (N)	100 (116)	100 (274)	100 (390)

Overall, slightly more than 78% of officers in this sample population were in compliance with the joint duty policy. The category of officers with waivers decreased from 30% to 25% of the officer population. A little more than 5% of the officers in this survey had waivers even though they had met the joint duty requirement.<sup>244</sup> Almost 22% of the officers in this sample are not in compliance with the joint duty requirement since they did not have full joint duty credit as required by law prior to promotion.<sup>245</sup> Furthermore, significance tests indicate that joint duty compliance is dependent on career field and there is an association between these two variables.<sup>246</sup> Combat officers are in greater compliance than non-combat officers with 82.5% of combat officers either meeting this requirement or having a waiver compared to 68.1% of non-combat officers.

**Table 7.3 Service Compliance with the Joint Duty Requirement (%)**  
(N values are in the parentheses and reflect the total number of officers for that service)\*

<u>Service</u>	<u>No Joint Duty</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Non-Combat</u>	<u>Combat</u>	
Army	33.3 (42)	23.3 (90)	26.5 (132)
Air Force	28.6 (49)	20.3 (74)	23.6 (123)
Marines	--	18.4 (38)	18.4 (38)

<sup>244</sup> 23 officers in this sample population had both full joint duty credit and a waiver. These officers are included in the Yes category rather than the Waiver category and accounts for the decrease from 30% to almost 25% of officer with waivers. Of these 23 officers, 20 were combat officers who received a Serving in JDA waiver. The other three officers with a waiver and full credit included a combat officer with a Good of Service waiver, a combat officer with a Previous JDA waiver, and a non-combat officer with a Science/Technology waiver. The waiver requests are submitted along with the nomination list of officers for promotion to O7 for approval from the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense approves the nomination list and in turn approves the waiver. A lag time exists between promotion and pinning on the rank, therefore some officers with waivers, especially those who have Serving In JDA waivers, are able to earn their full joint duty credit after being promoted but prior to pinning on O7 rank.

<sup>245</sup> It should be noted that 71 officers (18% of the total sample) had served in joint duty but had earned only partial or cumulative credit towards full joint duty credit.

<sup>246</sup> Chi-Squared test results for this table  $X^2=24.42$  and  $p<.001$ . See Appendix C for Chi-Squared test.

Navy	36.0 (25)	6.9 (72)	14.4 (97)
<u>Total</u> (N)	<u>31.9</u> (116)	<u>17.5</u> (274)	<u>21.8</u> (390)

The Army is the least compliant of the four services with 26.5% of their officers in this sample not meeting the full joint duty requirement. The Navy is the most compliant with 14.4% of their officers not meeting the joint duty requirement. It should also be noted that the Marines only promote officers from the combat career fields to general officer ranks.

**Hypothesis 1: While the majority of officers have met the joint duty requirement, the services are not in complete compliance with this policy.**

The majority of officers are complying with the joint duty requirement by either meeting the joint duty requirement or through waivers. However, non-compliance exists in this data population. Non-compliance is greatest amongst Army officers compared to the other services. Two important issues underlie these findings. First, for this sample population approximately 22% of the officers were promoted without meeting the joint duty requirement and without waivers exempting them from joint duty. For these same years, according to the Secretary of Defense annual reports to Congress that report service implementation of the joint duty compliance, all officers that did not meet the joint duty requirement were accounted for with a waiver.<sup>247</sup> No definitive answer could be found to explain this discrepancy. Two possible answers included that some of the officers in the sample did not assume the rank of O7 although they were promoted. They

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<sup>247</sup> See Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report to President and the Congress*, [http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr\\_intro.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html) either Appendix B or E depending on the year.

might have retired or separated instead of accepting promotion. A more plausible explanation stems from a possible problem with tracking joint duty compliance.

Monitoring joint duty compliance is not unified within the military personnel system. Two separate systems exist for tracking joint duty. Each service tracks the promotion records of their officers, which includes an officer's joint duty history. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Officer Management Branch also tracks all officers' joint duty.<sup>248</sup> The services are supposed to provide the data to the Joint Officer Management Branch so that they can update the Joint Duty Assignment Management Information System (JDAMIS). The probable reason given for the mismatch in waivers, as well as the 22% officer non-compliance, is that the services did not update the officer's record so that it was recorded correctly in JDAMIS. Therefore, officers might have had waivers or full credit in their service files but not in the files maintained by JDAMIS.<sup>249</sup>

However, according to the Defense Manpower Data Center, JDAMIS is the data source that is used by the Secretary of Defense to report joint duty compliance to Congress and is also the data source for this analysis. Waivers should match officers not meeting the joint duty requirement. This is not the case. No source consulted for this evaluation could account for the 22% of officers without waivers or explain why the Secretary of Defense's report did not match the data contained in personnel files except for a possible accounting problem.<sup>250</sup> Another key issue that could not be explained is the different level of compliance among the services.

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<sup>248</sup> Interview, Joint Officer Management Branch Office, 20 Jan 04.

<sup>249</sup> Interview, Joint Officer Management Branch Office, 25 Aug 03.

<sup>250</sup> Sources include Joint Officer Management Branch officials and General/Flag Officer Management officers from the Air Force, Army, and Navy.

All of the services have struggled to fully comply with the joint duty requirement according to Table 7.3. However, in this sample population, the Army was the least compliant of the four services even though the Army has had a tradition of supporting joint duty assignments and of sending their better officers to joint duty. The Army's support of joint duty stems from two reasons. First, the Army traditionally has been more reliant on other services to accomplish its mission. Colonial operations in the Philippines at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century first demonstrated the Army's reliance on the Navy. However, it was during the Vietnam War that the Army truly realized the benefit of sending competent officers to joint duty. Vietnam fell under the command of Pacific Command, which was normally headed by a Navy admiral. Army troops bore the brunt of the fighting during Vietnam, so it behooved the Army to send competent officers to Pacific Command assignments to represent the Army's viewpoint.<sup>251</sup>

In light of this traditional support of joint duty, no plausible reason could be found to explain why the Army was the least compliant of the four services. One potential explanation offered by Army personnel officers is that Army officers could have a tighter career path in terms of requirements and time constraints than officers from the other services. However, officers from all four services have similar demands and time constraints in order to be competitive for promotion to O7. One possible reason that will be examined further in the conclusion is that the Army officers had the sharpest decrease in time spent in the field grade ranks after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act

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<sup>251</sup> Testimony from former Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson, *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (H.R. 6828, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982) H.R. 6954: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Armed Services, 97<sup>th</sup> Congress, 2d. Session, HASC 97-47, 1982, p. 260.*

compared to the other services. However, as explored in the conclusion, officers from each service spent less time in the field grade ranks after the passage of the post-Goldwater Nichols Act.

**Sub-hypothesis 1: More combat officers are in compliance with the joint duty requirement policy than are non-combat officers.**

When looking at compliance according to career field, a higher percentage of combat officers are meeting the joint duty requirement than are non-combat officers in this data sample according to Table 7.2. Significance results confirm that joint duty compliance is dependent on career field.<sup>252</sup> Combat officers are in greater compliance than non-combat officers with 82.5% of combat officers either meeting this requirement or having a waiver compared to 68.1% of non-combat officers. Combat officers are in greater compliance for the three services that promote both combat and non-combat officers to O7. However, 17.5% of combat officers in this data sample were promoted without it. The Navy has the greatest percentage of combat officers meeting this requirement as well as the greatest percentage of non-combat officers not meeting this requirement according to Table 7.3. Joint officer programs are aimed at the warfighter. The higher percentage of combat officers meeting the requirement further indicates that the joint duty assignment can be fit into the demanding promotion requirements of future O7s from the combat career fields. In summary, the majority of the officers are complying with this policy though non-compliance does exist. Overall, more combat

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<sup>252</sup> Chi-Squared test results for this table  $X^2=24.42$  and  $p<.001$ . See Appendix C for Chi-Squared test.

officers are in compliance than non-combat officers. The next section will look at what effect compliance with the joint duty requirement has on officers promoted to O7.

### **JOINT DUTY AND PROMOTION TIME**

The second portion of the methodology looks at officer promotion times to O7 to determine if the services are behaving strategically or in a self-serving manner within the implementation of this policy. The compliance portion established that non-compliance with this policy is occurring. This portion will try to determine if the officers not in compliance with the policy are promoted at a faster rate than those officers in compliance.

#### **Pre and Post Goldwater-Nichols Promotion Times**

The first measure seeks to determine if there is a difference in promotion times for officers prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act compared to officers after the passage of the act. This measure establishes a baseline for promotion times to help determine if joint duty compliance had an effect on promotion time. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 will show the mean times to promotion from O6 to O7 and from O4 to O7, respectively, for this sample population. Table 7.6 presents the results of the significance test and Table 7.7 shows the regression results.

**Table 7.4 Promotion Time from O6 to O7 (months)**  
(N values are in the parentheses)\*

<u>Career Field</u>			
<u>Goldwater-Nichols Act</u>	<u>Non -Combat</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>
Pre-GNA	<b>79.5</b> (111)	<b>78.9</b> (292)	<b>79.1</b> (403)
Post-GNA	<b>69.6</b> (112)	<b>67.1</b> (271)	<b>67.8</b> (383)
Total	<b>74.5</b>	<b>73.2</b>	<b>73.6</b>
(N)	(223)	(563)	(786)

**Table 7.5 Promotion Time from O4 to O7 (months)**  
(N values are in the parentheses)\*

<u>Career Field</u>			
<u>Goldwater-Nichols Act</u>	<u>Non -Combat</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>
Pre-GNA	<b>198.7</b> (70)	<b>196.9</b> (192)	<b>197.4</b> (262)
Post-GNA	<b>187.3</b> (91)	<b>190.5</b> (229)	<b>189.6</b> (320)
Total	<b>192.3</b>	<b>193.4</b>	<b>193.1</b>
(N)	(161)	(421)	(582)

Tables 7.4 and 7.5 indicate that officers in the post Goldwater-Nichols group are promoted at a faster rate. For O6 promotion, officers in the post Goldwater-Nichols time frame are promoted eleven months faster while for O4 to O7 promotion, officers are promoted approximately seven months faster in the post Goldwater-Nichols group. For O6 promotion, combat officers are promoted slightly faster than their non-combat peers while for O4 to O7 promotion, non-combat officers overall are promoted slightly ahead of combat officers.

**Table 7.6 Significance Test for Promotion Times: Pre and Post Goldwater-Nichols Act**

	O6 to O7		O4 to O7	
	F	Probability	F	Probability
Career Field	1.36	0.244	0.19	0.659
Goldwater-Nichols Act (Pre/Post)	64.95	*0.000	32.80	*0.000
Career Field and Goldwater-Nichols Act	0.51	0.476	2.56	0.110

The significance test indicates that the difference in promotion times between the pre and post Goldwater-Nichols groups of officers is significant at  $p < 0.001$  for both O6 to O7 and O4 to O7 promotion metrics. The difference in promotion times according to career field is not significant nor is an interaction effect present between career field and Goldwater-Nichols.

**Table 7.7 Regression Results for Promotion Times Pre and Post Goldwater-Nichols Act**

	O6 to O7		O4 to O7	
	Coefficient	Probability	Coefficient	Probability
Time in Service	2.565	*0.000	5.016	*0.000
Level of Education	2.072	*0.001	-1.406	*0.027
Academy	2.642	0.155	0.189	0.924
ROTC	1.000	0.584	-2.854	0.139
OTS	-0.332	0.885	0.270	0.912
Career Field	-0.265	0.886	-1.839	0.341
Goldwater-Nichols (Pre/Post)	-10.629	*0.000	-13.859	*0.000
Career Field and Goldwater-Nichols	-1.541	0.551	4.882	0.056

After controlling for other promotion variables, the regression analysis confirms that the Goldwater-Nichols Act is significant at  $p < .001$  for both O6 to O7 and O4 to O7 promotion times. O6 promotion rates are almost 11 months faster in the post-Goldwater-Nichols time frame. Officers are promoted through the field grade ranks almost 14

months faster in the post-Goldwater-Nichols sample. The regression analysis also confirms that career field is not significant for promotion times. However, time in service is significant at  $p < .001$  for both O6 to O7 and O4 to O7 promotion metrics as is level of education at  $p = .001$  for O6 to O7 promotion and  $p = .027$  for O4 to O7 promotion.

### **Joint Duty and Promotion Time**

As Tables 7.4 through 7.7 indicate, officers in the post Goldwater-Nichols population sample are promoted at a faster rate. This next set of measures examines the impact of the joint duty requirement on officer promotion times for the post Goldwater-Nichols group of officers. Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show the mean times to promotion from O6 to O7 and O4 to O7 promotion times. Table 7.10 shows the significance test results of joint duty compliance and career field on promotion times. Table 7.11 presents the regression results analyzing joint duty compliance. Findings for sub-hypotheses two and three will be addressed before breaking down the effect of joint duty compliance according to service.

**Table 7.8 Promotion Time from O6 to O7 by Joint Duty Status**  
(N values are in the parentheses)\*

<u>Joint Duty</u>	<u>Career Field</u>		
	<u>Non-Combat</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>
No	<b>66.1</b> (34)	<b>64.0</b> (48)	<b>64.9</b> (82)
Yes	<b>71.2</b> (78)	<b>67.8</b> (223)	<b>68.6</b> (301)
Total (N)	<b>69.6</b> (112)	<b>67.1</b> (271)	<b>67.8</b> (383)

**Table 7.9 Promotion Times from O4 to O7 by Joint Duty Status**  
(N values are in the parentheses)\*

<u>Joint Duty</u>	<u>Career Field</u>		
	<u>Non-Combat</u>	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Total</u>
No	<b>183.9</b> (26)	<b>184.2</b> (43)	<b>184.1</b> (69)
Yes	<b>188.7</b> (65)	<b>192.0</b> (186)	<b>191.1</b> (251)
Total	<b>187.3</b>	<b>190.5</b>	<b>189.6</b>
(N)	(91)	(229)	(320)

Tables 7.8 and 7.9 present the mean time to promotions for officer compliance. Both tables indicate that for officers in this sample population, those officers not in compliance with the joint duty credit are promoted faster than those officers in compliance with this requirement. For O6 promotion, officers not in compliance with joint duty are promoted almost four months faster than officers who met the requirement. For O4 to O7 promotion time, officers not in compliance are promoted seven months faster. Table 7.8 and 7.9 reflect the same pattern seen in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 regarding career field. For O6 promotion, combat officers are promoted slightly faster than non-combat officers. For O4 to O7, this is reversed as non-combat officers are promoted about three months faster than combat officers.

**Table 7.10 Significance Test for Joint Duty Assignment**

	<b>O6 to O7</b>		<b>O4 to O7</b>	
	F	Probability	F	Probability
<b>Career Field</b>	2.10	0.149	0.56	0.454
<b>Joint Duty Assignment</b>	5.34	*0.021	7.12	*0.008
<b>Career Field and Joint Duty Assignment</b>	0.11	0.744	0.39	0.535

The significance test results in Table 7.10 indicate there is a difference in promotion times for officers compliant and non-compliant with the joint duty requirement and that the difference is significant at  $p=.021$  for O6 to O7 promotion and  $p=.008$  for O4 to O7 promotion. The difference in promotion times according to career field is not significant nor is an interaction effect present between career field and fulfillment of the joint duty assignment.

**Table 7.11 Regression Results for Joint Duty Assignment**

	O6 to O7		O4 to O7	
	Coefficient	Probability	Coefficient	Probability
Time in Service	2.113	*0.000	6.715	*0.000
Level of Education	1.027	0.241	-2.716	*0.002
Academy	6.472	*0.044	-6.853	*0.027
ROTC	5.155	0.106	-9.429	*0.002
OTS	3.353	0.337	-4.436	0.194
Career Field	-2.748	0.100	3.023	0.061
Joint Duty Assignment	3.560	*0.053	3.478	*0.047

After controlling for other promotion variables, the regression analysis confirms that joint duty compliance is significant in an officer's promotion from O6 to O7 at  $p=.053$  and from O4 to O7 at  $p=.047$ . For both promotion metrics, officers complying with the joint duty requirement are promoted a little more than three months slower than officers not in compliance according to the regression analysis. The regression analysis confirms that the difference in promotion times according to career field is not significant. Time in service is significant at  $P<.001$  for promotion from O6 to O7 and

from O4 to O7. Service academy as a commissioning source is also significant for both O6 to O7 promotion at  $p=.044$  and O4 to O7 promotion time at  $p=.027$ . ROTC is also significant but only for O4 to O7 promotion time at  $p=.002$ . Level of education is also significant for O4 to O7 promotion at  $p=.002$ .

**Sub-Hypothesis 2: For non-compliant officers, combat officers are promoted at a faster rate to O7 than non-combat officers.**

When looking at the effect of joint duty compliance and career field, faster promotion time is not a phenomenon restricted combat officers. Combat officers are not being promoted ahead of their non-combat colleagues in all cases. For non-compliant officers, both combat and non-combat officers are promoted faster than their compliant peers according to Tables 7.8 and 7.9. This indicates that the services are promoting their best officers without meeting the joint duty requirement regardless of career field. While career field is not significant in terms of time to promotion according Tables 7.10 and 7.11, promotion times are inconsistent for officers not in compliance. The lack of an interaction effect confirms this inconsistency. For non-compliant officers, O6 promotion is faster for combat officers by about two months while non-combat officers are promoted slightly faster from O4 to O7.

**Sub-hypothesis 3: For officers in compliance, combat officers are promoted at a faster rate to O7 than non-combat officers.**

The inconsistency in promotion times also appears for compliant officers. For O6 promotion, combat officers in compliance have a slightly faster mean time to promotion than non-combat officers in compliance by a little more than three months according to Table 7.8. However, for O4 to O7 promotion time, combat officers in compliance have a

slightly slower mean time to promotion by about three months according to Table 7.9.

While non-combat officers who have met the joint duty requirement are promoted more quickly through the field grades compared to their combat counterparts, this is likely a function of career field requirements than fulfillment of joint duty. Combat officers are likely to have more command requirements to meet in order to be promoted than non-combat officers and possibly accounts for the difference in O4 to O7 promotion times between non-combat and combat officers. This is the case for both compliant and non-compliant groups.

### Joint Duty and Promotion Time by Service

Tables 7.8 through 7.11 show that there is a difference in promotion times between officers compliant and non-compliant with the joint duty requirement and that overall, joint duty compliance is a significant factor for promotion times. Officers without joint duty are promoted faster than officers in compliance with the policy. Tables 7.12 and 7.13 present joint duty and promotion times broken down by service to determine if this trend is depicted by the individual services.

**Table 7.12 Promotion Times from O6 to O7 by Service**  
(N values are in the parentheses)\*

<u>Service</u>	<u>Non-Combat</u>			<u>Combat</u>		
	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	53.7 (14)	60.2 (28)	58.0 (42)	54.2 (21)	57.1 (69)	56.4 (90)
Air Force	77.1 (14)	81.4 (35)	80.1 (49)	76.3 (15)	77.5 (59)	77.3 (74)
Marines	--	--	--	62.4 (7)	59.7 (31)	60.2 (38)
Navy	69.5 (6)	67.7 (15)	68.2 (21)	70.2 (5)	74.1 (64)	73.9 (69)
<u>Total</u> (N)	66.1 (34)	71.2 (78)	69.6 (112)	64.0 (48)	67.8 (223)	67.1 (271)

**Table 7.13 Promotion Times from O4 to O7 by Service**  
(N values are in the parentheses)\*

<u>Service</u>	<u>Non-Combat</u>			<u>Combat</u>		
	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	179.8 (14)	189.9 (28)	<b>186.5</b> (42)	180.1 (20)	184.6 (66)	<b>183.6</b> (86)
Air Force	177.1 (8)	182.1 (28)	<b>181.0</b> (36)	177.3 (14)	178.4 (46)	<b>178.1</b> (60)
Marines	--	--	--	205.7 (7)	201.7 (29)	<b>202.5</b> (36)
Navy	211.8 (4)	205.6 (9)	<b>207.5</b> (13)	198.5 (2)	210.3 (45)	<b>209.8</b> (47)
<u>Total</u> (N)	<b>183.9</b> (26)	<b>188.7</b> (65)	<b>187.3</b> (91)	<b>184.2</b> (43)	<b>192.0</b> (186)	<b>190.5</b> (229)

Tables 7.12 and 7.13 indicate that officers without joint duty credit are promoted faster than officers in compliance with this policy except in the cases of Marine officers and non-combat naval officers. Due to small sample numbers, significance test results indicate that only for Army officers is the difference in promotion time between officers with and without joint duty significant at  $p=.048$  for O6 to O7 promotion and  $p=.018$  for O4 to O7 promotion.<sup>253</sup> When examining career field and joint duty compliance according to service, the inconsistency in promotion times previously discussed diminishes. Except for the Navy, combat officers are promoted faster at O6 and from O4 to O7.

**Hypothesis 2: Officers not meeting the joint duty requirement are promoted at a faster rate than officers in compliance with the joint duty promotion requirement.**

These findings indicate that overall the mean time to promotion is faster for officers who have not met the joint duty promotion requirement. Broken down by service, this holds true for all services except naval officers in non-combat career fields

<sup>253</sup> See Appendix A for Significance Tables and Regression Results by Service. See Appendix C for Anova and Regression equations.

and Marines. Both the significance tests and regression analyses indicate that there is a significant difference in promotion times for officers that comply and do not comply with the joint duty requirement. However, the significance of joint duty according to service could not be discerned for all services due to small sample sizes. Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings. One, this evidence indicates that the military is behaving strategically within the implementation process. The services are implementing this requirement in a manner that benefits their own organizational interests. Two, it should be noted that each service is affected differently by the joint duty requirement and that for this sample population joint duty compliance appears to be significant only for the Army.

These results indicate that the services are exhibiting strategic, self interested behavior within the implementation process. Overall, officers not in compliance are being promoted faster than officers meeting the joint duty requirement. Therefore, it appears that the services are promoting their best officers, the ones with the fastest promotion times to O7, without meeting the joint duty promotion requirement. At the very least, officers who comply with the joint duty requirement are impacted negatively in terms of promotion times. However, the differential in promotion times raises the question of why more officers are not meeting this requirement.

The promotional differential between those that fulfilled the requirement and those that did not is not that disparate. The difference in mean times to promotion is months not years. This could indicate two things. The services' better officers are spending more time in service assignments in order to get promoted early while officers complying with joint duty are curtailing time spent in specific service assignments in

order to fit in a joint assignment. Or, it could indicate that all officers not meeting the requirement spent some time in joint duty but did not fulfill the time requirements needed for full joint duty credit.<sup>254</sup>

It should be reported that each service approaches joint duty differently and that may or may not affect officers differently within their respective service. The Booz-Allen Hamilton study admitted that Title IV, "is complex and applies to all four services equally, but the services are not alike. They (the services) differ in the size and structure of their officer corps; their operational requirements; their educational and training philosophies; and their traditions, doctrines, and cultures."<sup>255</sup> Joint duty as a significant factor was only noted in Army officers and is too difficult to discern in other services because of sample size limitations. This analysis did show officers from the different services are promoted at different rates, which potentially impacts the ability to fit in a joint duty assignment. According to this sample, Navy and Marine officers spend the most time in the field grade ranks as shown in Table 7.13. This could account for their higher compliance rate over the Army or Air Force as presented in Table 7.3.

## CONCLUSION

These findings indicate that the services are behaving in a strategic, self-interested manner within the implementation process of the joint duty assignment. The services are not in full compliance with this policy. They are also promoting officers without joint duty faster than officers who have complied with this policy. Therefore, it appears that

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<sup>254</sup> It should be noted that 71 officers (18% of the total sample) had served in joint duty but had earned only partial or cumulative credit towards full joint duty credit.

<sup>255</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton, Chapter 1, p. 5.

the services are exhibiting strategic behavior by promoting their better officers without fulfilling the joint duty requirement. Strategic, self-interested behavior by the services offers another possible explanation for the implementation problems associated with this requirement. This does not dismiss other potential factors associated with implementation problems such as flaws in policy design and the relationship between services and Congress as irrelevant. Rather, service behavior implementing this requirement is another area that needs to be accounted for in conjunction with other problem areas.

Furthermore, these findings indicate that faster promotion time is not a phenomenon reserved for officers from the combat career fields. While the difference in promotion times between combat and non-combat officers is not significant, non-combat officers are promoted at a similar and sometimes faster rate through the field grade ranks. The next chapter will discuss policy implications of this research and future areas of research for this data.

## **Chapter Eight---Discussion and Conclusion**

Whether the services' behavior is intentional or is not is difficult to determine. As Kanter found in his budgetary study of the congressional-military relationship, service non-compliance occurs under three circumstances. Subordinates understand the goal and are willing to work toward it but lack the resources to accomplish it. Non-compliance also occurs because of honest confusion and misunderstanding. And lastly, deliberate non-compliance can occur, which presumes subordinates have diverging priorities from their superiors and that they are able to choose and behave in terms of their own preferences.<sup>256</sup>

A case could be made that the services are intentionally not complying with this policy. The apparent root of the problem is that the services value their service specific officer development for their future senior leaders over joint officer development. The services maintain the need for all of their officers to meet service specific promotion requirements in order to be promoted. This comes at the expense of the joint officer development policies that Congress wants officers to undergo. The services and congressional policymakers have diverging priorities for the development of officers and as this analysis indicates, the services are behaving in a self-serving manner.

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<sup>256</sup> Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective.*, pp. 45-47.

It is difficult to determine if promoting officers without the joint duty requirement is a conscious decision on the part of the services. Possibly, the services are not in compliance for other reasons that are too difficult to identify but could be a result of certain conditions such as lack of punitive action against the services, inattentive congressional oversight, or a continued tradition of service autonomy. An argument can be made that within the promotion system for general/admiral officers, a higher degree of importance is placed upon service requirements necessary for promotion to O7 rather than on joint requirements because officers are promoted without meeting this requirement. Therefore, somewhere within the promotion process, a decision is made that discounts the joint duty assignment as necessary for promotion and enables officers to be promoted without meeting the joint duty requirement.

However, an argument can also be made that non-compliance is unintentional. While the services have not embraced the implementation of the joint duty assignment, the services have shown a substantial degree of success complying with the requirement with a majority of their officers meeting this requirement. Furthermore, the difference in promotion times between officers in compliance versus officers not in compliance is not large enough that it would necessarily indicate intentional non-compliance by the services. This evidence shows that the services understand the goal and are willing to work towards it yet are still not in full compliance.

This leads to the question why the services are able to promote their better officers without joint duty and not fully comply with this policy. Builder argues that the most powerful institutions in the American national security arena are the military

services. They are more powerful than Congress or the president because the services have the ability to outlast any changes in administrations or personnel within the polity. Outside changes to the military by the Congress or the president will only be implemented if and when the services accept and pursue them.<sup>257</sup> Within the national security arena, organizations act in ways to protect their organizational essence.<sup>258</sup> A key element to the organizational essence of each service is its officer corps. The organizational beliefs and core values of each service are instilled, maintained, and propagated by each service's respective officer corps. By promoting their better officers without joint duty fulfillment and being able to get away with it, may be an example of the services attempting to protect part of their organizational essence.

Organizations within the national security arena, if allowed, will often choose to what extent they wish to follow a policy.<sup>259</sup> As noted in Chapter Three, no punitive actions have been taken against the services regarding failure to comply with this policy. The services may have realized that they are able to promote a portion of their officer corps without any repercussions. If the services are able to promote their better officers with no threat of punitive actions, the services will act and continue to act in a manner that best suits the needs of each service. Yet, the services' do not seem to be blatantly disregarding implementing this policy.

A paradox exists with the implementation of this policy. A majority of officers is in compliance with this policy and the promotional differential between officers in

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<sup>257</sup> Carl H. Builder, "Service Identities and Behavior" in *American Defense Policy*, p. 108.

<sup>258</sup> Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm" in *World Politics*, pp. 48-49.

<sup>259</sup> Allison and Halperin, p. 50.

compliance compared to officers not in compliance is not so extreme that it raises the question of why more officers are not meeting this requirement. The services have claimed that it is difficult to fit a joint duty assignment into an officer's crowded career path. The promotional differential between officers in compliance and officers not in compliance is months not years and is small enough to suggest that all officers should be meeting this requirement. The small promotional differential coupled with the majority of officers meeting this requirement indicates all officers should be in compliance with this requirement. This tends to counter the services' argument that it is too difficult to fit in a joint duty assignment.

The majority of officers meeting the requirement and the small promotion differential tend to validate congressional policymakers' design efforts for the joint duty assignment. As noted in the introduction to Chapter Four, congressional policymakers from the inception of this policy were aware of the difficulties of fitting the joint duty requirement into an officer's career path. As a result, congressional policymakers made subsequent changes to the policy requirements in an effort to get all officers joint duty promotion credit.<sup>260</sup> They reduced the time required in joint duty and created the critical occupational specialty (COS). Furthermore, when this policy was implemented, officers spent more time in the field grade ranks prior to promotion as indicated by Table 8.1.<sup>261</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Email Interview, James Locher, 26 Oct 03.

<sup>261</sup> Data from the GAO study, *Military Personnel: Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths*, 88-184BR, June 1988, p. 5 claims that for combat officers Air Force officers spend 14.3 years in field grade ranks while the Army, Navy, and Marines all spend 17.4 years. These times were used by congressional policymakers to evaluate changing the time requirements of the joint duty assignment back in 1988. For combat officers in this sample, time in the field grade ranks decreased for all services in the post-Goldwater Nichols portion of the sample. Breakdown according to service for combat officers (in years) for this sample is as follows: Army officers 16.8 years pre-GNA/15.3 years post-GNA; Air Force

Congress intended the services to accommodate the joint duty assignment using this longer time as a metric. Therefore, a majority of officers are fulfilling this requirement within a shorter time window than originally considered.

## **FUTURE RESEARCH**

A key issue uncovered in this research is the faster time to promotion in the post Goldwater-Nichols sample population and should be researched further. Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the number of service promotion requirements has remained the same, yet the time to promotion to O7 is faster. DoD officials argued in 1987 that, "there is limited time in an officers' career path at the field grade level to accomplish all the things an officer needs to do. Additionally, there were key positions that an officer needed to hold to assume higher level commands as a general officer."<sup>262</sup> Yet, in the post Goldwater-Nichols timeframe it appears the time an officer has to meet these requirements in addition to the two or three-year joint duty assignment has decreased. According to Table 8.1, officers in all services are spending less time in the field grade ranks after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Coincidentally, the Army had the lowest rate of compliance with joint duty requirement and the largest decrease in time officers spent in the O4 to O7 ranks. A greater understanding of why promotion time has decreased may help explain why non-compliance has occurred or why officers without joint duty are promoted faster.

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15.4 years pre-GNA/14.8 years post-GNA; Marines 17.4 years pre-GNA/16.9 years post-GNA; Navy 18 years pre-GNA/17.5 years post-GNA. Table 8.1 includes non-combat officers in its time to promotion.

<sup>262</sup> United States. General Accounting Office. *Military Personnel: Impact of Joint Duty Tours on Officer Career Paths*. GAO/NSAID-88-184BR, June, 1988. p.3.

**Table 8.1 Time Spent in Field Grade Ranks (years)<sup>263</sup>**

<u>Service</u>	<u>Period</u>	
	<u>1981-1985</u>	<u>1997-2001</u>
Army	16.9	15.4
Air Force	15.5	15.0
Marines	17.4	16.9
Navy	18.0	17.5

A solution to ensuring that all officers meet the joint duty requirement might only be accomplished through major changes to the officer career management system or changes to how officers are awarded joint duty credit.<sup>264</sup> With the decreased time officers are spending in the field grade ranks, Congress may have to re-examine the career progression of officers governed by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 so that services that promote their officers quickly will allot enough time to fit in a joint duty assignment. If Congress maintains that officers are required to meet the joint duty requirement sometime between O4 through O6, the possibility of extending the time in each field grade rank by a year would give the services an additional three years to fit in a joint duty assignment. With recent legislation that has increased the time length of general/admiral careers and coupled with recent efforts examining officer career paths, it appears that a change to either the time or the requirements needed for promotion to O7 might be a way to ensure complete compliance

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<sup>263</sup> Uses same sample used for the O4 to O7 promotion times (officers who were majors 10 years prior to start date of sample).

<sup>264</sup> Harrell, et. al., "How Many Can Be Joint? Supporting Joint Duty Assignments," MR-593, p. 7; See also Booz-Allen Hamilton, Chapter 4, p. 48.

with this policy.<sup>265</sup> However, this could have a negative impact on retention of outstanding officers.

The services promote their better officers faster for two reasons. As noted in Chapter Five, the services want to see their better officers promoted faster in an effort to fill senior level ranks with higher quality officers and have enough time fill the requirements of senior level rank. Faster promotion also helps retain these officers. Officers that display greater competence are rewarded with promotion that provides greater responsibility, increased rank, and increased authority. Extending the time an officer spends in a rank delays the rewards associated with promotion and can impact an officer's desire to stay in the military. A more prudent solution to ensuring all officers fulfill the joint duty requirement is change how joint duty credit is awarded.

Joint warfare has become the accepted method of U.S. military employment. This is largely a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act but also because of the reduction in force size due to the downsizing after the end of the Cold War. The services have to operate together to maximize the combat potential of the U.S. military in its post-Cold War roles and missions. Furthermore, the emergence of Joint Task Forces (JTF) within the unified combatant commands to handle U.S. military contingencies in the post-Cold War time frame has increased the requirement and demand for joint competency throughout all ranks of the military. The embodiment of joint duty experience desired by congressional policymakers is found in these JTFs and other contingency driven joint operations since

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<sup>265</sup> For information on length of officer careers see Harry J. Thie, et al., "Future Career Management Systems for U.S. Military Officers," (RAND Study MR-470 Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994); See Harrell, et al., "Aligning the Stars: Improvements to General and Flag Officer Management," Rand MR 1712.; See also Bernard Rostker, et al., "The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: A Retrospective Assessment," Rand Study MR 4246.

these operations bring together officers from the different services focused on the integration of the combat employment of land, sea, and air forces. However, joint duty credit is not awarded for joint experience gained at the lower officer ranks nor has joint duty credit been extended to officers who have served in a JTF since 1996.<sup>266</sup>

This is another element to the paradox of this policy. Many of the officers in this dataset who have not met joint duty requirement could possibly have had joint duty experience in the true ideal desired by congressional policymakers, yet they did not receive credit for it because they were either serving in joint duty in a rank that did not qualify them or their time spent in a JTF was not recognized as joint duty credit. Therefore, the policies regarding qualification for joint duty credit should be changed to facilitate the accumulation of joint credit.<sup>267</sup> The two most immediate changes that can be made are officers who serve in joint duty billets as an O3 should accumulate joint duty credit and officers regardless of rank who have gained significant joint duty experience through JTF experience or contingency driven joint operations should also accumulate joint duty credit.<sup>268</sup> A monitoring system could be implemented into an officer's personnel record to track an officer's time spent in joint duty deployments.<sup>269</sup>

The methodology also uncovered other findings that should be researched further. The differences between the services regarding compliance and joint duty monitoring are

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<sup>266</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 4, p. 48.

<sup>267</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 4, p. 48.

<sup>268</sup> Joint duty experience gained at the O3 level was repeatedly stressed in discussions with officers from the four services. It is also noted in the Booz-Allen Hamilton report in the Executive Summary page 6 and Chapter 4 page 48. The author's personal experience is also indicative of this point having spent several deployments as an O3 working with members from other services on a day to day basis over a period of months.

<sup>269</sup> This system would be akin to the data tracking method used by the Air Force to monitor a member's days deployed and overall deployment history.

two other areas this analysis did not fully explore. In addition to the promotion differential quandary, the level of compliance varied by service. This was only briefly touched upon noting that the Army had the most difficulty complying with this policy, yet it was an early advocate of joint duty. This research indicates that a possible explanation lies in the fact that the Army has had the largest decrease in promotion time for O4 to O7 promotions (Table 8.1) compared to the other services. Army personnel officers did confirm that the Army has some of the most stringent and tightest sequencing of promotion requirements in order to be competitive for O7 compared to the other services. However, according to this analysis, they are the least compliant while the Navy is the most compliant. Historically, the Navy viewed joint duty the least favorably prior to the Goldwater-Nichols Act.<sup>270</sup> The Navy has traditionally kept a higher state of readiness during peacetime than did any of the other services. The Navy benefited from having its best officers out in the fleet rather than in shore-based joint duty assignments.<sup>271</sup> Further research breaking down the joint duty assignment in the context of each service and their unique cultures would aid in further evaluations of the implementation of this policy.

This research also uncovered a possible flaw in the data management for monitoring joint duty compliance. Two systems exist. The services maintain their own

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<sup>270</sup> See Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense*, p. 251; See also Locher, *Victory on the Potomac*, p. 18; Barry M. Goldwater and Jack Casserly, *Goldwater*. (New York, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1988), p. 339. for reference to Navy's historical decentralize nature. See Thomas C. McNaugher, "Improving Military Coordination: Reorganization of the DOD", p.222 for Navy inclinations regarding JCS reform after World War II.

<sup>271</sup> Testimony from Admiral Thor Hanson, *Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (H.R. 6828, *Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982*) H.R. 6954: *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Armed Services*, p. 686.

personnel files, which supposedly include the joint duty history on their officers, and the JDAMIS, which monitors joint duty history for all officers. These two systems do not seem to match indicating a data disconnect between the data at the Defense Manpower Data Center and the data held by the services.<sup>272</sup>

## **POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

An inconsistency also exists with this policy. The professional expertise of the services to develop their officers is acknowledged and accepted by Congress but sometimes overrides the legal authority of Congress and its desire for joint officer development. Officers promoted without joint duty indicate that the services value service specific requirements over joint requirements. This is a source of concern since Congress continues to value joint officer development while the services seem to value service requirements ahead of joint requirements.

It is difficult to determine the value the services place on joint officer development and the joint duty requirement. The services may not value joint duty over service requirements because some assignments on the JDAL have little to do with the integrated employment of U.S. combat forces and therefore do not provide relevant experience to future senior officers. This, in turn, leads to the belief that the joint duty

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<sup>272</sup> When the possible explanation came forth that there was a discrepancy between service records and JDAMIS records, it was indicated that the services might have failed to enter data into the JDAMIS. An examination of duty assignment biographies of all Navy officers promoted to O7 revealed that the information in JDAMIS credited more officers with joint duty than what could be found in the assignment biographies. Also noted in a previous footnote (220) that service personnel indicated JDAMIS retained more accurate information regarding joint duty histories.

assignment is just a ticket to be punched in order to be competitive for promotion to O7 rather than a key element of officer development.<sup>273</sup>

However, a current argument states that service expertise is what is valued in the joint world. In discussions with various service personnel officers, and in recent studies, it was noted that service expertise is valued in the joint world over joint expertise.<sup>274</sup> An officer's service expertise is greater the higher the rank he or she has achieved. For example, an Air Force fighter pilot who serves his joint duty assignment as an O6 after fulfilling his or her squadron and group commander requirements has a greater working knowledge of the combat forces of the Air Force. An Air Force O4 serving in a joint duty does not have the same depth of knowledge as the O6 due to a lack of experience. Therefore, the argument advocating the merits of greater service expertise in the joint world presupposes that the later an officer serves his or her joint duty the more effective they will be in a joint duty assignment.

Anecdotally, it was also noted in discussions with personnel officers from the different services that the most appropriate time for an officer to do his or her joint duty assignment was at O6 rather than O4 or O5. Officers are trying to establish their reputation for command as an O4 and O5. The O4 and O5 ranks both have a greater burden of service requirements than O6. These officers would likely try to fill their joint duty requirement at O6. Officers who have potential for O7 are likely to fulfill their service requirements earlier and faster than other officers. This would lead to the

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<sup>273</sup> Booz Allen Hamilton Report, Chapter 1, p. 31.

<sup>274</sup> Brown, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Time for an Update to Joint Officer Personnel Management," p. 29; Interviews with various personnel officers from the services.

assumption that they would stay within their service in order to promulgate their potential as commanders to service supervisors responsible for their promotion.

While the argument for fulfilling joint duty later in an officer's career may be valid it is impractical. Joint organizations have requirements that are routinely filled by officers at the O4 and O5 ranks. A second argument put forth by the services is that due to the integrated approach now commonplace in U.S. military operations, in many ways the services feel that their officers, particularly combat officers, are getting requisite joint experience at the lower ranks of the officer corps and to constrict this requirement to the field grade ranks is unnecessary.<sup>275</sup> Another point stressed in discussions with personnel officers was officers not meeting the joint duty requirement prior to promotion to O7 will have to serve in a joint duty assignment for their first assignment as an O7. Therefore, the overall impression in discussions with personnel officers was that even if some of these officers are not meeting this requirement in the grades required by law, they are getting joint experience because of the integrated nature of U.S. military operations commonplace today or the mandatory joint requirement at O7.

Ultimately, though, officers not complying with the joint duty requirement create a problem for the services, which is manifested in the key policy implication of this research. Failure to comply with this policy invites further congressional scrutiny. Congress' commitment to joint officer development was reinforced recently when Congress mandated that by September 2007, all officers promoted to O7 must be JSOs.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> Booz-Allen Hamilton Report, Executive Summary, p. 6.

<sup>276</sup> Implemented under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002. Applies only to line officers. Certain officers such as medical, judge advocate general, and those with specific technical or

Officers will still have to meet the joint duty promotion requirement in the field grade ranks in addition to meeting the mandatory joint education requirements necessary to become a JSO in order to be promoted O7. Joint development for officers is and will continue to be an integral part of any future career path structure since Congress demands it and the success of future U.S. operations is heavily dependent on joint interoperability.

Additionally the U.S. military fights its wars under joint commands and in the integrated fashion.<sup>277</sup> This trend will continue. All major U.S. military operations, since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, are evidence of this fact. An understanding of joint operations has become a fundamental requirement for officer development. While the services have been able to promote officers without joint duty, failure to comply serves as an invitation for Congress to micromanage the services even further to ensure compliance with joint officer development policies.

## CONCLUSION

The implementation of the joint duty assignment as a promotion requirement has been a source of concern for both congressional policymakers and the services. The services have maintained that the joint duty assignment is a difficult requirement to meet for all officers promoted to O7. Congressional policymakers counter that argument saying that the services have refused ownership of joint officer development because it challenged their control over officer development. Congress feels that the services have

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scientific expertise will not be required to JSOs. See U.S. Code Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 36, Subchapter II, Sec. 619a.

<sup>277</sup> Don M. Snider, "Jointness, Defense Transformation, and the Need for a New Joint Warfare Profession," *Parameters* (Autumn 2003), p. 17.

not taken it upon themselves to implement the joint duty policy in accordance with congressional desires.

This analysis indicates that the services are reluctant partners regarding the joint duty promotion requirement mandate. The services are behaving in a self-interested manner that affects the successful implementation of this policy. While the services have made significant strides in complying with this policy, the services are still not sending all of their best officers, their future generals and admirals, to joint duty. Furthermore, the lack of compliance with the joint duty requirement does not hinder an officer's promotion to O7 in either being promoted or in terms of time to promotion. In fact, officers who have not fulfilled the joint duty requirement achieve the quickest times to promotion.

This conclusion argues that it is difficult to determine if the services' strategic, self-interested behavior is intentional or unintentional. The crux of the problem seems to be though that the services still value their service specific officer development for their future senior leaders over joint officer development. However, a paradox and inconsistency exist within the implementation of this policy. The services have shown great strides in complying with this policy to the point that it should be feasible for all officers to be in compliance. The services' proficiency in developing officers is established but sometimes ignores the legal authority of Congress.

Initially, the framers of the joint duty assignment policy were intent on overcoming service resistance and did not foresee that the limitations posed by an officer's career progression would not be resolved to ensure full compliance. Congress

did not push too hard in its enforcement expecting the services to make the necessary changes to accommodate the joint duty assignment. Congress also modified the joint duty requirement by reducing its length required for full credit so that officers could fit it into their career path.

Eventually changes will have to be made to the officer career path or the ability of officer's to earn joint duty credit in order to meet the initial objectives of the joint duty assignment policy. These changes will have to come from Congress. General Jones realized when he started the defense reform effort leading to Goldwater-Nichols that any substantive military reform comes from within Congress. However, this research indicates that it is possible for officers to meet both service and joint requirements because of the small difference in promotion times between those that are compliant versus those that are not. The services need to be in compliance. Because joint officer development has become an imperative for officer development for future warfighting success and more importantly, is still valued by Congress, the responsibility for compliance falls upon the services or they risk future congressional scrutiny of officer development.

## Appendix A: Supplements to Chapter Seven--Analysis and Findings

**Table A.1 Significance Test by Service**

		Time to O7 (O6)		Time to O7 (O4-O7)	
		F	Prob>F	F	Prob>F
Army	Career Field	0.31	.579	0.67	.415
	Joint Duty Assignment	4.00	.048	5.80	.018
	Career Field and Joint Duty Assignment	0.57	.450	0.82	.367
Air Force	Career Field	0.71	.402	0.73	.395
	Joint Duty Assignment	1.02	.316	2.13	.148
	Career Field and Joint Duty Assignment	0.33	.570	0.87	.354
Marines	Career Field	--	--	--	--
	Joint Duty Assignment	0.40	.533	1.34	.255
	Career Field and Joint Duty Assignment	--	--	--	--
Navy	Career Field	1.17	.283	0.57	.454
	Joint Duty Assignment	0.11	.742	0.25	.620
	Career Field and Joint Duty Assignment	0.75	.389	2.55	.116

## REGRESSION

**Table A.2 Army Regression Results**

	Time to O7 (O6)		Time to O7 (O4-O7)	
	Coefficient	P> t	Coefficient	P> t
Years of Service	4.907	0.000	7.855	0.000
Level of Education	-0.853	0.481	-0.636	0.588
Academy	1.388	0.712	-0.472	0.897
ROTC	0.098	0.978	1.057	0.762
OTS	1.043	0.820	-0.398	0.930
Career Field	-0.394	0.828	-0.431	0.808
Joint Duty Assignment	1.257	0.477	.775	0.657

**Table A.3 Air Force Regression Results**

	Time to O7 (O6)		Time to O7 (O4-O7)	
	Coefficient	P> t	Coefficient	P> t
Years of Service	0.360	0.667	3.412	0.000
Level of Education	3.386	0.048	1.981	0.138
Academy	-3.032	0.207	4.727	0.131
ROTC	--	--	5.150	0.105
OTS	-0.024	0.996	--	--
Career Field	-2.490	0.303	-0.803	0.612
Joint Duty Assignment	2.839	0.294	2.653	0.142

**Table A.4 Marine Regression Results**

	Time to O7 (O6)		Time to O7 (O4-O7)	
	Coefficient	P> t	Coefficient	P> t
Years of Service	3.639	0.006	2.722	0.007
Level of Education	1.186	0.390	2.119	0.060
Academy	1.700	0.810	5.825	0.309
ROTC	6.796	0.413	12.993	0.061
OTS	6.252	0.220	10.297	0.023
Career Field	--	--	--	--
Joint Duty Assignment	-4.373	0.268	-6.033	0.048

**Table A.5 Navy Regression Results**

	Time to O7 (O6)		Time to O7 (O4-O7)	
	Coefficient	P> t	Coefficient	P> t
<b>Years of Service</b>	6.362	0.000	9.489	0.000
<b>Level of Education</b>	-0.531	0.502	-0.572	0.568
<b>Academy</b>	3.446	0.171	1.797	0.573
<b>ROTC</b>	2.325	0.395	2.931	0.404
<b>OTS</b>	-0.847	0.766	-1.022	0.792
<b>Career Field</b>	2.153	0.274	0.872	0.747
<b>Joint Duty Assignment</b>	0.938	0.702	-0.766	0.829

## Appendix B: Variable List

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Type of Variable	Description
<b>Dependent Variables</b>							
jdawav	911	0.58	0.84	0	2	Categorical	Joint Duty. Three way categorical variable that measures overall compliance. Categories include no, waiver, and yes. Used in first methodology in tabular format to see what percentage of officers are meeting this requirement, what percentage have waivers, and what percentage are not meeting this requirement.
ttbg0607	900	74.84	20.33	35	182	Continuous	Promotion Time. Time to promotion from O6 to O7 measured in months. Used in Anova and regression analysis to determine if the services' are promoting their better officers without joint duty. Faster promotion times are indicative of better officers.
ttbg0407	892	187.36	21.98	125	316	Continuous	Promotion Time. Time to promotion from O4 to O7 measured in months. Used for sensitivity analysis to see if joint duty compliance has a wider impact on promotion times than just at the O6 grade.
<b>Independent Variables</b>							
cf	795	0.71	0.45	0	1	Dichotomous	Career Field. Dichotomous variable dividing sample population into two career categories: combat or non-combat. Joint duty is aimed at combat officers. Only includes line officers which eliminates medical, JAG, and chaplains from sample.
cfGNA	795	0.34	0.48	0	1	Dichotomous	Measures interaction effect of career field and Goldwater-Nichols
comm source	911	2.23	1.13	1	4	Categorical	Commissioning Source. Categorical variable that lists commissioning source of officers in sample population. Recoded into dummy variables that are listed below (acad, rotc, ots, other) to measure the effect of commissioning source as a promotion factor.
acad	911	0.33	0.47	0	1	Dichotomous	Promotion variable used to measure effect of service academy as commissioning source on promotion times
rotc	911	0.33	0.47	0	1	Dichotomous	Promotion variable used to measure effect of ROTC as commissioning source on promotion times
ots	911	0.11	0.32	0	1	Dichotomous	Promotion variable used to measure effect of OTS/OCS as commissioning source on promotion time.
other	911	0.22	0.42	0	1	Dichotomous	Promotion variable used to measure effect of other (direct ascension, medical corp, aviation cadet) as commissioning source on promotion time.
ed	910	17.84	0.97	15	21	Numerical	Education level of officers in years. Some college equaled 15 years, Bachelor's=16, Master's=18, PhD=21
GNA	911	0.46	0.50	0	1	Dichotomous	Goldwater Nichols Act.Places officers in sample in two categories: pre and post Goldwater-Nichols Act. Pre grouping has officers promoted to O7 from Sep 1981 to Sep 1985. Post grouping has officers promoted to O7 from Sep 97 to Sep 01.

jdacompliance	911	0.35	0.48	0	1	Dichotomous	Joint Duty Assignment. Used in Anova and regression analysis to determine the effect of joint duty compliance on promotion times. Officers fall into one category. No--did not comply with joint duty requirement or Yes--complied with joint duty requirement either via waiver or having full joint duty credit.
waiver	911	0.48	1.34	0	6	Categorical	Waiver. Used in compliance portion of methodology to break down percentages of the different waiver categories.
yos07	900	26.97	2.19	18.08	39.83	Continuous	Time in Service. Time an officer took to make O7 in years
<b>Other Variables</b>							
pg	907	2.26	0.49	1	4	Categorical	Rank. In order to measure O4 to O7 promotion times, pay grade category needed to be used. Due to data limitations, the database was only able to go back 10 years from the start time of the dataset (Sep 81 for officers in pre GNA group and Sep 97 for officers in post GNA group). The promotion date for whatever rank the officer was 10 years prior is given. Officers were either O3s, O4s, O5s, or O6s. The majority were O4s so to remain consistent only O4s were used for the sensitivity analysis.
ser1	911	2.20	1.17	1	4	Categorical	Service. Used in tabular, anova and regression to determine results specific to each service
ttbg1	892	15.61	1.83	10.41	26.33	Continuous	Used in conclusion. It is the field grade time of officers in years. It is the ttbg0407 divided by 12.

## Appendix C: Stata Calculations and Codebook

### A. Calculations

Stata 7.0 software

**Table 7.6 ANOVA EQUATIONS**

anova ttbg0607 cf GNA cf\*GNA

Number of obs = 786      R-squared = 0.1007  
Root MSE = 17.0096      Adj R-squared = 0.0972

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	25330.3511	3	8443.45036	29.18	0.0000
cf	393.175863	1	393.175863	1.36	0.2441
GNA	18790.5497	1	18790.5497	64.95	0.0000
cf*GNA	147.095455	1	147.095455	0.51	0.4760
Residual	226252.80	782	289.325832		
Total	251583.151	785	320.488091		

anova ttbg0407 cf GNA cf\*GNA if pg==2

Number of obs = 582      R-squared = 0.0564  
Root MSE = 16.5878      Adj R-squared = 0.0515

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	9506.74262	3	3168.91421	11.52	0.0000
cf	53.5767841	1	53.5767841	0.19	0.6592
GNA	9023.76083	1	9023.76083	32.80	0.0000
cf*GNA	704.967201	1	704.967201	2.56	0.1100
Residual	159039.477	578	275.154805		
Total	168546.22	581	290.096764		

**Table 7.7 REGRESSION EQUATIONS**

reg ttbg0607 yos07 ed acad rotc ots cf GNA cfGNA, beta

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =
Model	45772.3462	8	5721.54328	785
Residual	205651.926	776	265.015369	F( 8, 776) = 21.59
Total	251424.273	784	320.694225	Prob > F = 0.0000
				R-squared = 0.1821
				Adj R-squared = 0.1736
				Root MSE = 16.279
ttbg0607	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t
				Beta

yos07		2.565496	.3050229	8.41	0.000	.2935269
ed		2.071919	.602862	3.44	0.001	.1162679
acad		2.642419	1.858166	1.42	0.155	.0705562
rotr		1.000084	1.826168	0.55	0.584	.0268723
ots		-.3320332	2.285148	-0.15	0.885	-.0061325
cf		-.2647183	1.848914	-0.14	0.886	-.0066616
GNA		-10.62922	2.218052	-4.79	0.000	-.2968761
cfGNA		-1.541447	2.584716	-0.60	0.551	-.0409502
_cons		-28.19187	15.03982	-1.87	0.061	.

reg ttbg0407 yos07 ed acad rotr ots cf GNA cfGNA if pg==2, beta

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 581		
Model	62783.2447	8	7847.90559	F( 8, 572)	=	42.49
Residual	105643.953	572	184.692226	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	168427.198	580	290.391721	R-squared	=	0.3728
				Adj R-squared	=	0.3640
				Root MSE	=	13.59

  

ttbg0407	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	5.016165	.3292454	15.24	0.000	.5396591
ed	-1.405574	.6329318	-2.22	0.027	-.0755105
acad	.1890303	1.987962	0.10	0.924	.0053338
rotr	-2.854269	1.92553	-1.48	0.139	-.0823861
ots	.2704829	2.437074	0.11	0.912	.0050742
cf	-1.838722	1.930061	-0.95	0.341	-.0482417
GNA	-13.85886	2.182901	-6.35	0.000	-.4048821
cfGNA	4.881666	2.551098	1.91	0.056	.140108
_cons	91.71789	15.31281	5.99	0.000	.

**Table 7.10 ANOVA EQUATIONS**

anova ttbg0607 cf jdacompliance cf\*jdacompliance if GNA==1

				Number of obs = 383	R-squared = 0.0201
				Root MSE = 14.6864	Adj R-squared = 0.0123

  

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	1674.10021	3	558.033404	2.59	0.0528
cf	451.980803	1	451.980803	2.10	0.1486
jdacompliance	1152.63361	1	1152.63361	5.34	0.0213
cf*jdacompliance	23.0773959	1	23.0773959	0.11	0.7438
Residual	81746.5369	379	215.690071		
Total	83420.6371	382	218.378631		

anova ttbg0407 cf jdacompliance cf\*jdacompliance if GNA==1 & pg==2

				Number of obs = 320	R-squared = 0.0360
				Root MSE = 16.4591	Adj R-squared = 0.0269

  

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	3197.67946	3	1065.89315	3.93	0.0089

cf		151.999918	1	151.999918	0.56	0.4544
jdacompli~e		1929.3883	1	1929.3883	7.12	0.0080
cf*jdacompli~e		104.645776	1	104.645776	0.39	0.5347
Residual		85604.9174	316	270.901637		
Total		88802.5969	319	278.378047		

**Table 7.11 REGRESSION EQUATIONS**

. reg ttbg0607 yos07 cf ed acad rotc ots jdacompliance if GNA==1, beta

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 383		
Model	5932.15681	7	847.450973	F( 7, 375) = 4.10		
Residual	77488.4803	375	206.635947	Prob > F = 0.0002		
Total	83420.6371	382	218.378631	R-squared = 0.0711		
				Adj R-squared = 0.0538		
				Root MSE = 14.375		

  

ttbg0607	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	2.113466	.5157424	4.10	0.000	.2180806
cf	-2.747825	1.665948	-1.65	0.100	-.0846928
ed	1.027296	.874345	1.17	0.241	.0602852
acad	6.471756	3.205003	2.02	0.044	.2132557
rotc	5.154753	3.183718	1.62	0.106	.1698582
ots	3.35304	3.484409	0.96	0.337	.085285
jdacompli~e	3.560136	1.831685	1.94	0.053	.0989511
_cons	-13.74804	21.89673	-0.63	0.530	.

. reg ttbg0407 yos07 cf ed acad rotc ots jdacompliance if GNA==1 & pg==2, beta

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 320		
Model	39377.3664	7	5625.33806	F( 7, 312) = 35.51		
Residual	49425.2304	312	158.4142	Prob > F = 0.0000		
Total	88802.5969	319	278.378047	R-squared = 0.4434		
				Adj R-squared = 0.4309		
				Root MSE = 12.586		

  

ttbg0407	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	6.714624	.5095362	13.18	0.000	.5858301
cf	3.022776	1.609074	1.88	0.061	.0818571
ed	-2.716433	.8784988	-3.09	0.002	-.1327841
acad	-6.852646	3.08669	-2.22	0.027	-.2001042
rotc	-9.428565	3.053009	-3.09	0.002	-.2769098
ots	-4.435708	3.410448	-1.30	0.194	-.0966812
jdacompli~e	3.477539	1.742553	2.00	0.047	.085851
_cons	58.65179	21.56032	2.72	0.007	.

**EQUATIONS BROKEN DOWN BY SERVICE**

**ANOVA**

by ser:anova ttbg0607 cf jdacompliance cf\*jdacompliance if GNA==1

-&gt; ser = Army

		Number of obs = 132		R-squared = 0.0348	
		Root MSE = 11.4605		Adj R-squared = 0.0122	
Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	606.7468	3	202.248933	1.54	0.2074
cf	40.6233277	1	40.6233277	0.31	0.5791
jdacompliance	524.886033	1	524.886033	4.00	0.0477
cf*jdacompliance	75.491538	1	75.491538	0.57	0.4498
Residual	16811.882	128	131.342828		
Total	17418.6288	131	132.966632		

-&gt; ser = Air Force

		Number of obs = 123		R-squared = 0.0225	
		Root MSE = 12.7157		Adj R-squared = -0.0021	
Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	442.871062	3	147.623687	0.91	0.4370
cf	114.445333	1	114.445333	0.71	0.4019
jdacompliance	164.272648	1	164.272648	1.02	0.3155
cf*jdacompliance	52.6049561	1	52.6049561	0.33	0.5695
Residual	19241.1452	119	161.690296		
Total	19684.0163	122	161.344396		

-&gt; ser = Marines

		Number of obs = 38		R-squared = 0.0109	
		Root MSE = 10.2085		Adj R-squared = -0.0166	
Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	41.2186515	1	41.2186515	0.40	0.5334
cf	0.00	0			
jdacompliance	41.2186515	1	41.2186515	0.40	0.5334
cf*jdacompliance	0.00	0			
Residual	3751.64977	36	104.212494		
Total	3792.86842	37	102.509957		

-&gt; ser = Navy

Number of obs = 90      R-squared = 0.0667  
 Root MSE = 9.82697      Adj R-squared = 0.0341

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	593.354514	3	197.784838	2.05	0.1131
cf	112.512879	1	112.512879	1.17	0.2834
jdacompli~e	10.5268006	1	10.5268006	0.11	0.7421
cf*jdacompli~e	72.5527866	1	72.5527866	0.75	0.3885
Residual	8304.96771	86	96.569392		
Total	8898.32222	89	99.9811486		

by ser:anova ttbg0407 cf jdacompliance cf\*jdacompliance if GNA==1 & pg==2

-> ser = Army

Number of obs = 128      R-squared = 0.0538  
 Root MSE = 14.6929      Adj R-squared = 0.0309

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	1522.54625	3	507.515415	2.35	0.0756
cf	144.648594	1	144.648594	0.67	0.4146
jdacompli~e	1253.08291	1	1253.08291	5.80	0.0175
cf*jdacompli~e	176.900747	1	176.900747	0.82	0.3671
Residual	26769.2584	124	215.881116		
Total	28291.8047	127	222.770116		

-> ser = Air Force

Number of obs = 96      R-squared = 0.0531  
 Root MSE = 8.33544      Adj R-squared = 0.0222

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	358.289014	3	119.429671	1.72	0.1686
cf	50.7878535	1	50.7878535	0.73	0.3948
jdacompli~e	147.693052	1	147.693052	2.13	0.1483
cf*jdacompli~e	60.2871982	1	60.2871982	0.87	0.3540
Residual	6392.11724	92	69.4795352		
Total	6750.40625	95	71.0569079		

-> ser = Marines

Number of obs = 36      R-squared = 0.0379  
 Root MSE = 8.25982      Adj R-squared = 0.0096

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	91.3367542	1	91.3367542	1.34	0.2553
cf	0.00	0			
jdacompli~e	91.3367542	1	91.3367542	1.34	0.2553
cf*jdacompli~e	0.00	0			
Residual	2319.63547	34	68.2245726		
Total	2410.97222	35	68.8849206		

-> ser = Navy

Number of obs = 60      R-squared = 0.0507  
 Root MSE = 11.9859      Adj R-squared = -0.0002

Source	Partial SS	df	MS	F	Prob > F
Model	429.483333	3	143.161111	1.00	0.4013
cf	81.6855695	1	81.6855695	0.57	0.4540
jdacompli~e	35.713522	1	35.713522	0.25	0.6200
cf*jdacompli~e	367.018903	1	367.018903	2.55	0.1156
Residual	8045.11667	56	143.662798		
Total	8474.60	59	143.637288		

# REGRESSION

. by ser:reg ttbg0607 yos07 cf ed acad rotc ots jdacompliance if GNA==1, beta

-> ser = Army

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	132
Model	8098.88625	7	1156.98375	F( 7, 124) =	15.39
Residual	9319.74254	124	75.1592141	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	17418.6288	131	132.966632	R-squared =	0.4650
				Adj R-squared =	0.4348
				Root MSE =	8.6694

ttbg0607	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	4.906938	.5164493	9.50	0.000	.673064
cf	-.3943722	1.806674	-0.22	0.828	-.0159904
ed	-.8527573	1.207562	-0.71	0.481	-.0478356
acad	1.387803	3.747317	0.37	0.712	.056951
rotc	.0983842	3.582647	0.03	0.978	.00427
ots	1.042535	4.559153	0.23	0.820	.0228755
jdacompli~e	1.256617	1.762572	0.71	0.477	.0482869
_cons	-62.8334	25.73114	-2.44	0.016	.

-> ser = Air Force

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	123
--------	----	----	----	-----------------	-----

Model	1392.59016	6	232.09836	F( 6, 116) = 1.47
Residual	18291.4261	116	157.684708	Prob > F = 0.1938
				R-squared = 0.0707
				Adj R-squared = 0.0227
Total	19684.0163	122	161.344396	Root MSE = 12.557

ttbg0607	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	.3599474	.8332277	0.43	0.667	.0440401
cf	-2.489842	2.406811	-1.03	0.303	-.0963554
ed	3.38566	1.6961	2.00	0.048	.1804534
acad	-3.031973	2.390988	-1.27	0.207	-.1193568
rotc	(dropped)				
ots	.0242368	4.424206	0.01	0.996	.0005685
jdacomplia~e	2.83887	2.693413	1.05	0.294	.0952575
_cons	8.195406	37.41324	0.22	0.827	.

-> ser = Marines

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 38
Model	1234.80207	6	205.800345	F( 6, 31) = 2.49
Residual	2558.06635	31	82.5182693	Prob > F = 0.0437
				R-squared = 0.3256
				Adj R-squared = 0.1950
Total	3792.86842	37	102.509957	Root MSE = 9.084

ttbg0607	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	3.639103	1.220917	2.98	0.006	.4610169
cf	(dropped)				
ed	1.18593	1.359062	0.87	0.390	.1341781
acad	1.700218	6.9948	0.24	0.810	.0458906
rotc	6.796259	8.1829	0.83	0.413	.151901
ots	6.25173	4.997709	1.25	0.220	.2660387
jdacomplia~e	-4.372718	3.872653	-1.13	0.268	-.1696702
_cons	-63.76072	41.36841	-1.54	0.133	.

-> ser = Navy

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs = 90
Model	4734.30957	7	676.329938	F( 7, 82) = 13.32
Residual	4164.01266	82	50.7806421	Prob > F = 0.0000
				R-squared = 0.5320
				Adj R-squared = 0.4921
Total	8898.32222	89	99.9811486	Root MSE = 7.1261

ttbg0607	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	6.362017	.7195586	8.84	0.000	.7459559
cf	2.15306	1.9564	1.10	0.274	.091583
ed	-.530571	.7870902	-0.67	0.502	-.0532968
acad	3.445975	2.497872	1.38	0.171	.1732375
rotc	2.325162	2.717718	0.86	0.395	.0954298

```

      ots | -.8468462  2.840487  -0.30  0.766          -.0317399
jdacomplia~e | .9384937  2.448331   0.38  0.702          .0309148
      _cons | -97.50535  24.96104  -3.91  0.000          .
-----

```

```

. by ser: reg ttbg0407 yos07 cf ed acad rotc ots jdacompliance if GNA==1 &
pg==2, beta

```

```

-> ser = Army

```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	128
Model	19824.2463	7	2832.03519	F( 7, 120) =	40.13
Residual	8467.55838	120	70.5629865	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	28291.8047	127	222.770116	R-squared =	0.7007
				Adj R-squared =	0.6832
				Root MSE =	8.4002

ttbg0407	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	7.855097	.520156	15.10	0.000	.8167639
cf	-.4307208	1.764798	-0.24	0.808	-.013603
ed	-.6363142	1.17098	-0.54	0.588	-.0280059
acad	-.4715836	3.641525	-0.13	0.897	-.0149819
rotc	1.057264	3.480431	0.30	0.762	.0354486
ots	-.398384	4.50832	-0.09	0.930	-.0064864
jdacomplia~e	.7750744	1.739577	0.45	0.657	.0230256
_cons	-19.14373	25.18167	-0.76	0.449	.

```

-> ser = Air Force

```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	96
Model	2044.12977	6	340.688296	F( 6, 89) =	6.44
Residual	4706.27648	89	52.879511	Prob > F =	0.0000
Total	6750.40625	95	71.0569079	R-squared =	0.3028
				Adj R-squared =	0.2558
				Root MSE =	7.2718

ttbg0407	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07	3.411891	.6122702	5.57	0.000	.5293198
cf	-.8031003	1.578055	-0.51	0.612	-.0463656
ed	1.980515	1.322223	1.50	0.138	.1331034
acad	4.726819	3.100245	1.52	0.131	.2808642
rotc	5.149932	3.145175	1.64	0.105	.306473
ots	(dropped)				
jdacomplia~e	2.652506	1.791934	1.48	0.142	.1329484
_cons	47.46726	29.96078	1.58	0.117	.

```

-> ser = Marines

```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	36
				F( 6, 29) =	3.85

Model		1069.64371	6	178.273952	Prob > F	=	0.0060
Residual		1341.32851	29	46.2527073	R-squared	=	0.4437
<hr/>							
Total		2410.97222	35	68.8849206	Adj R-squared	=	0.3286
					Root MSE	=	6.8009

ttbg0407		Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07		2.722203	.9411883	2.89	0.007	.4151926
cf		(dropped)				
ed		2.119493	1.081634	1.96	0.060	.2887569
acad		5.825043	5.627899	1.04	0.309	.1967295
rotc		12.99251	6.660305	1.95	0.061	.3636639
ots		10.29665	4.275573	2.41	0.023	.5230856
jdacomplia~e		-6.033726	2.929068	-2.06	0.048	-.2918007
_cons		85.17613	31.94836	2.67	0.012	.

-> ser = Navy

Source		SS	df	MS	Number of obs =	60
Model		5593.67799	7	799.096856	F( 7, 52) =	14.42
Residual		2880.92201	52	55.4023464	Prob > F	= 0.0000
<hr/>					R-squared	= 0.6601
Total		8474.60	59	143.637288	Adj R-squared	= 0.6143
					Root MSE	= 7.4433

ttbg0407		Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	Beta
yos07		9.487821	1.031144	9.20	0.000	.835381
cf		.8717419	2.682543	0.32	0.747	.0302185
ed		-.5715726	.9943068	-0.57	0.568	-.0484861
acad		1.796734	3.169338	0.57	0.573	.0752121
rotc		2.931019	3.485002	0.84	0.404	.0954284
ots		-1.022644	3.849874	-0.27	0.792	-.0276233
jdacomplia~e		-.7664262	3.533316	-0.22	0.829	-.0193467
_cons		-39.3976	33.05071	-1.19	0.239	.

### CHI-SQUARED TEST

tab jdawav cf, row col chi2, if GNA==1

		CareerField		
jdawav1		Non-Comba	Combat	Total
<hr/>				
No		37	48	85
		43.53	56.47	100.00
		31.90	17.52	21.79
<hr/>				
Wav		39	57	96
		40.63	59.38	100.00
		33.62	20.80	24.62
<hr/>				
Yes		40	169	209
		19.14	80.86	100.00
		34.48	61.68	53.59
<hr/>				

Total		116	274		390
		29.74	70.26		100.00
		100.00	100.00		100.00

Pearson chi2(2) = 24.4180 Pr = 0.000

## **B. Codebook**

### **Statistical Software: Stata 7.0**

#### **Variables**

##### **1. CF: Career Field**

tab dpoc

dpoc	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
000	61	6.70	6.70
102	203	22.28	28.98
201	76	8.34	37.32
202	9	0.99	38.31
203	19	2.09	40.40
204	8	0.88	41.27
205	193	21.19	62.46
207	60	6.59	69.05
301	17	1.87	70.91
302	3	0.33	71.24
401	9	0.99	72.23
403	29	3.18	75.41
404	10	1.10	76.51
405	3	0.33	76.84
406	3	0.33	77.17
411	4	0.44	77.61
414	21	2.31	79.91
501	1	0.11	80.02
504	3	0.33	80.35
506	11	1.21	81.56
507	5	0.55	82.11
511	2	0.22	82.33
512	11	1.21	83.53
601	27	2.96	86.50
603	4	0.44	86.94
605	5	0.55	87.49
607	1	0.11	87.60
609	2	0.22	87.82
701	7	0.77	88.58
702	1	0.11	88.69
703	17	1.87	90.56
704	9	0.99	91.55
705	2	0.22	91.77
707	5	0.55	92.32
708	8	0.88	93.19
801	19	2.09	95.28
802	14	1.54	96.82
803	19	2.09	98.90
804	10	1.10	100.00

```
-----+-----
      Total |          911      100.00
```

```
. encode dpoc, gen (dpocnum)
tab dpocnum, nolab
```

dpocnum	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	61	6.70	6.70
2	203	22.28	28.98
3	76	8.34	37.32
4	9	0.99	38.31
5	19	2.09	40.40
6	8	0.88	41.27
7	193	21.19	62.46
8	60	6.59	69.05
9	17	1.87	70.91
10	3	0.33	71.24
11	9	0.99	72.23
12	29	3.18	75.41
13	10	1.10	76.51
14	3	0.33	76.84
15	3	0.33	77.17
16	4	0.44	77.61
17	21	2.31	79.91
18	1	0.11	80.02
19	3	0.33	80.35
20	11	1.21	81.56
21	5	0.55	82.11
22	2	0.22	82.33
23	11	1.21	83.53
24	27	2.96	86.50
25	4	0.44	86.94
26	5	0.55	87.49
27	1	0.11	87.60
28	2	0.22	87.82
29	7	0.77	88.58
30	1	0.11	88.69
31	17	1.87	90.56
32	9	0.99	91.55
33	2	0.22	91.77
34	5	0.55	92.32
35	8	0.88	93.19
36	19	2.09	95.28
37	14	1.54	96.82
38	19	2.09	98.90
39	10	1.10	100.00

```
-----+-----
      Total |          911      100.00
```

```
. encode dpoc, gen (dpocnum)
```

```
. recode dpocnum 1=. 2/8=1 9/19=0 22/23=0 24/28=. 29/39=0 20/21=.
(911 changes made)
```

```
. gen cfld1=dpocnum
(116 missing values generated)
```

```
. lab var cfld1 CareerField
```

```
. lab def cfld1 0"Non-Combat" 1"Combat"
```

```
. lab val cfld1 cfld1
```

```
. tab cfld1
```

CareerField	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Non-Combat	227	28.55	28.55
Combat	568	71.45	100.00
Total	795	100.00	

```
. rename cfld1 cf
```

## 2. Commsource: commissioning source

```
. tab comm
```

comm	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
00	100	10.98	10.98
01	149	16.36	27.33
02	47	5.16	32.49
03	51	5.60	38.09
04	55	6.04	44.13
08	94	10.32	54.45
09	210	23.05	77.50
10	102	11.20	88.69
13	27	2.96	91.66
14	16	1.76	93.41
15	45	4.94	98.35
21	2	0.22	98.57
22	1	0.11	98.68
30	12	1.32	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. encode comm, gen (commnum)
```

```
. recode commnum 1=4 9/14=4 2/5=1 6/7=2 8=3  
(911 changes made)
```

```
. tab commnum
```

commnum	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
00	302	33.15	33.15
01	304	33.37	66.52
02	102	11.20	77.72
03	203	22.28	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. tab commnum, nolab
```

commnum	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
---------	-------	---------	------

1	302	33.15	33.15
2	304	33.37	66.52
3	102	11.20	77.72
4	203	22.28	100.00
<hr/>			
Total	911	100.00	

```
. gen commsource=commnum
. lab var commsource CommSource
. lab def commsource 1"Academy" 2"ROTC" 3"OTS" 4"Other"
. lab val commsource commsource
. tab commsource
```

CommSource	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
<hr/>			
Academy	302	33.15	33.15
ROTC	304	33.37	66.52
OTS	102	11.20	77.72
Other	203	22.28	100.00
<hr/>			
Total	911	100.00	

```
. gen acad=1 if commsource==1
(609 missing values generated)

. replace acad=0 if commsource~=1
(609 real changes made)

. gen rotc=1 if commsource==2
(607 missing values generated)

. replace rotc=0 if commsource~=2
(607 real changes made)

. gen ots=1 if commsource==3
(809 missing values generated)

. replace ots=0 if commsource~=3
(809 real changes made)

. gen other=1 if commsource==4
(708 missing values generated)

. replace other=0 if commsource~=4
(708 real changes made)
```

### 3. Ed: Education

```
tab educ
```

educ	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
<hr/>			
00	1	0.11	0.11
09	1	0.11	0.22

10	131	14.38	14.60
11	739	81.12	95.72
12	39	4.28	100.00
<hr/>			
Total	911	100.00	

```
. encode educ, gen(educnum)
```

```
. recode educnum 1=. 2=15 3=16 4=18 5=21
(911 changes made)
```

```
. gen Ed=educnum
(1 missing value generated)
```

```
. lab var Ed Edlevel
```

```
. lab def Ed 2"Some College" 3"Bachelor's" 4"Master's" 5"PhD"
```

```
. lab val Ed Ed
```

```
. tab Ed
```

Edlevel	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
<hr/>			
15	1	0.11	0.11
16	131	14.40	14.51
18	739	81.21	95.71
21	39	4.29	100.00
<hr/>			
Total	910	100.00	

```
gen Ed1=Ed
```

```
(1 missing value generated)
```

```
. lab var Ed1 Ed1
```

```
. lab def Ed1 15"College" 16"Bach" 18"Master" 21"PhD"
```

```
. lab val Ed1 Ed1
```

```
. lab var Ed1 Educlevel
```

```
. tab Ed1
```

Educlevel	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
<hr/>			
College	1	0.11	0.11
Bach	131	14.40	14.51
Master	739	81.21	95.71
PhD	39	4.29	100.00
<hr/>			
Total	910	100.00	

```
. drop Ed
```

```
rename Ed1 Ed
```

```
. tab Ed
```

Educlevel	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
<hr/>			
College	1	0.11	0.11
Bach	131	14.40	14.51
Master	739	81.21	95.71
PhD	39	4.29	100.00
<hr/>			

Total |            910            100.00

#### 4. GNA=Pre or Post Goldwater-Nichols Act

encode start, gen(startnum)

. gen GNA=startnum

. recode GNA 1=0 2=1  
(911 changes made)

. tab GNA

GNA	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	492	54.01	54.01
1	419	45.99	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

. lab def GNA 1"Post" 0"Pre"

. lab var GNA GNA

. lab val GNA GNA

. tab GNA

GNA	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Pre	492	54.01	54.01
Post	419	45.99	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

#### 5. JDA: Joint Duty Assignment

##### a. Compliance Considering Waivers (First part of Methodology)

gen jdawaiver=wavdummy\*10

. gen jdawav=jdawaiver+jda

. tab jdawav

jdawav	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	592	64.98	64.98
1	186	20.42	85.40
10	110	12.07	97.48
11	23	2.52	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

. recode jdawav 0=1 10=2 1=3 11=3  
(911 changes made)

. tab jdawav

jdawav	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	592	64.98	64.98
2	110	12.07	77.06
3	209	22.94	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. lab var jdawav jdawav
```

```
. lab def jdawav 1"No" 2"Waiver" 3"Yes"
```

```
. lab val jdawav jdawav
```

```
. tab jdawav
```

jdawav	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	592	64.98	64.98
Waiver	110	12.07	77.06
Yes	209	22.94	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

### **b. Joint Duty (Compliance Methodology) and Joint Duty Assignment (Effect on promotion)**

```
rename jdawav1 jdawav
```

```
. tab jdawav
```

jdawav1	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	592	64.98	64.98
Wav	110	12.07	77.06
Yes	209	22.94	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. gen jdacompliance=jdawav
```

```
. tab jdacompliance
```

jdacomplian	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
ce			
0	592	64.98	64.98
1	110	12.07	77.06
2	209	22.94	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. recode jdacompliance 0=0 1/2=1  
(209 changes made)
```

```
. tab jdacompliance
```

jdacomplian	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
ce			

0	592	64.98	64.98
1	319	35.02	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. lab var jdacompliance jdacompliance
. lab def jdacompliance 0"NonCompl" 1"Comp"
. lab val jdacompliance jdacompliance
tab jdacompliance
```

jdacomplian			
ce	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
NonCompl	592	64.98	64.98
Comp	319	35.02	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

## 6. PG: Pay Grade

```
tab pg10yr
```

pg10yr	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
03	14	1.54	1.54
04	655	72.22	73.76
05	230	25.36	99.12
06	8	0.88	100.00
Total	907	100.00	

```
. encode pg10yr, gen (pg10yrnum)
. tab pg10yrnum
```

pg10yrnum	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
03	14	1.54	1.54
04	655	72.22	73.76
05	230	25.36	99.12
06	8	0.88	100.00
Total	907	100.00	

```
. tab pg10yrnum, nolab
```

pg10yrnum	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	14	1.54	1.54
2	655	72.22	73.76
3	230	25.36	99.12
4	8	0.88	100.00
Total	907	100.00	

```
. rename pg10yrnum pg
```

## 7. TTBG: Time to Brigadier General

### a. TTBG0607

```
gen int dbgyr=dorbg/100
```

```
. tab dbgyr
```

dbgyr	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	11	1.21	1.21
81	8	0.88	2.09
82	83	9.11	11.20
83	146	16.03	27.22
84	128	14.05	41.27
85	125	13.72	54.99
97	7	0.77	55.76
98	81	8.89	64.65
99	97	10.65	75.30
100	152	16.68	91.99
101	73	8.01	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. recode dbgyr 0=.
(11 changes made)
```

```
. gen dbgmo=dorbg- dbgyr*100
(11 missing values generated)
```

```
. tab dbgmo
```

dbgmo	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	58	6.44	6.44
2	40	4.44	10.89
3	28	3.11	14.00
4	28	3.11	17.11
5	28	3.11	20.22
6	47	5.22	25.44
7	128	14.22	39.67
8	141	15.67	55.33
9	150	16.67	72.00
10	176	19.56	91.56
11	52	5.78	97.33
12	24	2.67	100.00
Total	900	100.00	

```
. gen int d6yr=doro6/100
```

```
. gen d6mo=doro6-d6yr*100
```

```
. tab d6mo
```

d6mo	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	77	8.45	8.45

2	74	8.12	16.58
3	29	3.18	19.76
4	26	2.85	22.61
5	34	3.73	26.34
6	57	6.26	32.60
7	131	14.38	46.98
8	87	9.55	56.53
9	166	18.22	74.75
10	78	8.56	83.32
11	70	7.68	91.00
12	82	9.00	100.00
-----			
Total	911	100.00	

. tab d6yr

d6yr	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-----			
69	1	0.11	0.11
71	3	0.33	0.44
72	4	0.44	0.88
73	13	1.43	2.31
74	31	3.40	5.71
75	76	8.34	14.05
76	35	3.84	17.89
77	107	11.75	29.64
78	99	10.87	40.50
79	88	9.66	50.16
80	34	3.73	53.90
81	1	0.11	54.01
84	1	0.11	54.12
85	2	0.22	54.34
86	2	0.22	54.56
87	1	0.11	54.67
88	2	0.22	54.88
89	3	0.33	55.21
90	3	0.33	55.54
91	15	1.65	57.19
92	54	5.93	63.12
93	76	8.34	71.46
94	109	11.96	83.42
95	104	11.42	94.84
96	40	4.39	99.23
97	7	0.77	100.00
-----			
Total	911	100.00	

. gen d6mos=12\*(d6yr-70)+d6mo

. gen dbgm0s=12\*(dbgyr-70)+dbgm0  
(11 missing values generated)

. gen ttbg=dbgm0s-d6mos  
(11 missing values generated)

. l doro6 dorbg d6mos dbgm0s ttbg

	doro6	dorbg	d6mos	dbgm0s	ttbg
1.	7101	8201	13	145	132
2.	7106	8310	18	166	148

3.	7106	8310	18	166	148
4.	7208	8212	32	156	124
5.	7210	8209	34	153	119
6.	7305	8209	41	153	112
7.	7312	8310	48	166	118
8.	7406	8210	54	154	100
9.	7407	8310	55	166	111
10.	7411	8210	59	154	95
11.	7411	8210	59	154	95
12.	7412	8208	60	152	92
13.	7412	8502	60	182	122
14.	7502	8110	62	142	80
15.	7502	8210	62	154	92
16.	7505	8203	65	147	82
17.	7505	8310	65	166	101
18.	7506	8405	66	173	107
19.	7506	8209	66	153	87
20.	7506	8504	66	184	118
21.	7507	8210	67	154	87
22.	7508	8502	68	182	114
23.	7509	8206	69	150	81
24.	7509	8210	69	154	85
25.	7510	8211	70	155	85
26.	7511	8310	71	166	95
27.	7511	8502	71	182	111
28.	7512	8212	72	156	84
29.	7512	8311	72	167	95
30.	7512	8302	72	158	86
31.	7512	8504	72	184	112
32.	7512	8212	72	156	84
33.	7512	8311	72	167	95
34.	7601	8202	73	146	73
35.	7601	8302	73	158	85
36.	7603	8309	75	165	90

--Break--

r(1);

rename ttbg ttbg0607

## b. TTBG0407

. gen fgmo=dor10yr-fgyr\*100

. tab fgmo

fgmo	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-----+-----			
0	4	0.44	0.44
1	47	5.18	5.62
2	66	7.28	12.90
3	57	6.28	19.18
4	33	3.64	22.82
5	91	10.03	32.86
6	57	6.28	39.14
7	85	9.37	48.51
8	99	10.92	59.43
9	106	11.69	71.11
10	122	13.45	84.56
11	67	7.39	91.95

12	73	8.05	100.00
<hr/>			
Total	907	100.00	

. tab fgyr

fgyr	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
<hr/>			
57	1	0.11	0.11
65	5	0.55	0.66
66	86	9.52	10.19
67	123	13.62	23.81
68	104	11.52	35.33
69	102	11.30	46.62
70	52	5.76	52.38
71	15	1.66	54.04
80	4	0.44	54.49
81	25	2.77	57.25
82	49	5.43	62.68
83	79	8.75	71.43
84	91	10.08	81.51
85	70	7.75	89.26
86	68	7.53	96.79
87	29	3.21	100.00
<hr/>			
Total	903	100.00	

. recode fgyr 0=.  
(0 changes made)

. gen fgmos=12\*(fgyr-57) + fgmo

. gen dbgmos=12\*(dbgyr-57) + dbgmo

. gen ttbg=dbgmos-fgmos

. l dor10yr dorbg fgmos dbgmos ttbg

	dor10yr	dorbg	fgmos	dbgmos	ttbg
1.	6609	8407	117	331	214
2.	6609	8309	117	321	204
3.	6609	8308	117	320	203
4.	6610	8505	118	341	223
5.	6610	8309	118	321	203
6.	6610	8507	118	343	225
7.	6610	8408	118	332	214
8.	6610	8309	118	321	203
9.	6611	8408	119	332	213
10.	6611	8507	119	343	224
11.	6611	8309	119	321	202
12.	6612	8507	120	343	223
13.	6612	8507	120	343	223
14.	6612	8408	120	332	212
15.	6612	8407	120	331	211
16.	6612	8308	120	320	200
17.	6612	8403	120	327	207
18.	6612	8409	120	333	213
19.	6612	8507	120	343	223
20.	6612	8407	120	331	211
21.	6612	8208	120	308	188

```

22.      6612      8309      120      321      201
23.      6612      8508      120      344      224
24.      6612      8406      120      330      210
25.      6612      8311      120      323      203
26.      6612      8308      120      320      200
27.      6701      8505      121      341      220
28.      6701      8407      121      331      210
29.      6701      8407      121      331      210
30.      6701      8407      121      331      210

```

```
--Break--
```

```
rename ttbg ttbg0407
```

### c. TTBG1 (Time to O7 in years)

```
gen ttbg1=ttbg0407/12
```

### 8. Wav:WAIVER

```
. tab wav, nolab
```

wav	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
J	20	15.27	15.27
K	43	32.82	48.09
L	7	5.34	53.44
M	9	6.87	60.31
N	42	32.06	92.37
P	10	7.63	100.00
Total	131	100.00	

```
. tab wavnum, nolab
```

wavnum	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1	20	15.27	15.27
2	43	32.82	48.09
3	7	5.34	53.44
4	9	6.87	60.31
5	42	32.06	92.37
6	10	7.63	100.00
Total	131	100.00	

```
. recode wav .=0
```

```
lab def wav 0"No"
```

```
. tab wav
```

Wav	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	780	85.62	85.62
GOS	20	2.20	87.82
S/T	43	4.72	92.54
Med/Jag	7	0.77	93.30
PrevJDA	9	0.99	94.29
InJDA	42	4.61	98.90

Pre-87		10	1.10	100.00
-----				
Total		911	100.00	

```
. lab val wav wav
```

```
. tab wav
```

Wav		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-----				
No		780	85.62	85.62
1		20	2.20	87.82
2		43	4.72	92.54
3		7	0.77	93.30
4		9	0.99	94.29
5		42	4.61	98.90
6		10	1.10	100.00
-----				
Total		911	100.00	

```
. gen wav1=wav
```

```
. lab def wav1 0"No" 1"GOS" 2"S/T" 3"M/J/C" 4"PJDA" 5"InGDA" 6"Pre-87"
```

```
. lab val wav1 wav1
```

```
. tab wav1
```

Wav		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-----				
No		780	85.62	85.62
GOS		20	2.20	87.82
S/T		43	4.72	92.54
M/J/C		7	0.77	93.30
PJDA		9	0.99	94.29
InGDA		42	4.61	98.90
Pre-87		10	1.10	100.00
-----				
Total		911	100.00	

```
. drop wav
```

```
. rename wav1 wav
```

```
. tab wav
```

Wav		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-----				
No		780	85.62	85.62
GOS		20	2.20	87.82
S/T		43	4.72	92.54
M/J/C		7	0.77	93.30
PJDA		9	0.99	94.29
InGDA		42	4.61	98.90
Pre-87		10	1.10	100.00
-----				
Total		911	100.00	

```
. tab wav, nolab
```

Wav	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	780	85.62	85.62
1	20	2.20	87.82
2	43	4.72	92.54
3	7	0.77	93.30
4	9	0.99	94.29
5	42	4.61	98.90
6	10	1.10	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
gen wav1=wav
```

```
. recode wav1 1/6=1  
(111 changes made)
```

```
. tab wav1
```

wav1	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
0	780	85.62	85.62
1	131	14.38	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. gen wav2=wav1
```

```
. lab def wav2 0"No" 1"Yes"
```

```
. lab val wav2 wav2
```

```
. tab wav2
```

wav2	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	780	85.62	85.62
Yes	131	14.38	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. drop wav1
```

```
. rename wav2 wavdummy
```

```
. tab wavdummy
```

wavdummy	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
No	780	85.62	85.62
Yes	131	14.38	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

## 9. YOS07: Years of Service (at time of O7 promotion)

```
gen start2=real(start)
```

```
. tab start2
```

start2	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
8109	492	54.01	54.01
9709	419	45.99	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. tab start2, nolab
```

start2	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
8109	492	54.01	54.01
9709	419	45.99	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. tab start, nolab
```

start	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
8109	492	54.01	54.01
9709	419	45.99	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. gen int start3=start2/100
```

```
. tab start3
```

start3	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
81	492	54.01	54.01
97	419	45.99	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. gen startmos=start2-start3*100
```

```
. tab startmos
```

startmos	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
9	911	100.00	100.00
Total	911	100.00	

```
. gen int dbgyr1=dorbg/100
```

```
. tab dbgyr
```

dbgyr	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
81	8	0.89	0.89
82	83	9.22	10.11
83	146	16.22	26.33
84	128	14.22	40.56
85	125	13.89	54.44

97		7	0.78	55.22
98		81	9.00	64.22
99		97	10.78	75.00
100		152	16.89	91.89
101		73	8.11	100.00
-----				
Total		900	100.00	

```
. gen dbgmol=dorbg-dbgry*100
(11 missing values generated)
```

```
. tab dbgmol
```

dbgmol		Freq.	Percent	Cum.
-----				
1		58	6.44	6.44
2		40	4.44	10.89
3		28	3.11	14.00
4		28	3.11	17.11
5		28	3.11	20.22
6		47	5.22	25.44
7		128	14.22	39.67
8		141	15.67	55.33
9		150	16.67	72.00
10		176	19.56	91.56
11		52	5.78	97.33
12		24	2.67	100.00
-----				
Total		900	100.00	

```
. gen startmos1=12*(start3-81) + startmos
. gen dbgmol1=12*(dbgyr1-81) + dbgmol
(11 missing values generated)
. gen ttbgfromstart=dbgmol1-startmos1
(11 missing values generated)
. l startmos1 dbgmol1 ttbgfromstart
```

	startmos1	dbgmol1	ttbgfro~t
1.	201	234	33
2.	201	247	46
3.	201	214	13
4.	9	20	11
5.	201	233	32
6.	9	22	13
7.	201	236	35
8.	201	229	28
9.	9	46	37
10.	9	21	12

```
---Break---
```

```
. gen ttbgyos1=ttbgfromstart/12 + yos
(11 missing values generated)
```

```
rename ttbgyos1 yos07
```

## Appendix D—Contact Information for Background Information

<u>Service</u>	<u>Position/Contact Info</u>
Army	General Officer Management Office/703-697-7994 Chief, Joint Officer Management Branch/ 703-325-7884 Joint Officer Management Branch/703-325-5181 Joint Officer Management Branch/703-325-8129
Air Force	USAF NORAD/Northcom Chief of Protocol/ 719-554-7366 Joint Officer Mgmt, Joint Manpower Div, J1, JCS 703-695-2286 Air Force Senior Leader Management Office (703) 604-8141 Air Force Pentagon Personnel Office/703-604-5019
Marines	Marine Pentagon Personnel Office/703-784-9200 Joint Duty Assignment List/ 703-784-9284/5/6
Navy	Director, Surface Officer Distribution/901-874-3927 Flag Officer Management and Distribution/ 703-614-1129 Navy Joint Assignment Manager/901-874-4217 Navy Surface Officer Assignments/901-874-3923 Navy Intelligence Officer Assignments/901-874-3991

### Interviews

Dr. Arch Barrett, Naval Postgraduate School Faculty Member/Author *Reappraising Defense Organization*/Former HASC Staffer/Co-Author Goldwater-Nichols Act, 9 April 03 and 16 December 03.

James Locher, Former Undersecretary of Defense/Author of *Defense Organization: The Need for Change: Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate* (Locher Report)/Former SASC Staffer/Co-Author of Goldwater-Nichols Act, 25 March 03.

Karen Miller, Program Analyst, Joint Officer Mgmt Joint Manpower Div, J1, JCS, 703-695-2286, 15 July 03 initially with repeated queries afterwards.

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